Opinion
CV 21-09411-RSWL-PDx
05-09-2022
PRUDENCIANO FLORES, Plaintiff, v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.; DOWNEY IMPORT CARS, INC.; and DOES 1-10, Defendants.
ORDER RE: MOTION TO REMAND [14]
HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff Prudenciano Flores (“Plaintiff”) brings this Action against Defendant Nissan North America, Inc. (“Nissan”) for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and against Defendant Downey Import Cars, Inc. (“Downey”) for negligent repair. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to Los Angeles County Superior Court (“Motion”) [14]. Having reviewed all papers submitted pertaining to this Motion, the Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff is a resident of Los Angeles, California. First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 11. Nissan is a corporation authorized to conduct business in California. Id. ¶ 3. Downey is a corporation organize under the laws of California and authorized to conduct business in California. Id. ¶ 4.
On May 24, 2020, Plaintiff purchased a 2020 Nissan Sentra (“Vehicle”), which was manufactured and distributed by Nissan. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff received an express written warranty in which Nissan undertook to preserve or maintain the utility and performance of the Vehicle and to provide compensation if there was a failure in the Vehicle's utility or performance for a specified period of time. Id. ¶ 10. The warranty provided that in the event a defect developed with the Vehicle during the warranty period, Plaintiff could deliver the Vehicle for repair services to a repair sho and the Vehicle would be repaired. Id.
During the warranty period, the Vehicle contained or developed defects that substantially impaired the use, safety, and value of the Vehicle. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff provided Nissan with sufficient opportunity t repair the Vehicle, but Nissan failed to repair the Vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. Plaintiff also delivered the Vehicle to Downey for repair on numerous occasions, but Downey breached its duty to properly store and repair the Vehicle in accordance with industry standards. Id. ¶¶ 43-45. Because of Nissan's breach of warranty and Downey's negligence in failing to repair the Vehicle, Plaintiff was financially damaged. Id. ¶¶ 18, 47.
B. Procedural Background
On October 29, 2021, Plaintiff filed her Complaint [1-2] against Nissan in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. On December 3, 2021 Nissan removed [1] the case to this Court. Nissan stated that this Court had diversity jurisdiction over the case because Plaintiff is domiciled in California, while Defendant is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Tennessee. See Notice o Removal ¶¶ 13-14, ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) [11] on December 22, 2021, which added a new cause of action for negligent repair against Downey. Plaintiff then filed the instant Motion to Remand [14] on January 24, 2022, arguing that the case must be remanded becaus the addition of Downey destroys diversity. Defendant has not opposed the Motion.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Civil actions may be removed from state court if the federal court has original jurisdiction. See Syngenta Crop Prot», Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33 (2002). Diversity jurisdiction exists in all civil actions between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. There must be complete diversity of citizenship, meaning “each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than each of the defendants.” Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996)).
“The burden of establishing jurisdiction falls on the party invoking the removal statute, which is strictly construed against removal.” Sullivan v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted). Courts resolve all ambiguities “in favor of remand to state court.” Hunte v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). A removed case must be remanded “[i] at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
B. Discussion
The Court begins by noting that Defendants failed to oppose this Motion and offer no excuse for their failure to oppose. The Motion is therefore GRANTED for this reason. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-12 (“The failure to file any required document, or the failure to file it within the deadline, may be deemed consent to the granting or denial of the motion.”); Flores v. FCA U.S. LLC, No. 2:20-cv-6278-ODW (KSx), 2020 WL 5549140 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2020). Nonetheless, the Court finds tha remand is warranted on the merits as well.
In its Notice of Removal, Defendant asserts that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over this Action because Plaintiff is a citizen of California and Defendant is a citizen of both Delaware and Tennessee. See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 13-14. Plaintiff argues that remand is necessary because the addition of Downey to this Action destroys diversity. Pl.'s Mem. P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Remand 1:14-18, ECF No. 14-1. The Court agrees that the addition of Downey would destroy this Court's diversity jurisdiction. Downey does not appear to be diverse from Plaintiff because both are alleged to be California citizens, and neither Defendan has stated otherwise. See FAC ¶¶ 2, 4; see also Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1371 (stating that the burden is on the removing defendant to establish that subject matter jurisdiction is proper). Therefore, the Court must analyze whether Downey was properly joined to this Action to determine whether the case must be remanded for lack of jurisdiction.
1. Joinder
Where a case has been removed from state court and the plaintiff attempts to amend its complaint to join nondiverse defendants that would destroy the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction, the amendment must be scrutinized under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). Clinco v. Roberts, 41 F.Supp.2d 1080, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 1999). Section 1447(e) affords courts discretion to either den joinder of the nondiverse defendant or to permit joinde and remand the action to state court. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1447(e).
In deciding whether to permit joinder, “a court should consider: (1) whether the party sought to be joined is needed for just adjudication and would be joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a); (2) whether the statute of limitations would prevent the filing of a new action against the new defendant should the court deny joinder; (3) whether there has been unexplained delay in seeking the joinder; (4) whether the joinder is solely for the purpose of defeating federal jurisdiction; and (5) whether the claim against the new party seems valid.” Clinco, 41 F.Supp. at 1082. The Court will address each factor in turn.
a. Rule 19
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 requires joinder of persons whose absence would preclude the grant of complete relief, or whose absence would impede their ability to protect their interests or would subject any of the parties to the danger of inconsisten obligations.” Clinco, 41 F.Supp.2d at 1082; Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a). Courts consider whether a non-diverse defendant is a necessary party under Rule 19 when determining whether to allow a diversity-destroying amendment, but amendment under § 1447(e) is less restrictive than joinder under Rule 19. IBC Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Compiana Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1011-12 (N.D. Cal. 2000). Under § 1447(e), joinder is proper when “failure to joi will lead to separate and redundant actions.” Id. at 1012. Moreover, “a court may find that joinder [under § 1447(e)] is appropriate for the just adjudication of the controversy if there is a high degree of involvemen by the defendant in the occurrences that gave rise to the plaintiff's cause of action.” Yenokian v. BMW of N Am., LLC, No. CV 18-4897JFW(RAOx), 2018 WL 6177230, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2018) (quoting McGrath v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 298 F.R.D. 601, 608 (S.D. Cal. 2014)).
Here, Plaintiff's claims against Nissan and Downey involve the same Vehicle, the same alleged defects in the Vehicle, and the same attempted repairs. See FAC ¶¶ 10-18, 43-47. Nissan's warranty ensured that Plaintiff could deliver the Vehicle to a repair shop to be repaired, and Downey is the repair shop Plaintiff sought services from. Id. ¶¶ 10, 43. Thus, Downey had a high degree of involvement in the occurrences giving rise to Plaintiff's breach of warranty claims against Nissan. See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 17-04964 SJO (MRWx), 2017 WL 10433673, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2017) (finding repair facility necessary for just adjudication of claims against defendant because it was “a direct participant in the events and transactions giving rise to the case”); Forward-Rossi v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, No. 2:16-cv-00949-CAS(KSx), 2016 WL 3396925, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2016) (same). Moreover, resolution of Plaintiff's claims against Nissan and Downey will likely require review of many of the same documents and witnesses. See Yenokian, 2018 W 6177230, at *2. Denying joinder of Downey here would lead to separate and redundant actions, and this factor therefore weighs in favor of joinder. b. Statute of Limitations
If a plaintiff could file an action against the joined defendant in state court, then there is less reason to permit joinder under § 1447(e). See Clinco, 41 F.Supp.2d at 1083. Under California law, the statute of limitations for a negligent repair claim is three years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(c)(1); Sabicer v. Ford Motor Co., 362 F.Supp.3d 837, 841 (C.D. Cal. 2019). Plaintiff does not specify the date on which th attempted repairs took place, but the statute of limitations could not have run because Plaintiff purchased the Vehicle on May 24, 2020. See FAC ¶ 6. Because Plaintiff would not be time-barred from filing new action against Downey in state court, this factor weighs against joinder.
c. Unexplained Delay
“When determining whether to allow amendment to add a nondiverse party, courts consider whether the amendment was attempted in a timely fashion.” Clinco, 41 F.Supp.2d at 1083. “District courts generally measure delay from the date of removal to determine whether an unreasonable delay has occurred.” Yenokian, 2018 WL 6177230, at *3. Here, Plaintiff filed the FAC to include a claim against Downey less than three weeks after the case was removed to federal court.
Plaintiff's amendment was therefore timely. See Harris 2017 WL 10433673, at *2 (finding amendment timely because it was sought less than three weeks after removal); Yenokian, 2018 WL 6177230, at *3 (finding amendment timely when sought almost three months after removal). This factor therefore favors permitting joinder.
d. Motive for Joinder
A court must look with particular care at a plaintiff's motive for joining a nondiverse defendant t a removed case “when the presence of a new defendant will defeat the court's diversity jurisdiction and will require a remand to state court.” Clinco, 41 F.Supp. at 1083. The question of whether joinder is solely intended to defeat jurisdiction is intertwined with an assessment of the strength of the claims against the proposed new defendant. McGrath, 298 F.R.D. at 608.
While it is possible that Plaintiff is motivated to defeat jurisdiction and have the case remanded, it is unlikely that this is Plaintiff's sole motivation. As explained below, the Court finds that Plaintiff's negligent repair claim against Downey is at least facially valid. Moreover, the FAC is substantively different from Plaintiff's original complaint because the negligent repair claim is distinct from Plaintiff's claims against Nissan. Compare Clinco, 41 F.Supp. at 1083 n.2 (finding improper motive where the original an first amended complaints were “substantially similar”), with Forward-Rossi, 2016 WL 3396925, at *4 (declining t impute an improper motive to plaintiff where she sought “to add two additional claims that, while relying on many of the same facts, [were] conceptually distinct from her two existing claims under the Song-Beverly Act”). Accordingly, the Court cannot say that Plaintiff's sole motivation in alleging a claim against Downey is to defeat diversity jurisdiction, particularl where Plaintiff is simply exercising the right to amend the complaint “once as a matter of course.” See Sabag v. FCA US, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-06639-CAS(RAOx), 2016 WL 6581154, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2016); Fed. R. Civ. P 15(a)(1). Therefore, the Court finds this factor weigh slightly in favor of permitting joinder.
e. Validity of Claim against Downey
“The existence of a facially legitimate claim against the putative defendant weighs in favor of permitting joinder under § 1447(e).” Forward-Rossi, 2016 WL 3396925, at *4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is facially legitimate if i “seems valid, ” which is a lower standard than what is required to survive a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment. Sabag, 2016 WL 6581154, at *6.
Plaintiff alleges that the Vehicle was delivered to Downey on numerous occasions and that Downey breached its duty to use ordinary skill and care in the storage, preparation, diagnosis, and repair of the Vehicle in accordance with industry standards. FAC ¶¶ 43-45. These allegations establish, at minimum, a facially legitimate claim for negligent repair. See Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 1970) (noting that, generally “[o]ne who undertakes repairs has a duty arising in tor to do them without negligence”); see also Yenokian, 201 WL 6177230, at *4; Forward-Rossi, 2016 WL 3396925, at *4.
2. Remand
On balance, the Clinco factors weigh in favor of permitting joinder under § 1447(e). Because the addition of Downey destroys complete diversity between the parties, this Court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction over this Action. The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion. This Action is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles IT IS SO ORDERED.