Opinion
No. 05-03-01050-CR.
Opinion issued February 17, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law, Kaufman County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 02CL-1252. Affirmed.
Before Justices BRIDGES, FRANCIS, and LANG-MIERS.
OPINION
Douglas Everett Frye appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated. Appellant waived a jury trial and pleaded not guilty before the court. The trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to ninety days in the county jail, probated for two years, and assessed an $800 fine. In a single point of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Appellant asserts the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support the conviction. He does not cite the standard of review for either legal or factual sufficiency challenges, but asks for alternative relief of acquittal or remand Appellant cites three cases in his argument. One case addresses only legal sufficiency, one addresses both legal and factual sufficiency, and the third does not address sufficiency issues at all. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.9. Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, we will address appellant's claim as challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 753 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. See Edwards v. State, 813 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). A person commits the offense of DWI if he operates a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 49.04 (Vernon 2003). "Intoxicated" means not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, or a combination of two or more of those substances or any other substance into the body. See id. § 49.01(2)(A). Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that on April 7, 2002, Department of Public Safety Trooper William Kasper was dispatched to the scene of a one-vehicle accident. Arriving at about 7:00 p.m., he saw appellant leaning against the bed of a pickup truck. Kasper asked appellant if he was okay. Appellant stated he was driving the truck and was "going too fast to negotiate the corner and wrecked the vehicle." Appellant wrecked the truck when he exited Interstate 20 at FM429. Appellant did not say how long he had been at the accident scene. Kasper smelled alcohol on appellant's breath and noticed appellant's movements were slow and methodical. When Kasper asked if appellant had been drinking, appellant stated he had "a couple of beers when he was fishing earlier that day." Not seeing any fishing equipment at the scene, Kasper believed appellant had been fishing and drinking before the accident. Kasper, who is a certified police officer trained in observing and detecting persons under the influence of alcoholic beverages, administered field sobriety tests to appellant at the scene. Appellant exhibited six out of six clues on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Asked to recite the alphabet from A to K, appellant went from A to N. Kasper also administered a portable breath test. The results indicated the presence of alcohol in appellant's body. Kasper believed appellant did not have the normal use of his mental and physical faculties due to the introduction of alcohol into his body. He arrested appellant and took him to the county jail. A videotape of appellant performing field sobriety tests at the jail was published to the court. The videotape shows: appellant sat in a chair while Kasper read the breath test warnings; appellant's speech was slurred; appellant argued with Kasper about whether to submit a breath sample; during the HGN, appellant swayed and moved his head; and during the one-leg-stand and walk-and-turn tests, appellant did not maintain his balance. Kasper's testimony, standing alone, can be sufficient to prove the elements of intoxication. See Annis v. State, 578 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979); Watkins v. State, 741 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, pet. ref'd). Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to establish that he was driving his vehicle while intoxicated. Specifically, he contends that absent evidence showing when the wreck occurred and how much time passed between the wreck and the arrival of Kasper, the State has failed to prove that he was driving the vehicle while intoxicated. Extrajudicial confessions alone are not sufficient to support a conviction. See Emery v. State, 881 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). The extrajudicial statement must be corroborated by other evidence tending to show that a crime has been committed. See Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). The corroborating evidence does not have to independently prove the offense. All that is required is that there be some evidence that renders the commission of the offense more probable than it would be without the evidence. Id. Appellant told Kasper that he had been driving the truck and wrecked it after failing to make the turn. He admitted to having consumed beer while fishing earlier in the day. Kasper found no fishing equipment at the scene, refuting appellant's implied assertion that he drove the truck, wrecked it, and then consumed the beer that left him in the intoxicated state Kasper found him in. No one else was at the scene. The evidence presented by Kasper and the videotape corroborates the admissions made by appellant that he was driving at the time of the wreck and had consumed an alcoholic beverage prior to the wreck. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole point of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.