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In Coombe and Galinski, as in the present case, the minor plaintiffs were invited on the defendants' property for the purpose of using a minibike or ATV that was owned or provided by the defendants. The court finds this distinguishing factor significant in striking the defendants' special defense and allowing the plaintiffs' negligent supervision claims to proceed.
Summary of this case from Arsenault v. AdelsteinOpinion
No. 5001474.
December 5, 2006.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On July 26, 2006, the plaintiffs, Krystal and Patrick Coombe, filed a two-count complaint against the defendants, Mary and Dorothy Kovach. This action arises out of injuries and losses allegedly sustained by Krystal Coombe while riding an all-terrain vehicle on the defendants' property.
In count one, the plaintiffs allege that on July 4, 2004, Krystal Coombe was invited to a gathering at the defendants' house and while occupying an all-terrain vehicle provided by the defendants for their guests' use, she was injured when the vehicle "impacted the ground with .. . crushing force." They allege that the defendants were negligent in allowing Coombe to ride an all-terrain vehicle on their property without any warning of artificial terrain changes and any instruction of how to navigate the vehicle and in failing to provide adequate safeguards or protection from falls off the vehicle. Count two reiterates these allegations and claims a loss of consortium and other losses sustained by Patrick Coombe.
On September 7, 2006, the defendants filed a motion to strike both counts of the complaint on the ground that they are legally insufficient because General Statutes § 52-557j provides immunity from liability to the defendants. On September 20, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion. On October 3, 2006, the defendants filed a reply memorandum of law. Oral argument was heard on the matter on October 16, 2006.
DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading . . . and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. United Technologies Corp., 277 Conn. 337, 347, 890 A.2d 1289 (2006). The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is "to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).
The defendants argue that the complaint is legally insufficient because, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557j, the defendants are immune from liability for injuries sustained on their property by an operator or a passenger of an all-terrain vehicle. They argue that the language of § 52-557j is plain and unambiguous. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants misinterpret § 52-557j by failing to take into account the broader context from which the statute is drawn. The plaintiffs argue that the purpose of § 52-557j is to promote recreational use of land by providing immunity to those private landowners who opened their land to the public and the defendants are outside the scope of protection provided by § 52-557j.
The issue in the present case involves the construction of General Statutes § 52-557j. "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." General Statutes § 1-2z. Although the courts first look to the language of the statute, if "application of the statute to a particular situation reveals a latent ambiguity in seemingly unambiguous language . . . [the courts] turn for guidance to the purpose of the statute and its legislative history to resolve that ambiguity." (Quotation marks omitted.) Conway v. Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 665, 680 A.2d 242 (1996).
"[General Statutes § 52-557j] states in plain language that no landowner will be liable for any injuries to operators or passengers arising from the operation of certain vehicles including motorcycles [or all-terrain vehicles] on the landowner's property unless the landowner charged a fee for the operation, or unless the injury is caused by the wilful or malicious conduct of the landowner . . . This language is clear and unambiguous." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Warner v. Leslie-Elliott Constructors, Inc., 194 Conn. 129, 133, 479 A.2d 231 (1984). "[T]he legislature has effectively abrogated the common law right to sue such a landowner for negligence resulting in injuries from the operation of a motorcycle [or an all-terrain vehicle] . . ." Id., 131. "General Statutes § 52-557j limit[s] landowner liability to situations where such owner charged a fee for such operation or such injury is caused by the wilful or malicious conduct of such landowner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 131-32.
General Statutes § 52-557j provides: "No landowner may be held liable for any injury sustained by any person operating a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, as defined in section 14-379, motorcycle or minibike or minicycle, as defined in section 14-1, upon the landowner's property or by any passenger in the snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle or motorcycle, minibike or minicycle, whether or not the landowner had given permission, written or oral, for the operation upon his land unless the landowner charged a fee for the operation, or unless the injury is caused by the wilful or malicious conduct of the landowner."
The plaintiffs argue that, even if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, an ambiguity arises in the application of the statute to the particular facts of this case. They argue that it was not the legislative intent to encompass social guests at a private party within the scope of § 52-557j, indicating that the defendants' property was not held out to the public. The defendants argue that the plain language of § 52-557j does not expressly exclude social guests.
The plaintiffs rely upon Conway v. Wilton, supra, 238 Conn. 653, to support their argument that § 52-557j should apply only to those landowners who opened their land to the public. In Conway v. Wilton, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the legislative history of the Recreational Land Use Act, General Statutes § 52-557f et seq., does not suggest that the legislature intended to provide immunity for governmental entities. Id., 674. After contemplating the legislative history of the act, the court found that "the immunity conferred by the act was the carrot that legislators dangled before private landowners to encourage them to make their property available for public recreation . . ." Id., 664. The court's overall discussion about the legislative history of the act, encompassing §§ 52-557f through 52-557i, however, did not include that of § 52-557j. Instead, the court noted that "§§ 52-557j and 52-557g serve different purposes: § 52-557g offers immunity as an incentive for private landowners to open up their land to free public use, while the purpose of § 52-557j is to immunize landowners from liability to [operators or passengers of certain vehicles] regardless of whether their land is open to the public for recreational use and regardless of whether the owner even knows that others are using its land. See 14 H.R. Proc., Pt. 8, 1971 Sess., p. 3544." (Emphasis added.) Id., 673 n. 12. The focus of § 52-557j is on use of certain inherently dangerous vehicles on private land rather than on public use of private land. Accordingly, § 52-557j provides immunity to a landowner even if his or her land was not open to the public for recreational use, as long as other requirements are met.
Section 52-557j is applicable to an action against a landowner by a social invitee of the landowner. In Galinski v. Neukom, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 03 0090491 (July 19, 2004, Brunetti, J.) ( 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 508), where the plaintiff, a minor, was invited to the defendant's property and was injured while riding a minibike owned by the defendant, the court held that § 52-557j was applicable to cases involving a social invitee because the language of the statute unambiguously encompasses such cases.
There is no exception for social invitees in § 52-557j. "It authorizes recovery only where the plaintiff has shown that a fee was charged or the landowner acted wilfully or maliciously." Oliver Joice, Administration v. Meadowview, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 307442 (August 11, 1992, Hadden, J.) ( 7 Conn. L. Rptr. 188). "Where the language used by the legislature is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction by the courts and the statute will be applied as its words direct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Warner v. Leslie-Elliott Constructors, Inc., supra, 194 Conn. 135. Courts "cannot create an exception to a statute . . . which the legislature itself has not created either expressly or by implication." State v. Bunkley, 202 Conn. 629, 640, 522 A.2d 795 (1987).
The legislative history of § 52-557j also reveals that § 52-557j covers social invitees. Representative Richard B. Edwards, in his remarks before the House of Representatives, raised this particular issue: "If an individual . . . has a motorcycle and is invited to a person's house, drives in the driveway and there's a hazard there that should not be there . . . [and] he is injured by that, the landowner I believe would be held responsible. Does this bill relieve the owner of that piece of property, not necessarily farm land, . . . from liability?" (Emphasis added.) 14 H.R. Proc., Pt. 8, 1971 Sess., p. 2206. Representative Thomas H. Dooley, one of the primary sponsors of the statute, responded that the statute would necessarily cover such cases to provide broader protection to the owners of farmland in eastern Connecticut. See 14 H.R. Proc., Pt. 8, 1971 Sess., p. 2207. In this respect Section 52-557j, like other recreational land use statutes, "reflects the judgment of the legislature that the public benefit of attracting private landowners to allow their land to be used outweighs the risk of potential injuries." Conway v. Wilton, supra, 238 Conn. 671.
The plaintiffs' final argument in opposition to the defendants' motion to strike is that § 52-557j is not applicable to the present case because they alleged negligent supervision by the defendants. They indicate that the defendants owned and provided the instrumentality of the incident to the plaintiffs. The defendants argue that there is no duty to supervise adult operators or occupants of a vehicle.
Section 52-557j may not apply to those cases in which a plaintiff claims negligent supervision by a landowner. Galinski v. Neukom, supra, 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 509 (holding that § 52-557j does not apply because "the claimed liability is not based on the use of the land, but on negligent supervision of the plaintiff by the defendant"). "There is no language in § 52-557j barring actions for injuries caused by negligent supervision." Id.
"Negligent supervision requires pleading that the defendant had a duty to supervise and knew or should have known that a particular behavior would have caused injury of the general nature of the kind suffered by the plaintiff." American Networks International v. Federowicz, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Middletown, Docket No. X04 CV 04 4005211 (October 18, 2006, Beach, J.) ( 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 211). In general, "[t]he ultimate test of the existence of the duty to use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if it is not exercised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Monk v. Temple George Associates, LLC, 273 Conn. 108, 115, 869 A.2d 179 (2005). "Would the ordinarily prudent man in the position of the defendant, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result? This does not mean foreseeability of any harm whatsoever or foreseeability that the particular injury which resulted would occur. It is, in short, the foreseeability or anticipation that harm of the general nature of that suffered would be likely to result, which gives rise to a duty to use due care, breach of which might constitute negligence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Seguro v. Cummiskey, 82 Conn.App. 186, 194, 844 A.2d 224 (2004). Thus, as a matter of law, a duty to supervise an adult invitee may exist in certain situations. See Jevarjian v. Smith, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 03 0404269 (August 10, 2004, Wolven, J.) (duty to supervise plaintiff, social invitee, injured while helping defendant clear vines).
In the present case, the plaintiffs allege that they were invited to the defendants' property for a private party and that Krystal Coombe was injured while riding an all-terrain vehicle on the defendants' property. The language of § 52-557j clearly provides the defendants with immunity from liability for injuries resulting from the operation or occupation of an all-terrain vehicle on their property. But, § 52-557j should not apply to the present case because the plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the defendants were negligent in supervising Coombe's occupation of the all-terrain vehicle. In paragraph 6 of the complaint, the plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that the defendants failed "to warn of any artificial terrain changes," "to instruct of proper occupying techniques, and how to navigate any artificial terrain changes," "to provide any adequate safeguards" or "protection from falls off of the all-terrain vehicle," and "to maintain and inspect any artificial terrain encountered by the all-terrain vehicle." They also allege that the defendants failed to exercise due care "to guard against all dangers, which might reasonably and naturally be expected to arise in view of the circumstances."
Sufficient facts relating to the defendants' duty to supervise have been pleaded. In light of the inherently dangerous nature of an all-terrain vehicle and the alleged artificial terrain changes, the defendants knew or should have known that their failure to supervise Coombe would cause the kind of injury that she suffered. Her injuries were the type of general harm that was reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances. In paragraphs 7 through 10 of the complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants' failure to supervise Coombe was a direct and proximate cause of her injuries and losses. Therefore, the plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient facts to claim negligent supervision by the defendants.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the above foregoing reasons, this court finds that § 52-557j should not apply to the present case, and, thus, the defendants' motion to strike counts one and two of the plaintiffs' complaint is hereby denied.