Opinion
Civil Action 01-0102-P-M
March 27, 2001
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, filed a self-styled complaint commencing this action together with a Motion to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (Doc. 1). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this action has been referred to the undersigned for appropriate action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(1). For the reasons discussed herein, it is recommended that Plaintiff's action be remanded to the Mobile County District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action.
Local Rule 72.2(c)(1) provides:
(c) Civil Actions.
(1) Non Dispositive Pretrial Matters.
All civil actions shall be automatically referred for the purpose of conducting a pretrial conference and the entry of a Fed.R.Civ.2. 16(b) scheduling order. The referral shall also be for the purpose of hearing and determining all non-dispositive. pretrial motions.
I. Proceedings.
The Court is reviewing the complaint to determine if the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action. Plaintiff was advised in his other action, Franklin v. Scott, et al., 00-1105-P-M, that he must establish in the complaint that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction (Doc. 4). It appears that Plaintiff has attempted to do so in the present complaint when he states:
This Court takes judicial notice of its records. ITT Ravonier, Inc. v. United States, 651 F.2d 343, 345 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1981).
IMPARTIALITY BY MOBILE COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE DELANO J PALUGHI UNDER TITLE 28 SECTION 455 NOTES 51-54 of USCA. FOR DISQUALIFICATION AND — RETRAIL OF KRISTINE DOUGLAS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES COMMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 2 TITLE6-11-20 UNDER ALABAMA CODE 1975 AND REMOVAL FROM STATE COURT UNDER TITLE 28 SECTION 1441 @ NOTES 39-42-202-204 OF USCA
Notwithstanding Plaintiff's assertion of these federal statutes, the Court is obligated to determine if these references to federal statutes provide a jurisdictional basis for Plaintiff's action.
A. Complaint (Doc. 1).
In this Court, Plaintiff filed a complaint titled "Petition for Expedit Action on Charges of [sic)" (Doc. 1) against Delano J. Palughi, a Mobile County district court judge, and Kristine Douglas, a bus driver. Plaintiff is seeking to disqualify Judge Palughi and to receive punitive damages from Douglas.
Plaintiff alleges that he filed an action against Douglas on January 30, 2001, in Mobile County District Court. Plaintiff attached to his federal complaint a handwritten document titled "Plaintiff Answer to Defendant Answers to Prove Punitive Damages," which bears the caption and style of an action filed in Mobile County District Court by Plaintiff against Douglas and contains the case number 00-5398.
In the federal complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his state court case against Douglas, 00-5398, was assigned to Judge Palughi over his protests which were based on Judge Palughi's handling of Plaintiff's prior cases. Plaintiff relates that he informed Judge Palughi that he was suing Douglas because as a MTA bus driver Douglas bypassed him causing him to miss three doctors' appointments and a food stamp appointment. Plaintiff claims that Judge Palughi asked him what happened and that he responded by asking the judge to take a copy of "Plaintiff Answer to Defendant Answer to Prove Punitive Damages" as it would explain everything. Plaintiff asserts that Judge Palughi refused to take the pleading and ordered Plaintiff's case be dismissed and Plaintiff "have nothing to do with buses." Plaintiff then advised Judge Palughi that Plaintiff would "file" to disqualify him for bias. Plaintiff contends that Judge Palughi said that Plaintiff's cases no longer should be placed on his docket. Plaintiff avers that he responded that Judge Palughi has three of Plaintiff's cases that Judge Palughi never filed, and reiterated that he would "file" to disqualify Judge Palughi. Plaintiff requests this Court "To READ PLAINTIFF ANSWER TO DEFENDANT ANSWER TO PROVE PUNITIVE DAMAGES And take into CONSIDERATION the "BIAS" — INCOMPENTANT AND IMPARTIALITY and Disqualify Mobile County District Judge Delano J Palughi under The Subject Matter Jurisdiction Statue and A Fair Award For Punitive Damages By Kristine Douglas [sic)."
Plaintiff's federal complaint refers to other actions brought by Plaintiff in state court which were assigned to Judge Palughi and describes Judge Palughi's handling of these cases, which was not satisfactory to Plaintiff.
The document, which is attached to Plaintiff's federal complaint, reflects that Plaintiff is seeking punitive damages under Ala. Code § 6-11-27 from Douglas. In this document, Plaintiff, who is in a wheelchair, alleges that Douglas had him thrown off her bus because he used the "bathroom all over (himself]." At his apartment, after he disrobed, Plaintiff noticed that there may have been three tiny spots which could have gone unnoticed as he used the bathroom in a hurry before the bus came. Plaintiff claims to have an agreement with Mr. Bryant, Douglas's supervisor, who permits Plaintiff to get on MTA buses that do not have a wheelchair ramp. Plaintiff states that he able to get onto non-ramp buses without the driver touching him, that he is able to get his wheelchair on and off the bus, with or without the assistance of other passengers, and that he can get to a seat. Plaintiff states that wheelchair ramps do not function all of the time, and one time, Douglas worked for 20 minutes attempting to get a wheelchair ramp to work until he told her to go on. Plaintiff complains that Douglas has laughed while she passed him, that she has passed him four times, and that he has complained to Mr. Bryant about her.
The Court notes that Plaintiff's document does not refer to any federal law.
II. Discussion.
A federal court is obligated to inquire sua sponte whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest stage of proceedings. University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). Removed actions are no exception to this inquiry. Id. "[W]hen an action is removed from state court, the district court first must determine whether it has original jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims." Id. The federal district court may not rule on other matters in the removed action until it first determines whether it has jurisdiction. Id. "[A]ll doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court." Id. at 411.
One of the federal statutes to which Plaintiff refers is 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Plaintiff's reason for mentioning this statute is not clear. The Court does not know if he mentioned this statute for the purpose of removing his action or of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.
Section 1441(a) provides, in part:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
Section 1441 provides the authority by which an action, over which a federal district court has original jurisdiction, may be removed from state court to federal district court. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 386, 118 S.Ct. 2047, 2051, 141 L.Ed.2d 364 (1998) ("The governing provision of the federal removal statute authorizes a defendant to remove "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction. . . . The language of this section obviously permits the removal of a case that contains only claims that "arise under" federal law.") Section 1441 does not contain a grant of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, any argument that Plaintiff may have that 28 U.S.C. § 1441 gives the Court subject matter jurisdiction is without merit.
The Court next examines whether as an action removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action. A federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review claims that were previously ruled upon by a state court. District off Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1315, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1997); Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 165 (11th Cir. 1988); Hollins v. Wessel, 819 F.2d 1073, 1074 (11th Cir. 1987).
According to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, "a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Review of such judgments may be had only in (the United States Supreme Court]." District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1315. 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) . . . . The doctrine applies not only to claims actually raised in the state court, but also to claims that were not raised in the state court but are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court's judgment. Feldman, 460 at 482 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 1315 n. 16. This Court has recognized an "important limitation" on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when the plaintiff had no "reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claim in state proceedings." Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210, 104 S.Ct. 2398, 81 L.Ed.2d 355 (1984). In that situation, we consider that the federal claim was not "inextricably intertwined" with the state court's judgment. Id.
. . . .
Even if the federal court collateral attack on the state court judgment is premised on the unconstitutionality of a federal statute, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine still applies. It still applies for reasons that go to the heart of our system of federalism — the dual dignity of state and federal court decisions interpreting federal law. "In our federal system, a state trial court's interpretation of federal law is no less authoritative than that of the federal court of appeals in whose circuit the trial court is located." Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376, 113 S.Ct. 838, 846, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) (Thomas, J. concurring). Moreover, the doctrine is not limited to states appellate court judgments. A litigant may not escape application of the doctrine by merely electing not to appeal an adverse state trial court judgment.Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 466-67 (11th Cir. 1996).
In Powell, supra, the state court awarded forty percent of Mr. Powell's military retirement to Mrs. Powell as alimony pursuant to the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act ("FSPA"). Instead of appealing the state court's decision to a higher state court, Mr. Powell filed a complaint in federal district court seeking to enjoin the Secretary of the Navy from disbursing his retirement pay to Mrs. Powell and challenging the constitutionality of FSPA because its application to him had resulted in an unconstitutional taking of his property. On summary judgment, the federal district court ruled against Mr. Powell based on res judicata principles and did not address the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded the district court from having subject matter jurisdiction and ordered that the district court dismiss Mr. Powell's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 468. The court of appeals found that Mr. Powell's claim was inextricably intertwined with the state court's judgment because a ruling that the FSPA was unconstitutional would have the effect of overruling the state court's judgment ordering that Mrs. Powell was to receive a portion of Mr. Powell's retirement pay. Id. at 467. Thus, the federal district court would be reviewing a state court's judgment, which is prohibited by Rooker-Felddman. Id.
Furthermore, in the action of Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163 (11th Cir. 1988), the plaintiff filed a § 1983 action in federal district court against the state trial court judge who ruled against him, and at the same time, the plaintiff filed an appeal with the state appeals court. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's § 1983 action on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a state court decision and that the state trial court judge was entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Id. at 164-65. In ruling on the plaintiff's issues on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that "[a] section 1983 action is neither an alternative nor a complement to the appeal of a state trial court decision to a higher state court." Id. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that an appeal to the state appeals court was the proper means by which to gain relief. Id.
In the present action, Plaintiff states that he is seeking a re-trial of his state court case against Douglas. This Court, however, does not have jurisdiction to hear a case that has already been tried and had judgment entered by a state court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S.Ct. at 1315. This Court is not an appeals court to which a person can appeal a state court decision. An appeal of a state court decision must be taken first to the appropriate state courts and then to the United States Supreme court. Id.
Furthermore, Plaintiff lodges a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 455 against Judge Palughi for bias. Section 455 governs the conduct of federal justices, judges, and magistrate judges. United States v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 931 F. Supp. 1074, 1102 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 120 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 1997). Judge Palughi is a state court judge. Therefore, 28 U.S.C. § 455 does not apply to Judge Palughi and does not provide a basis for this Court's jurisdiction over Plaintiff's removed action.
Section 455(a) provides:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably questioned.
Turning to the substantive nature of Plaintiff's bias claim, the claim of bias against Judge Palughi for the decision in Plaintiff's state court case is inextricably intertwined with Plaintiff's state court case. If a ruling were made by this Court that Judge Palughi was biased in Plaintiff's state case, the ruling would have the effect of invalidating the state court decision. Powell, 80 F.3d at 467. Plaintiff's claim of bias is one that should be included in an appeal to the appropriate state appeals court.
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action and, therefore, Plaintiff's action is due to be remanded to the Mobile County District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c).
Court points out to Plaintiff that the procedure by which he removed his state court action to this Court is improper. Only a defendant to a state court action can remove an action to federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) 1446(a). Then, only an action over which a federal district court has original jurisdiction may be removed from state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a). Thus, Plaintiff, who was the plaintiff in the state court action, cannot remove his state court action to this Court. American Int'l Underwriters v. Continental Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 1253, 1260 (9th Cir. 1988).
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT
1. Objection . Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982) (en banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:
A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A), by filing a "Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge's Recommendation" within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the party's arguments that the magistrate judge's recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the objection.
A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals; only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.
2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded) . Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the cost of the transcript.