Opinion
Record No. 1164-94-4
Decided: March 7, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY, Carleton Penn, Judge Designate
Mary Ellen Craig (Craig Hirsch, P.C., on briefs), for appellant.
Joe S. Ritenour (Christine Mougin-Boal; Paice Mougin-Boal, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Barrow, Fitzpatrick, and Senior Judge Duff
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Appellant, John G. Frey, appeals the decision of the Loudoun County Circuit Court finding him liable for the support of his son, appellee John Henry Frey.
The appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, as to appeals of right, is set out in Code Sec. 17-116.05. As the Loudoun County Circuit Court order from which this appeal is taken did not set either the amount of support or the amount of attorney's fees, that order is not a final order appealable to this Court under Code Sec. 17-116.05(3). Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. ___, 451 S.E.2d 711 (1994). Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal only if the order is determined to be an "interlocutory decree or order . . . adjudicating the principles of a cause." Code Sec. 17-116.05(4).
In order to adjudicate the principles of a cause, a decree must decide an issue which "would of necessity affect the final order in the case." The decree must "determine the rules by which the court will determine the rights of the parties." It must "respond to the chief object of the suit . . . . However, "[t]he mere possibility" that an interlocutory decree "may affect the final decision in the trial does not necessitate an immediate appeal."
Polumbo v. Polumbo, 13 Va. App. 306, 307, 411 S.E.2d 229, 229 (1991) (quoting Pinkard v. Pinkard, 12 Va. App. 848, 851-53, 407 S.E.2d 339, 341-42 (1991)). See also Erikson, 19 Va. App. at ___, 451 S.E.2d at 712-13.
The order appealed from places no limits on the discretion of the Clarke County courts to determine the amount of both support and attorney's fees. Thus, the Loudoun County Circuit Court order raises "the mere possibility" that its determination that support is due will result in a final order awarding support to the son.
Moreover, as the son elected to file under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA), codified at Code Sections 20-88.12 through 20-88.31, he is bound by its statutory scheme which splits authority to determine support awards between the "initiating court" and the "responding court." Ordinarily, "the initiating court will normally have reviewed the petition to determine whether it states a prima facie case for support." William Fox, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 12 Family L. Q. 113, 129 (1978).
RURESA was repealed in 1994 and replaced with the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, codified at Code §§ 20-88.32 through 20-88.82.
This is not to say that the support duty may not be ordered initially in the context of a URESA proceeding; that is, the duty of support need not have been adjudicated in some other previous proceeding. An initiating court, in other words, may identify and a responding court may confirm the support duty in the context of passing on the URESA petition. Id. at 116 (emphasis added).
This interpretation comports with that previously applied to RURESA by this Court:
[T]he initiating state court reviews the petition's sufficiency and determines whether it alleges facts "from which it may be determined that the obligor . . . owes a duty of support . . . ." If sufficient, the petition is transmitted to the responding state where it becomes the basis of a civil support action against the obligor.
Upon receipt of the transmitted URESA petition, the trial court of the responding state reviews the petition and determines whether it is sufficient to meet the requirements of the laws of the responding state. At that stage the petition is no more than a pleading which contains allegations made for the purpose of presenting the issue to be tried.
Dickens v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 72, 74, 341 S.E.2d 392, 393 (1986).
As the order from which this appeal is taken is neither a final order nor an interlocutory order adjudicating the principles of the cause, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
Dismissed.