No. 14-08-00613-CR
Opinion filed April 14, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 114th District Court, Smith County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 114-0296-07.
Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices ANDERSON and SEYMORE.
ADELE HEDGES, Chief Justice.
Appellant, Juan Fuentes, appeals his conviction for engaging in organized criminal activity while committing burglary of a habitation for which he was sentenced to 50 years in prison and fined $5,000. In four issues, appellant contends that: (1) the trial court erroneously admitted extraneous offense evidence; (2) the trial court erroneously denied his motion for directed verdict; and (3) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case involves allegations that appellant engaged in a gang-related burglary. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence shows that appellant is a member of the Nortenos, also known as the Northside Bloods, a gang that continuously engages in criminal activity. Prior to the instant offense, appellant and other members of the Nortenos were jointly arrested for various crimes. On November 21, 2003, appellant and four other gang members were detained at a local park that is frequented by gang members. Officer Scott Behrend of the Tyler Police Department testified that he observed all five men fully clothed in red, a color favored by the Nortenos. Officer Behrend further testified that during the detention, appellant acknowledged that he was a member of the Nortenos and that his gang name was "Pelon." Appellant was arrested that night for possession of marijuana and unlawfully carrying a weapon. On January 22, 2004, appellant was arrested for burglary of a habitation. Deputy Clifton Hunter of the Smith County Sheriff's Department testified that he was responding to a call regarding the suspicious activity of two men when he made contact with appellant and Jose Martinez, also known to be a member of the Nortenos. Both men were dressed in red clothing and were ultimately arrested for burglarizing a nearby house. On September 1, 2005, Officer Donald Michael Saxion of the Tyler Police Department responded to a call for an automobile burglary in process. He eventually stopped a vehicle driven by appellant; Emigeio Cervantes, another member of the Nortenos, was riding in the passenger's seat. Officer Saxion discovered marijuana and a stolen stereo in the vehicle. Both men were arrested that night, and appellant was charged with burglary of an automobile. The current offense occurred on December 8, 2006, when two intruders entered the house of Jose Arceaga and his fiancé, Ymeldi Aguilar. Aguilar's teenage daughter, V.A., was at home lying in bed when she heard intruders enter the house. V.A. testified that she heard the intruder's footsteps first enter her mother's bedroom and then throughout the house. Shortly thereafter, V.A. observed two men enter her bedroom and rummage through her belongings. V.A. testified that she recognized the first intruder as appellant and asked the two men, "What are y'all doing." Alarmed by V.A., the second intruder fled the house, but appellant stood still for a short moment and made eye contact with V.A. Appellant fled seconds later. A neighbor across the street, Alejandrina Perez, testified that she saw two men, one of whom she identified as appellant, acting suspiciously outside Arceaga and Aguilar's house around the same time that the house was ransacked. Alejandrina testified that she saw appellant peeking into the house through a window and that he was trying to open the front door. The second suspect was walking from the backyard towards the front of the house. Concerned with the two men's suspicious acts, Alejandrina opened her front door, making herself visible to the two men. Appellant and the other suspect immediately ran away. Alejandrina's sister, Rebecca Perez, also testified that she saw appellant running away from the same area around the same time. Rebecca was driving in the neighborhood towards Alejandrina's house when she observed appellant, who was partially dressed in red clothing, and the another unidentified man running away from the area. The police later arrived, and witnesses described their observations to the officers. Appellant was identified as one of the suspects, while the second suspect remained unidentified. Arceaga and Aguilar also discovered that certain pieces of jewelry were missing from their house, including Arceaga's necklace and rings. Appellant was subsequently charged with engaging in organized criminal activity while committing burglary of a habitation. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the indictment, and the case was tried to a Smith County jury. Appellant was found guilty of the charged offense, and his sentence, enhanced with a prior felony, was assessed at 50 years in prison and a $5,000 fine. In four issues, appellant contends that: (1) the trial court erroneously admitted extraneous offense evidence; (2) the trial court erroneously denied his motion for directed verdict; and (3) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to sustain his conviction. II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his second issue, appellant challenges the denial of his directed verdict. We treat a complaint concerning a trial court's failure to grant a motion for an instructed or directed verdict as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Grantham v. State, 116 S.W.3d 136, 143 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2003, pet. ref'd). Because appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence in his third issue, we address issues two and three together. In a legal sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational jury could have found the defendant guilty of all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 140, 142 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be given to their testimony. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). Reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence is within the exclusive province of the jury. Dudley v. State, 205 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2006, no pet.). We must resolve any inconsistencies in the testimony in favor of the verdict. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). In his fourth issue, appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence. In a factual sufficiency review, we review all the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). We then ask (1) whether the evidence supporting the conviction, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless so weak that the jury's verdict seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or (2) whether, considering the conflicting evidence, the jury's verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 414-15, 417; Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). A person commits the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity if, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate as a member of a criminal street gang, he commits or conspires to commit one of several enumerated offenses, one of which includes burglary of a habitation. Tex. Penal Code § 71.02(a)(1). "Criminal street gang" means "three or more persons having a common identifying sign or symbol or an identifiable leadership who continuously or regularly associate in the commission of criminal activities." Id. § 71.01(d). Appellant contends that the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's finding that he: (1) is a member of a criminal street gang; and (2) committed burglary of a habitation as a member of a criminal street gang. A. Member of a Criminal Street Gang
Detective Chris Miller, a gang intelligence officer for the Tyler Police Department, testified that the Nortenos is a gang that was created in Tyler in the 1990s. He testified that in December 2006, there were three or more documented Nortenos, all of whom had a common identifying sign or symbol or identifiable leadership and continuously or regularly associated in the commission of criminal activities. Detective Miller further explained that the Nortenos commit various crimes, including homicides, robberies, burglaries, retaliations, graffiti, assaults, and thefts and that such criminal activity is the "common denominator" keeping the gang together. Based on these factors and others, Detective Miller opined that the Nortenos is a criminal street gang. See Curiel v. State, 243 S.W.3d 10, 17-18 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd) (reasoning that officer's testimony describing a particular gang as "three or more persons having a common identifying sign or symbol or an identifiable leadership who continuously or regularly associate in the commission of criminal activities" was sufficient to establish that the gang met the definition a "criminal street gang" under the Penal Code); Muniz v. State, No. 09-97-00317-CR, 1999 WL 22634, at *2 (Tex.App.-Beaumont Jan. 20, 1999, pet. ref'd) (per curiam) (not designated for publication). Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence sufficiently establishes that the Nortenos meet the definition of a criminal street gang. The evidence further supports the State's contention that appellant was a member of the Nortenos at the time of the offense. Detective Miller testified that appellant had distinctive tattoos identifying appellant as a member of the Nortenos and dressed in red clothing, a color favored by the Nortenos. See Sierra v. State, 266 S.W.3d 72, 78 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (membership established by appellant's tattoos that had distinctive meanings and were common in the criminal street gang); Hunter v. State, No. 12-06-00434-CR, 2008 WL 4117218, at *4 (Tex.App.-Tyler Sept. 3, 2008, pet. struck) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding the defendant's tattoos identified him as being a member of a criminal street gang). Officer Behrend and Zehren each testified that appellant was a member of the Northside Bloods, and Officer Behrend further testified that appellant himself had acknowledged his membership with the Nortenos. Officer Behrend, Deputy Hunter, Zehren, and others testified that appellant wore gang-related attire while committing the instant offense and other prior offenses and associated with other members of the Nortenos while committing previous crimes. See Beasley v. State, 902 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995); Anderson v. State, 901 S.W.2d 946, 948-951 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) (membership established by defendant's wearing of gang attire and his association with gang members). Considering the evidence of tattoos, association, and self-proclamation, we find that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to establish that appellant was a member of the Nortenos. B. Commission of Offense as a Member of a Criminal Street Gang
Additionally, the evidence establishes that appellant committed the instant offense as a member of a criminal street gang. The State was required to prove that appellant intended to establish, maintain, or participate in the underlying offense as a member of the Nortenos. See Tex. Penal Code § 71.02(a). To that end, the State presented evidence that appellant committed the crime in retaliation against a rival gang, the Eastside Locos or Northside Crips. One of the victims in this case, Arceaga, was identified by Detective Miller as a member of a rival gang. Detective Miller testified that it is common practice for a gang member, such as appellant, to commit theft or other offenses against a rival gang member in retaliation or to move up within the hierarchy of a gang. The evidence presented by the State establishes that appellant committed a crime against a rival gang member while wearing gang-related clothing, and that appellant had participated, as a member of the Nortenos, in other criminal acts with fellow gang members. See Chaddock v. State, 203 S.W.3d 916, 922 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (reasoning that the State's evidence of appellant's association with other gang members and engaging in a pattern of similar criminal behavior sufficiently established that the defendant committed the instant offense as a member of a criminal street gang). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to establish that appellant committed the underlying burglary of a habitation offense with the intent to participate as a member of a criminal street gang, the Nortenos. We overrule issues two, three, and four. III. EXTRANEOUS-ACTS EVIDENCE
In his first issue, appellant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted three extraneous offenses: (1) appellant's arrest on November 21, 2003 for possession of marijuana and unlawfully carrying a weapon; (2) appellant's arrest on January 22, 2004 for burglary of a habitation; and (3) appellant's arrest on September 1, 2005 for burglary of an automobile. Appellant contends that these extraneous offenses were inadmissible under rules of evidence 403 and 404(b). A. Standard of Review
Extraneous-acts evidence is admissible if it is relevant to a fact of consequence in the case, and the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Tex. R. Evid. 401. Evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). Character conformity evidence that has no relevance beyond a tendency to show the defendant is a bad person or of a character from whom criminal conduct might be expected is inadmissible. Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Arroyo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 282, 288 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2007, pet. ref'd). However, evidence of extraneous crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible under rule 404(b) if it tends in logic and common experience to serve some purpose other than character conformity to make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (op. on reh'g). Rule 404(b) also provides that extraneous-acts evidence may "be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). This list is illustrative rather than exhaustive. Johnston v. State, 145 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Extraneous-acts evidence may also be admissible to rebut a defensive theory. Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). If a trial court determines that extraneous misconduct evidence is not barred under rule 404(b), it may still be inadmissible under rule 403. Relevant evidence is properly excluded under rule 403 when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Tex. R. Evid. 403. Courts should balance the following factors under a rule 403 analysis: (1) the strength of the evidence in making a fact more or less probable; (2) the potential of the extraneous offense evidence to impress the jury in some irrational but indelible way; (3) the amount of time the proponent needed to develop the evidence; and (4) the strength of the proponent's need for this evidence to prove a fact of consequence. Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Whether extraneous-acts evidence has relevance apart from character conformity is a question for the trial court. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391. The trial court must conclude that the evidence tends in logic and common experience to serve some purpose other than character conformity to make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Id. We review the trial court's ruling under an abuse of discretion standard and will not disturb the ruling if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). B. Admissibility of Extraneous Offenses
To establish appellant's guilt in this case, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant, "with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate . . . as a member of a criminal street gang," committed burglary of a habitation. See Tex. Penal Code § 71.02(a)(1). To establish appellant as a member of a criminal street gang, the State had to prove that the Nortenos consisted of "three or more persons having a common identifying sign or symbol or an identifiable leadership who continuously or regularly associated in the commission of criminal activities." Id. § 71.01(d). The extraneous offenses admitted in this case tended to "make the existence" of a fact of consequence "more probable" and established that: (1) the Nortenos was a criminal street gang as defined under the Texas Penal Code; (2) appellant had an affiliation with the Nortenos; and (3) appellant committed the instant offense as a member of a criminal street gang, the Nortenos. See Canales v. State, 98 S.W.3d 690, 697 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003); Bradford v. State, 178 S.W.3d 875, 879 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd). Moreover, the record reflects that the gang-related evidence was relevant because it provided the motive for appellant's burglary against Arceaga and was not offered solely to show character conformity. Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 239-40 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (holding that gang affiliation is relevant to show a motive for a gang-related crime). The extraneous offenses established that appellant committed the instant burglary against Arceaga in retaliation against a rival gang member and to move up within the hierarchy of his gang. See id.; Williams v. State, 974 S.W.2d 324, 331 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. ref'd) (holding that evidence of defendant's gang affiliation was admissible to establish motive for robbery). The complained-of evidence was admissible for purposes of determining appellant's intent, motive, and membership in a criminal street gang. See Chaddock, 203 S.W.3d at 925. Additionally, the trial court's limiting instruction limited the jury's consideration of the extraneous offenses to its proper purposes. Accordingly, the evidence was not prohibited under rule 404(b). See Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). Furthermore, the probative force and the State's need to admit the extraneous offenses outweigh the factors that favor exclusion. The evidence was not only relevant, but essential to the State's burden of proof. See Chaddock, 203 S.W.3d at 923-24. The probative value of the extraneous offenses was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. See Tex. R. Evid. 403; see also Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) (rule 403 carries a presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial). We overrule appellant's first issue. Having overruled all of appellant's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.