Opinion
No. 574, 2001
Submitted: January 11, 2002
Decided: March 22, 2002
Court Below-Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County Cr.A. Nos.IN98-02-0048 RI-0051 RI IN98-02-1465 R.I. 1467 RI.
Affirmed.
Unpublished Opinion is below.
TSCHAKA W. FORTT, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below-Appellee. No. 574, 2001 In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: January 11, 2002 Decided: March 22, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices.
MYRON T. STEELE, Justice.
ORDER
This 22nd day of March 2002, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The defendant-appellant, Tschaka W. Fortt, filed an appeal from the Superior Court's October 19, 2001 order denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. We find no merit to the appeal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
(2) In this appeal, Fortt claims that: a) the Superior Court improperly denied his motion to sever the charges against him; b) the Superior Court improperly denied his motion for acquittal at the close of the State's evidence; c) the Superior Court improperly admitted a gun into evidence; and d) his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance.
(3) In October 1999, a Superior Court jury found Fortt guilty of two counts of Robbery in the First Degree, one count of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree and three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony. Fortt was sentenced to a total of 15 years imprisonment at Level V, to be followed by 3 years of decreasing levels of probation. Fortt's convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.
Fortt v. State, 767 A.2d 799 (Del. 2001).
(4) When reviewing a motion under Rule 61, this Court must first determine that the motion satisfies the procedural requirements of the rule before addressing any substantive issues. In this case, Fortt unsuccessfully raised his first three claims in his direct appeal. As such, those claims are procedurally barred unless Fortt can demonstrate that reconsideration of the claims is warranted in the interest of justice. There is no evidence that the Superior Court lacked the authority to convict or sentence Fortt and, therefore, there is no basis for a reconsideration of Fortt's claims.
Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991).
SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (4).
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 746 (Del. 1990).
(5) Fortt's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is also unavailing.
Because the claim was not raised initially in the Superior Court we are precluded from considering it. The claim is meritless in any case. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Fortt must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Fortt's ineffectiveness claim is based solely upon his three claims of substantive error by the Superior Court, all of which were previously rejected by this Court in his direct appeal. Fortt, thus, can not show that any alleged errors by counsel resulted in prejudice to him.
SUPR. CT. R. 8.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.