Opinion
No. 1D21-3274
03-09-2022
Clarence FREEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Clarence Freeman, pro se, Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Clarence Freeman, pro se, Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Rowe, C.J.
Clarence Freeman appeals an order summarily denying his motion seeking judicial review of the sentence imposed for a crime he committed when he was a juvenile. Because Freeman does not qualify for judicial review under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.802 and section 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2021), we affirm.
Freeman was arrested in 2002, when he was sixteen years old. The State charged him with one count of sexual battery. Freeman pleaded guilty to the charge. The trial court sentenced him to thirty years in prison, followed by five years of sex offender probation. Freeman did not timely appeal his judgment and sentence.
Eighteen years later, Freeman filed a motion under rule 3.802 asserting that he was entitled to judicial review of his sentence because he was sixteen years old when he committed the offense. The trial court determined that Freeman did not fall within the class of offenders eligible to seek relief under the applicable rule and statute. The court denied Freeman's motion. This timely appeal follows.
Because this case turns on statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. Drayton v. State , 321 So. 3d 921, 921 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). After the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Miller and Graham , the Legislature amended Florida's sentencing statutes to allow for judicial review of certain sentences of defendants who committed crimes as juveniles. See McCrae v. State , 267 So. 3d 470, 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). The supreme court adopted rule 3.802 to provide the procedure for a qualifying defendant to seek a review of his sentence. See In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure & Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140. , 176 So. 3d 980, 981 (Fla. 2015). The rule applies to juvenile offenders as that term is defined in section 921.1402(1), Florida Statutes. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.802(a). The statute defines a juvenile offender as "a person sentenced to imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Corrections for an offense committed on or after July 1, 2014, and committed before he or she obtained 18 years of age." § 921.1402(1), Fla. Stat. (2021).
Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (holding that life sentences without the possibility of a parole for juvenile homicide offenders were unconstitutional).
Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (holding that life sentences without the possibility of parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders violates the Eight Amendment).
Although the statute provides an effective date of July 1, 2014, the supreme court has determined section 921.1402 applies retroactively to juvenile offenders whose sentences were unconstitutional under Miller and Graham . Id. ; see also Horsley v. State , 160 So. 3d 393, 395 (Fla. 2015) ; Henry v. State , 175 So. 3d 675, 680 (Fla. 2015).
But even though section 921.1402(1) applies retroactively to offenders who committed crimes when they were juveniles, it applies only to a narrow class of offenders—those juvenile offenders who committed an offense before July 1, 2014, and whose sentences are unconstitutional under Miller or Graham . See State v. Michel , 257 So. 3d 3, 4 (Fla. 2018) (holding that juvenile offenders whose sentences do not violate the Eighth Amendment under Graham or Miller "are not entitled to resentencing under section 921.1402, Florida Statutes"); State v. Michaud , 320 So. 3d 860, 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) ; cf. Santiago v. State , 165 So. 3d 804 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).
Freeman committed his offense on May 11, 2002, so he meets the first requirement. But he does not meet the second one because his sentence is not unconstitutional under Miller or Graham . Freeman received a thirty-five-year sentence. This sentence does not "meet the threshold requirement of being a life sentence or the functional equivalent of a life sentence." See Pedroza v. State , 291 So. 3d 541, 548 (Fla. 2020) (holding that a forty-year sentence is not the functional equivalent of a life sentence). For these reasons, Freeman is not entitled to judicial review of his sentence under rule 3.802 or section 921.1402. We AFFIRM the trial court's denial of his motion.
Lewis and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.