Opinion
11-P-1439
06-05-2012
ALEXIS GARCIA v. MEDICAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INC.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
On September 3, 2009, the plaintiff, Alexis Garcia, initiated an employment discrimination charge against the defendant, Medical Information Technology, Inc. (Meditech), by filing a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). The MCAD dismissed her complaint on the ground that it was time barred, and Garcia commenced the present action. See G. L. c. 151B, § 9. Meditech moved to dismiss, again on the ground that the MCAD complaint was untimely filed. A judge of the Superior Court agreed and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed.
In her complaint, Garcia alleges that she was hired as a Spanish development specialist at Meditech in July, 2008. A few months later, on November 3, 2008, Meditech fired her. Although Meditech cited Garcia's poor performance, Garcia alleges that she was terminated because of her age, national origin, and color in violation of G. L. c. 151B. Garcia acknowledges in her complaint that the MCAD 'dismissed the charge on jurisdictional grounds because more than three hundred (300) days had elapsed between the date of termination and the filing of the Charge.' She does not challenge that finding on appeal. Rather, she argues that her claim should be equitably tolled until she became aware that she has been replaced by an employee under forty years of age. An employee may not commence an action under G. L. c. 151B, § 9, in the Superior Court unless she has first filed a timely charge of discrimination at the MCAD within 300 days of the alleged act or acts of discrimination. See G. L. c. 151B, § 5. The employee may be entitled to equitable relief from this statute of limitations in limited circumstances. An employee's cause of action for age discrimination under G. L. c. 151B may be tolled until the employee knows or should have known that she was harmed by the employer's conduct. See Wheatley v. American Tel & Tel. Co., 418 Mass. 394, 397-399 (1994) (limitations period does not begin to run in discrimination action until plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of replacement by younger employee); Silvestris v. Tantasqua Regional Sch. Dist., 446 Mass. 756, 766 (2006). In this case, we agree with the motion judge that Garcia's cause of action accrued no later than November 3, 2008, the date of her termination by Meditech. Taking, as we must, the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, see Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), the complaint alleges that statements were made to Garcia and actions taken that caused her, or should have caused her, to believe at the time of her termination that her termination was based on age (as well as color and national origin). Although '[i]n most instances, the question when a plaintiff knew or should have known of the existence of a cause of action is one of fact that will be decided by the trier of fact,' Silvestris, supra at 767, in this case the facts establishing knowledge are clearly alleged in the complaint. For this reason, her complaint is fatally deficient, and was properly dismissed.
The plaintiff has apparently abandoned her claims of discrimination on the basis of national origin and color.
The MCAD described the 300 day time limit as 'jurisdictional.' The statutory filing deadlines are better described as a statute of limitations subject to modification by equitable doctrines such as waiver, equitable tolling, and continuing violation, doctrines whose application would otherwise be barred if the filing requirements were jurisdictional. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394-396 (1982) (recognizing equitable tolling because the administrative filing deadlines under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(e), are not jurisdictional). Like the Federal courts, our Massachusetts appellate cases 'contain scattered references to the timely filing requirement as jurisdictional, . . . and as or more often in the same or other cases, we have referred to the provision as a limitations statute.' Id. at 395. See, e.g., Everett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585, 600 n.21 (2009). We treat the filing requirement as a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling, consistent with well-settled precedent in Massachusetts. See Christo v. Edward G. Boyle Ins. Agency, Inc., 402 Mass. 815, 817 (1988) (equitable tolling); Wheatley v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 418 Mass. 394, 397-399 (1994)(considering Federal authority). See also Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. , 434 Mass. 521, 531-532 (2001)(continuing violation); Everett v. 357 Corp., supra (discussing equitable tolling, estoppel, and waiver).
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Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Trainor, Smith & Sullivan, JJ.),