Summary
holding that § 52-557j does not apply because "the claimed liability is not based on the use of the land, but on negligent supervision of the plaintiff by the defendant"
Summary of this case from Coombe v. KovachOpinion
No. CV 03 0090491 S
July 19, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This matter came before the court on June 8, 2004 on the Defendant's motion for summary judgment dated February 17, 2004. The plaintiff filed a brief and affidavit in opposition on June 8, 2004. The complaint in this action alleges that on June 19, 2001, the plaintiff, who was a minor at the time, was invited onto the defendant's property to ride an off-road motorcycle (a minibike). That while operating the minibike on the defendant's property the plaintiff fell and was injured. The defendant claims that General Statue 52-557j bars the cause of action by the plaintiff. The parties agree 1) the plaintiff was operating the minibike on private property owned by the defendant, 2) no fee was charged for the operation and 3) the vehicle operated by the plaintiff falls within the statutory definitions. There is no allegation that the landowner's conduct was willful or malicious. The complaint alleges negligent supervision by the defendant. The plaintiff in its opposition to the motion for summary judgment argues that General Statute 52-557j does not apply because the plaintiff was 1) a social invitee 2) was encouraged and allowed by the defendant to ride on a motorbike owned by the defendant, and 3) the defendant's negligence in failing to properly supervise or instruct the plaintiff in the use of the minibike was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
C.G.S. 52-557j provides that "No landowner may be held liable for any injury sustained by any person operating a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, as defined in section 14-379, motorcycle, or minibike minicycle as defined in section 14-1, upon the landowner's property or by any passenger in the snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle or motorcycle, minibike or minicycle, whether or not the landowner had given permission, written or oral, for the operation upon his land unless the landowner charged a fee for the operation, or unless the injury is caused by the willful or malicious conduct of the landowner."
Pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book Section 17-49, summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A material fact is one that will make a difference in the outcome of the case. Yanow v. Teal Industries, Inc., 178 Conn. 262, 268 (1979). Summary judgment should be granted if the "moving party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts." Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279-80 (1989). "The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." Id. at 279.
"The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitled [that party] to a judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 105 (1994). "Although the moving party has the burden of presenting evidence that shows the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the opposing party must substantiate its adverse claim with evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue." Haesche v. Kissner, 229 Conn. 213, 217 (1994). "Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court." Bartha v. Waterbury House Wrecking Co., Inc., 190 Conn. 8, 12 (1983).
The issue before the court is, does General Statute 52-557j bar any and all actions against a landowner by an injured party who is a social invitee of the landowner, who is injured while operating a vehicle owned by the defendant, where no fee was charged and no willful or malicious conduct was alleged?
In construing a statute the court must look to plain meaning of the statute. "Where the language used by the legislature is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction by the courts and the statute will be applied as its words direct." Warner v. Leslie-Elliot Constructors, Inc., 194 Conn. 129, 134, 479 A.2d 231 (1984), Muha v. United Oil Co., 180 Conn. 720, 730, 433 A.2d 1009 (1980). General Statute 52-557j clearly bars actions against a landowner for injuries that are a result of the operation of a vehicle. However, in this action the plaintiff in paragraph 8 of the complaint specifically alleges that his injuries were a result of negligent supervision of the plaintiff by the defendant, not operation on the defendant's land There is no language in 52-557j barring actions for injuries caused by negligent supervision. The purpose of 52-557j is to insulate owners of land from liability by recreational users of the land In this action the claimed liability is not based on the use of the land, but on negligent supervision of the plaintiff by the defendant. The court thus finds General Statute 52-557j does not apply to the facts of this case. The court does find there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the supervision of the plaintiff. The court having found that 52-557j does not apply, need not address the constitutional objections offered by the plaintiff. The defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.
Brunetti, J.