Opinion
2012-10-3
GAETANO D., Plaintiff, v. ANTOINETTE D., Defendant.
Joseph J.A. Tringali, Sr., Scarsdale, for plaintiff. Guttridge & Cambareri, P.C., Tarrytown, for defendant.
Joseph J.A. Tringali, Sr., Scarsdale, for plaintiff. Guttridge & Cambareri, P.C., Tarrytown, for defendant.
Irene Goldsmith, White Plains, Attorney for the Children.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SEEK MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT ORDER
FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, J.
This decision contains a child support order. The parties are advised that pursuant to the Low Income Support Obligations and Improvement Act of the Laws of 2010, contained in Domestic Relations Law § 236B(7)(d) and (9)(b)(2) and Family Court Act § 451, unless the parties have specifically opted out of subparagraph (2) or (3) below in a validly executed agreement or stipulation, either party has the right to seek a modification of this child support order upon a showing of:
1. a substantial change of circumstances; or
2. that three years have passed since the order was entered, last modified, or adjusted; or
3. there has been a change in either party's gross income by 15% or more since the order was entered, last modified, or adjusted, provided that the reduction in income was involuntary and the party has made diligent attempts to secure employment commensurate with his or her education, ability, and experience.
The parties are further advised that, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236B(9)(b)(2), child support arrears that have accrued prior to the date of application to annul or modify any prior order or judgment as to child support may not be reduced or annulled.
The following documents numbered 1 to 39 were read in connection with the defendant's motion brought by Order To Show Cause:
Defendant's Order to Show Cause, Affidavit, Affirmation, Memorandum of Law, Exhibits 1–15
Plaintiff's Affidavit in Opposition, Affirmation, Exhibits 16–33
Defendant's Reply Affidavit, Memorandum of Law, Exhibits 34–39
The defendant's motion by Order to Show Cause seeks an order of pendente lite relief, including an order of child support in the amount of $1,854.00 per month plus 71% of all statutory add-ons, maintenance in the amount of $1,443.00 per month, contribution to the expenses of the marital residence including paying one-half of the mortgage and real estate taxes, an order directing the plaintiff to complete the transfer of title to the 1998 Ford Suburban and 2004 GMC Suburban to his sole name and to obtain insurance for these vehicles without prejudice to defendant's equitable distribution of these assets, and an award of interim counsel fees in the amount of $10,000.00. The plaintiff opposes the motion claiming it is unnecessary. He alleges that he has been voluntarily contributing to the shelter and support of the children based upon his actual income. He claims that the support award the defendant seeks from him is impossible, as she misrepresents both his income and the parties' expenses to this Court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties were married on March 7, 1999 and have two children of the marriage, ages 10 and 13. This action for divorce was commenced on December 13, 2011. The plaintiff is 45 years of age and the defendant is 52 years of age. The marital residence is located in Westchester County, New York. The plaintiff was removed from the marital residence after being arrested on December 4, 2011, following an incident where he allegedly choked the parties' son. The plaintiff denies choking his son, claiming he was only wrestling with him. Child Protective Services became involved and, according to the plaintiff, the report was “unfounded.” There is currently a temporary order of protection in place. An Attorney for the Children was appointed on February 16, 2012. The plaintiff has supervised visitation with the children. The plaintiff currently lives with his parents in Westchester County.
The defendant is employed as a secretary in a school district and also works selling real estate. In 2011 she earned $45,127.55, comprised of $30,150.50 from income as a secretary, as reflected on her 2011 W–2, and $14,977.50 from her work in real estate, as reflected on her 1099. In 2010 she earned income of $20,826.00, of which $393.00 was from her work in real estate.
The plaintiff is self-employed and owns a construction business. The parties' 2010 tax return shows the plaintiff earned business income of $28,345.00, with a net profit of $8,571.00 after expenses. The parties' 2011 income tax return shows the plaintiff earned business income of approximately $37,000.00, which, after deduction of various expenses, netted a profit of $24,106.00. A review of the business' schedule C's for other years indicate net profits of $42,635.00 for 2004, $36,740.00 for 2005, $37,937.00 for 2006, $46,580.00 for 2008 and $31,246.00 for 2008. Both parties acknowledge that many of the household expenses were historically paid through the plaintiff's business.
The defendant asks this Court to impute income to the plaintiff in the amount of $110,000.00, claiming he has underreported his income on their tax returns. She asserts that they could not have afforded their lifestyle on plaintiff's claimed income. She began working in 2006, yet the parties have traditionally lived a comfortable lifestyle, taking modest vacations and providing nicely for their children. She asserts they purchased the marital residence in 2006 by paying $100,000.00 in cash and taking a mortgage of $400,000.00. She asks this Court to conclude that the plaintiff earned substantially more income than reported based upon their lifestyle and expenses.
The plaintiff claims his income as reported is accurate, pointing to the decline in the construction industry since 2008 due to the poor economy. He claims that the parties were able to afford their lifestyle because their income has been supplemented by the proceeds of the sale of a “spec” house in 2008, which earned plaintiff a profit of $258,946.09. This money was deposited into various marital accounts and used over the last four years for living expenses, with the remaining balance of $48,000.00
distributed equally to the parties in approximately December, 2011, with each party receiving $24,000.00. The defendant did not address this additional income in her motion, however, once the plaintiff raised this issue in his opposition papers, the defendant minimizes the impact of this source of funds on their finances in her reply papers. She claims that the plaintiff had a “silent partner” in the sale of the spec house who was paid $60,000.00 from the proceeds. She does not identify the name of this person nor show any evidence of this claim. Nor does she acknowledge that the parties used the balance of the proceeds to pay for their usual and customary expenses, but rather, she states that this will be an issue at trial.
The plaintiff claims they each received $33,000.00. The defendant does not deny this but claims they distributed $48,000.00 consisting of the remaining proceeds from the sale of the spec house, and they distributed another $18,000.00 of marital assets from a savings account.
The defendant's stated expenses on her net worth statement dated March 2, 2012 total $7,404.18 per month and include $3,322.00 for the mortgage and real estate taxes, $560.00 for utilities, $540.00 for food, clothing, and laundry, $298.00 for various insurances, $350.00 for unreimbursed medical expenses, $350.00 for household maintenance, $200.00 for household help, $280.00 for automobile expenses, $90.00 for education, $85.00 for camp, $200.00 for recreation, and $790.00 for miscellaneous expenses.
She lists assets of $36,909.99 in a Capital One account, $24,106.00 in HSBC Mutual Funds, a life insurance policy on the plaintiff with a face value of $1,588.86, a pension with an indeterminate amount, and an IRA valued at $14,267.53. She claims to have $18,000.00 in premarital funds, which the plaintiff disputes. Her debts are listed as a mortgage on the marital residence in the amount of $383,151.39 and approximately $11,000.00 in credit card debt, $5,000.00 of which she claims is the plaintiff's business debt. She is also paying half of the automobile insurance coverage for two vehicles owned by the parties but used by the plaintiff in his business.
The plaintiff's stated expenses on his net worth statement dated February, 2012, total $6,777.31 per month and include $3,200.00 for the mortgage, $640.00 for utilities, $640.00 for food, $416.66 for various insurances, $26.50 for unreimbursed medical expenses, $511.50 for automobile expenses for three vehicles, $172.00 for educational expenses, $251.00 for recreational expenses, and $263.00 in miscellaneous expenses, which include the repayment of a loan. He claims his personal monthly expenses include $430.00 for groceries, $475.00 for clothing, $15.00 for dry cleaning, $166.00 for automobile insurance, $26.50 for unreimbursed medical expenses, $511.50 for gasoline, repairs, and tolls, $58.00 for miscellaneous expenses and $200.00 for credit card debt. He also claims he pays his parents $700.00 per month for rent, which the defendant disputes.
The plaintiff lists assets of $13,800.00 in cash accounts, $24,000.00 in a joint CD, and equity in the marital residence in an indeterminate amount. The plaintiff is the sole owner of a construction company, the value of which is unknown. His net worth statement lists liabilities of $4,700.00 in credit card expense, some of which was incurred by the business, and the mortgage of $370,000.00.
The plaintiff has been voluntarily contributing support for the household expenses and children's needs. Initially, he was paying one-half of the mortgage on the marital residence, as well as paying the cable, internet, phones, car insurance, and Con Edison bills through his business. Currently, he is paying one-half of the mortgage payment and giving the defendant $1,000.00 for other expenses, totaling $2,700.00 per month. He challenges many of the defendant's claimed expenses, such as the expenses for babysitting when her family watches the children for no charge, and $100.00 for a maid when she has never employed one. He also criticizes her monthly expenses for gardening and snow plowing when there are no charges for these services. Many of the defendant's claimed expenses are non-existent or inflated, as she concedes in her reply affidavit. However, she anticipates having these expenses in the future once the parties are divorced. The defendant's net worth statement establishes her reasonable monthly expenses to maintain the home and care for herself and the children, excluding add-on expenses, are about $6,000.00 per month.
It appears the plaintiff has historically earned income greater than the amount reported on the parties' income tax returns. The plaintiff goes to great lengths to show this Court the deposits made into his business account in an effort to establish how little he earns. However, this exercise does not rule out the possibility that plaintiff earned other income that was not deposited into this account. Moreover, it defies logic that the plaintiff would hire employees and maintain the expenses for two trucks, including gas and insurances to run a business that only turned an annual profit in 2010 of $8,571.00, making his earnings substantially less than minimum wage. While it appears the plaintiff underreported his income since 2008, the parties have also supplemented their earned income with proceeds from the sale of the spec house. The remaining proceeds in the approximate amount of $50,000.00 to $60,000.00 have been distributed to the parties. The defendant takes the position that the remaining funds she received from the sale of the spec house should not be used to pay the household expenses, but rather, her share should be considered her separate property since the accounts have already been divided.
DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS
Pendente Lite Support
Temporary Maintenance
For all actions commenced after October 12, 2010, courts are required to apply a statutory mathematical formula in determining temporary maintenance awards (DRL § 236B[5–a][c] ). The standards previously used by the courts in determining pendente lite support—fashioning an award that serves as an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the moving spouse and the financial ability of the other spouse ( Pezza v. Pezza, 300 A.D.2d 555, 752 N.Y.S.2d 550 [2d Dept.2002]; Anonymous v. Anonymous, 63 A.D.3d 493, 498, 881 N.Y.S.2d 66 [1st Dept.2009] ), and to “tide over the more needy party, not to determine the correct ultimate distribution” ( Valente v. Valente, 269 A.D.2d 389, 390, 703 N.Y.S.2d 206 [2d Dept.2000]Yecies v. Yecies, 108 A.D.2d 813, 814, 485 N.Y.S.2d 128 [2d Dept.1985] )—no longer apply. The new statute “creates a substantial presumptive entitlement [i]n an effort to provide consistency and predictability in calculating temporary spousal maintenance awards” ( Khaira v. Khaira, 93 A.D.3d 194, 197, 938 N.Y.S.2d 513 [1st Dept.2012] ).
Pursuant to DRL § 236B(5–a)(c), after the statutory formula is applied to the parties' income, the calculated amount is considered the presumptive award of temporary maintenance, which shall be ordered, unless the court finds that the presumptive award would be unjust or inappropriate based upon the following 17 factors prescribed in DRL § 236B(5–a)(e)(1):
(a) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(b) the age and health of the parties;
(c) the earning capacity of the parties;
(d) the need of one party to incur education or training expenses;
(e) the wasteful dissipation of marital property;
(f) the transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration;
(g) the existence and duration of a pre-marital joint household or a pre-divorce separate household;
(h) acts by one party against another that have inhibited or continue to inhibit a party's earning capacity or ability to obtain meaningful employment;
(i) the availability and cost of medical insurance for the parties;
(j) the care of the children or stepchildren, disabled adult children or stepchildren, elderly parents or in-laws that has inhibited or continues to inhibit a party's earning capacity or ability to obtain meaningful employment;
(k) the inability of one party to obtain meaningful employment due to age or absence from the workforce;
( l ) the need to pay for exceptional additional expenses for the children, including school, day care, and medical treatment;
(m) the tax consequences to each party;
(n) marital property subject to distribution;
( o) the reduced or lost earning capacity of the party seeking temporary maintenance as a result of having foregone or delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities during the marriage;
(p) the contributions and services of the party seeking temporary maintenance as a spouse, parent, wage earner, and homemaker, and to the career potential of the other party; and
(q) any other factor the court expressly finds to be just and proper.
In making the calculations, the court must first determine the parties' income as defined by DRL § 236B(5–a)(b)(4). In determining income for purposes of calculating temporary maintenance, the statute uses the same definition of income as set forth in the Child Support Standards Act, and also includes any income from income producing property to be distributed as part of equitable distribution (DRL § 236B[5–a][b][4] ). The court is required to establish the parties' support obligation “as a function of the income that is, or should have been, reflected on the party's most recently filed income tax return” ( See Wallach v. Wallach, 37 A.D.3d 707, 708, 831 N.Y.S.2d 210 [2d Dept.2007]; DRL § 240[1–b][b][5][i] ). Where the record demonstrates that a party's income tax return does not reflect the party's actual income or demonstrated earning potential, the court may impute income to establish the party's support obligation ( Id.; See also Bittner v. Bittner, 296 A.D.2d 516, 517, 745 N.Y.S.2d 559 [2d Dept.2002] ). In determining income for purposes of calculating temporary maintenance, the statute is problematic, as it requires the court “to consider factors some of which can only be established after a full trial and or extensive discovery” ( Scott M. v. Ilona M., 31 Misc.3d 353, 361, 915 N.Y.S.2d 834 [Sup. Ct. Kings Co.2011] ).
However, for those difficult cases where the court is presented with insufficient evidence to determine gross income, or where a party defaults, DRL § 236B(5–a)(g) requires the court to issue a temporary maintenance award based upon the needs of the party seeking maintenance, or the standard of living of the parties prior to commencement of the divorce action, whichever is greater.
Here, determining the plaintiff's income is particularly challenging. The parties' lifestyle and expenses suggest income greater than what they have reported on their income tax returns. According to the defendant, the plaintiff always has large amounts of cash on hand, including over $3,000. 00 sitting in a drawer in the house he used to bail himself out of jail. Also, the defendant claims the plaintiff was able to accumulate $100,000.00 in cash to pay the downpayment for the marital residence, which suggests that not all of his income is reported. Moreover, plaintiff's admission that his business paid many of the parties' personal expenses indicates his actual earnings were greater than what he reported on his tax returns ( See Beroza v. Hendler, 71 A.D.3d 615, 896 N.Y.S.2d 144 [2d Dept.2010] ).
Due to the questionable financial information contained in the parties' submissions, the Court cannot determine with accuracy plaintiff's actual income. It is apparent that the parties' lifestyle and the expenses set forth in their net worth statements exceed the income stated in their tax returns. The defendant suggests that this Court should impute income to the plaintiff in the amount of $110,000.00. However, based upon the submissions, it appears that the plaintiff earns less than this amount. Nevertheless, if the Court were to use this figure for plaintiff's imputed income, the presumptive award for temporary maintenance would be $13,048.00 per year, or $1,087.33 per month.
The plaintiff's net income would be calculated at $96,489.00 ($110,000.00 less $13,511.00 for FICA). The defendant's net income is calculated at $42,579.00 ($45,128.00 less $2,549.00 for FICA). For the first calculation, the court is required to subtract 20% of the payee's income from 30% of the payor's income to arrive at the first figure for the comparison. Here, 20% of defendant's income is $8,516.00, and 30% of the plaintiff's income is $28,947.00. After subtracting these figures, the first calculated figure is $20,431.00.
For the second calculation, the court is required to add together the payor's income and the payee's income, and multiply this sum by 40%. The payee's income is then subtracted from this figure. Here, the parties' incomes total $139,068.00. Multiplying this figure by 40%, the calculated figure is $55,627.00. The defendant's net income of $42,579.00 is then subtracted from the figure of $139,068.00, resulting in a difference of $13,048.00.
The guideline amount for temporary maintenance shall be the lower of these two calculated figures, which is $13,048.00 per year.
In addition to the guideline amount of temporary maintenance, the defendant requests that the temporary maintenance award direct the plaintiff to pay one-half of the monthly payments for the mortgage and real estate taxes. However, the statutory formula for calculating temporary maintenance is intended to cover all of the payee spouse's presumptive reasonable expenses, including an allowance for housing. If the Court were to order the plaintiff to pay a portion of the defendant's housing expenses in addition to the guideline amount of temporary maintenance, this award would include an impermissible double shelter allowance. ( See generally Khaira v. Khaira, 93 A.D.3d 194, 198, 938 N.Y.S.2d 513 [1st Dept.2012]; Krantz v. Krantz, 175 A.D.2d 863, 864–865, 573 N.Y.S.2d 736 [2d Dept.1991]; Barone v. Barone, 292 A.D.2d 481, 482–483, 740 N.Y.S.2d 350 [2d Dept.2002]; Smitreski v. Smitreski, 251 A.D.2d 490, 674 N.Y.S.2d 418 [2d Dept.1998] ). Although the Court could adjust its calculations to avoid awarding a double shelter allowance by deducting any carrying charges attributable to the payor spouse from his gross income before calculating temporary maintenance, this method of calculation would be inappropriate under the facts and circumstances presented here considering the questionable financial information contained in the parties' submissions to determine plaintiff's income.
After considering the 17 statutory factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236B(5–a)(e)(1), and in particular, the standard of living established during the marriage; the age and health of the parties; the earning capacity of the parties; the reduced or lost earning capacity of the party seeking temporary maintenance as a result of having foregone or delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities during the marriage; the contributions and services of the party seeking temporary maintenance as a spouse, parent, wage earner, and homemaker; the career potential of the other party; and the reasonable expenses to maintain the pre-divorce marital residence, the court finds the presumptive amount of temporary maintenance of $1,087.33 per month, which is based upon the imputed income suggested by the defendant, would be unjust and inappropriate, thereby warranting a deviation.
Nevertheless, since the Court has been provided with insufficient evidence to determine the plaintiff's gross income, the temporary maintenance award shall be based upon the defendant's reasonable needs (DRL § 236B[5–a] [g] ). Considering the defendant's income and the child support award as discussed below, an appropriate award for temporary maintenance would be $2,000.00 per month. This award that shall be applied to the defendant's reasonable and necessary monthly expenses, and is more appropriate under the circumstances presented here.
Child Support
“Courts considering applications for pendente lite child support may, in their discretion, apply the CSSA standards and guidelines, but they are not required to do so.” ( Rubin v. Salla, 78 A.D.3d 504, 505, 910 N.Y.S.2d 439 [1st Dept.2010]; George v. George, 192 A.D.2d 693, 597 N.Y.S.2d 129 [2d Dept.1993] ). In accordance with the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA), the Court has considered the calculations delineated in Domestic Relations Law § 240(1–b)(c) as well as the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 240(1–b)(f), which permit a deviation from the calculations set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 240(1–b)(3). Considering the children's reasonable monthly expenses, the Court declines to apply the guidelines and makes an award of child support in the sum of $1,200.00 per month, which is just and appropriate after considering the expenses covered by the temporary maintenance award.
Support Award
The total support award of $3,200.00 per month, consisting of $2,000.00 in temporary maintenance and $1,200.00 in child support, shall be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant on the first day of each month, commencing on November 1, 2012. The defendant is responsible for paying all of the expenses for the marital residence, including the mortgage and taxes, as well as all other expenses for herself and for the children, except those set forth below, which shall be paid based upon the parties' pro-rata share of income. The maintenance award shall be tax deductible to the plaintiff and taxable as income to the defendant, or as permitted by the IRS. ( See IRS Publication 504 for Divorced or Separated Individuals).
The parties shall maintain in full force and effect any life insurance policy in effect with the other spouse designated as beneficiary. The parties shall also maintain in full force and effect the current medical and dental insurance coverage and shall contribute to the cost thereof based upon their pro-rata share of income. The parties and the children shall use in-network healthcare providers whenever possible. The parties shall pay for the unreimbursed medical, dental, and other healthcare expenses, including psychological, psychiatric, therapy, and prescription expenses, based upon their pro-rata share of income, with the plaintiff's share being 70% and the defendant's share being 30%. The parties shall also pay the children's reasonable add-on expenses, including school expenses and extra-curricular activities based upon their pro rata share of income (DRL § 240[1–b][c][4], [5], and [7] ).
This award is retroactive to the original date of service of this application ( See DRL § 236B[6]; Dooley v. Dooley, 128 A.D.2d 669, 513 N.Y.S.2d 167 [2d Dept.1987] ). Retroactive sums due by reason of this award shall be paid at the rate of $500.00 per month in addition to the sums awarded until all arrears have been satisfied. The plaintiff may take a credit for sums voluntarily paid for actual support of the children incurred after the making of this motion and prior to the date of this decision for which he has canceled checks or other similar proof of payment ( See Peltz v. Peltz, 56 A.D.2d 519, 391 N.Y.S.2d 857 [1st Dept.1977]; Pascale v. Pascale, 226 A.D.2d 439, 641 N.Y.S.2d 56 [2d Dept.1996] ). The first payment hereunder shall be made on November 1, 2012 and monthly thereafter, with payment to be made by the first day of each month.
Transfer of Title to Motor Vehicles
The defendant seeks an order directing plaintiff to complete the transfer of title to the 1998 Ford Suburban and a 2004 GMC Suburban to his sole name and to obtain insurance for these vehicles. She claims the plaintiff uses these vehicles in his business and they are often driven by his workers. She claims not to have funds to continue to insure these vehicles. To this end, defendant has given the titles to the plaintiff's attorney to enable the plaintiff to complete the title transfer and obtain insurance. To date, this has not been completed, although the plaintiff has allegedly agreed to do so. Since the plaintiff does not object to plaintiff's request in his opposition papers, he is directed to complete the transfer of title and obtain insurance on these vehicles in his name or his businesses' name within 10 days from the date of this order.
Counsel Fees
The defendant seeks an order directing the plaintiff to pay pendente lite counsel fees in the sum of $10,000.00. DRL § 237 creates a “rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse.” The statute further provides that, in exercising its discretion, the court shall seek to assure that each party is adequately represented, and that any award for fees and expenses is made on a timely basis, pendente lite, so as to enable adequate representation from the commencement of the proceeding (DRL § 237 [a] ).
At first blush it appears that the plaintiff would be considered the monied spouse based upon the parties' respective incomes. However, the support award shifts the parties' finances, giving the defendant more available resources than the plaintiff. Considering that the parties have few assets to consider, the shift in financial resources to the defendant rebuts the presumption that the plaintiff is the monied spouse ( See Scott M. v. Ilona M., 31 Misc.3d 353, 915 N.Y.S.2d 834 [Sup. Ct. Kings Co.2011] ). Nevertheless, the plaintiff has been the primary wage earner during the marriage and has the ability to earn a substantially higher income than the defendant over the long term. The defendant only recently returned to work in a secretarial position. Considering her educational level and experience, her earnings potential is limited.
Defendant seeks $10,000.00 in interim counsel fees. To date she has paid her counsel $7,500.00 and owes an additional $3,532.00. Domestic Relations Law § 237(a) authorizes the court to “direct either spouse ... to pay such sum or sums of money directly to the attorney of the other spouse to enable that spouse to carry on or defend the action or proceeding as, in the court's discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties.” This statute “is designed to redress the economic disparity between the monied spouse and the non-monied spouse. Recognizing that the financial strength of matrimonial litigants is often unequal, ... the Legislature invested Trial Judges with the discretion to make the more affluent spouse pay for legal expenses of the needier one. The courts are to see to it that the matrimonial scales of justice are not unbalanced by the weight of the wealthier litigant's wallet” ( O'Shea v. O'Shea, 93 N.Y.2d 187, 190, 689 N.Y.S.2d 8, 711 N.E.2d 193 [1999] ). Moreover, “courts should not defer requests for interim counsel fees to the trial court, and should normally exercise their discretion to grant such a request made by the non-monied spouse, in the absence of good cause” ( Prichep v. Prichep, 52 A.D.3d 61, 65, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667 [2d Dept.2008] ). “An appropriate award of attorney's fees should take into account the parties' ability to pay, the nature and extent of services rendered, the complexity of the issues involved, and the reasonableness of the fees under all of the circumstances” ( Grumet v. Grumet, 37 A.D.3d 534, 536, 829 N.Y.S.2d 682 [2d Dept.2007] ).
Accordingly, in order to create parity in the divorce litigation, while also considering the shift in financial resources to the defendant, the availability of limited assets to pay for litigation fees, and the non-complexity of the issues presented, the plaintiff is awarded interim counsel fees in the amount of $7,500.00 to be paid by the plaintiff directly to the defendant's attorney within 30 days after the date of this decision.
All other relief requested and not decided herein is denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.