Opinion
HHDCV186095387S
08-30-2019
Montavious FINLEY v. WESTERN EXPRESS, INC. et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
PECK, JTR
Before the court is the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On May 31, 2018, the plaintiff, Montavious Finley, filed a one-count complaint against the defendants Western Express, Inc. and National Casualty Company seeking to recover for injuries sustained due to the alleged negligence of an uninsured motorist.
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. The defendants are authorized by the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Connecticut to transact business in Connecticut, and are in the business of writing various types of insurance including automobile liability insurance policies. On or about October 17, 2017, and for some time prior thereto, the defendants issued an automobile insurance policy to the plaintiff that included coverage for uninsured and underinsured motorists. Under the terms of the policy, the plaintiff was an insured or covered person and the defendants agreed to pay all sums he is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle as damages resulting from bodily injury sustained in an accident involving the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured or underinsured vehicle. All premiums due on the policy had been paid by Western Express, Inc., and the policy was in full force and effect.
On or about October 17, 2017, the plaintiff was the operator of a Western Express, Inc. tractor trailer traveling in an easterly direction on Interstate 84 when his vehicle was struck by an unavoidable object, causing the plaintiff injuries. The collision was caused by the negligence and carelessness of the unidentified tortfeasor. As a result of the collision, the plaintiff has suffered injuries. At the time of the accident, the unidentified tortfeasor was an uninsured motorist and his or her vehicle was an uninsured motor vehicle as defined by the defendant’s policy. The plaintiff’s injuries and losses are the legal responsibility of the defendants pursuant to the terms of the plaintiff’s policy and in accordance with General Statutes § 38a-336. The defendants were duly notified of the accident and the uninsured status of the tortfeasor and his or her vehicle, and the plaintiff or his representatives have duly performed all of the conditions and obligations required by the terms of the insurance policy.
On December 28, 2018, the defendants filed the present motion for summary judgment and memorandum in support. In support of their motion, the defendants submit the sworn affidavit of Ron Lowell; a sworn copy of the Connecticut Uniform Police Crash Report for the crash dated October 17, 2017; a sworn copy of the subject vehicle’s registration; and a sworn copy of the vehicle’s insurance policy. On February 11, 2019, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment. On February 22, 2019, the defendants filed a reply to the plaintiff’s objection. Oral argument was heard on the present motion on May 6, 2019.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Graham v. Commissioner of Transportation, 330 Conn. 400, 414-15, 195 A.3d 664 (2018).
"In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle[s] him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ... As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent ... When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue ... Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ... It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact ... are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § 380 [now § 17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fiano v. Old Saybrook Fire Co. No. 1, Inc., 332 Conn. 93, 101 (2019).
II. Choice of Law
The defendants argue that they should be granted summary judgment because the insurance policy in question does not include an uninsured motorist provision, and Connecticut’s uninsured motorist requirement does not apply to vehicles not registered or principally garaged in Connecticut. In the alternative, the defendants argue that if the uninsured motorist requirement did apply to out of state vehicles the coverage limit should be $20,000 per person. In response, the plaintiff contends that the defendants were required to maintain uninsured motorist coverage while operating in Connecticut. In their reply the defendants reassert that Connecticut’s uninsured motorist requirement does not apply to out of state vehicles, and argue that Connecticut does not have a public policy interest in doing so.
As the present case concerns an insurance policy issued to a Tennessee company, a vehicle that is registered in Tennessee, and an accident that occurred in Connecticut, as an initial matter it is necessary to determine which state law applies. "The obligation of [an] insurance carrier providing uninsured motorist coverage as a part of its liability insurance coverage on the automobile of the insured person is a contractual obligation arising under the policy of insurance." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) General Accident Ins. Co. v. Mortara, 314 Conn. 339, 345, 101 A.3d 942 (2014). "[Our Supreme Court has] adopted the most significant relationship approach of the Restatement (Second) ... for analyzing choice of law issues involving contracts ... Thus, the choice of law determination in this case involves an interplay among § § 193, 188 and 6 of the Restatement (Second) ... Where there is no choice of law provision in the contract, the general rule to be applied is that of § 188. Section 188, in turn, directs us to other provisions for specific types of contracts. With respect to liability insurance contracts, the starting point is § 193 of the Restatement (Second) ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 346.
"Section 193 of the Restatement (Second) provides that [t]he validity of a contract of fire, surety or casualty insurance and the rights created thereby are determined by the local law of the state which the parties understood was to be the principal location of the insured risk during the term of the policy, unless with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied. Thus, § 193 establishes a special presumption in favor of application, in liability insurance coverage cases, of the law of the jurisdiction that is the principal location of the insured risk ... [A]n insured risk, namely the object or activity which is the subject matter of the insurance, has its principal location, in the sense here used, in the state where it will be during at least the major portion of the insurance period." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "[I]n the case of an automobile liability policy, the parties will usually know beforehand where the automobile will be garaged at least during most of the period in question." (Emphasis removed; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 347. Thus, "those courts that have adopted the Restatement (Second) approach to choice of law problems ... hold that the principal location of the risk is determined by the location of the relevant vehicle during the majority of the contract term." American States Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 454, 463, 922 A.2d 1043 (2007).
In order to overcome the special presumption in favor of applying the law of the insured risk’s principal location, "another state’s interest must outweigh those of the state where the insured risk is located and must be sufficiently compelling to trump the ... presumption. Section 6(2) of the Restatement (Second) ... provides the criteria by which that overriding interest should be evaluated. It must be remembered that even if another state has a substantial interest under § 6(2), that interest will not defeat the ... presumption unless it is sufficiently compelling." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 467. Those criteria are: "(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 467-68. "Furthermore, [§ ]188(2) ... lists five contacts to be considered in applying the principles set forth in § 6 to a contract dispute: (a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 468.
In the present case, the uncontested sworn testimony of Ron Lowell indicates that the vehicle in question was not registered or garaged in Connecticut. Def. Mem., 12. Rather, it was both registered and principally garaged in Tennessee. Id. Accordingly, the principal location of the vehicle in question was Tennessee and a special presumption is created in favor of applying the law of Tennessee in the present case that will not be overcome unless Connecticut’s interest is sufficiently compelling.
Turning to an analysis of the § 188 contacts, the place of contracting and the place of negotiation of the contract are not known. The sworn copy of the vehicle’s title demonstrates that the defendant Western Express, Inc. is located in Tennessee. See id., Tab 2. The sworn copy of the vehicle’s insurance policy indicates that the defendant National Casualty Company has offices in Wisconsin and Arizona. See id., Tab 3. The plaintiff’s summons indicates that he is a resident of Alabama. The location of the contract’s subject matter as stated in the previous paragraphs was principally Tennessee, and it follows that the place of performance was also principally Tennessee. The sole contact with the state of Connecticut by any party in the present case stems from the fact that it was the location where the accident occurred. The fact "that the accident occurred in Connecticut is not relevant to [a] determination in [a] contract-based action ... [T]he location of fortuitous events, such as automobile accidents, generally is not considered a persuasive factor in choice of law analysis ..." (Internal citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) American States Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 469. Accordingly, an analysis of the relevant contacts also supports the application of Tennessee law.
In examining the relevant policy factors, "[w]ith the contacts analysis generally favoring the application of [Tennessee] law, the plaintiff can make a sufficiently compelling showing necessary to overcome the presumption already established by § 193 of the Restatement (Second) in favor of [Tennessee] only by demonstrating that the application of [Tennessee] law would violate a fundamental public policy of Connecticut ... or be offensive to our sense of justice." (Internal citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 469-70. The plaintiff argues that Connecticut policy favors uninsured motorist coverage in order to "protect properly insured motorists from the negligence of financially irresponsible motorists; " Pl. obj., 4; and "to reward those who obtain insurance coverage for the benefit of those they might injure." Id., 5. Nonetheless, Connecticut has generally "not sought to require minimum uninsured motorist coverage of every vehicle that spends any time in Connecticut." Ramcke v. Cigna Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-95-0074860-S (June 12, 1998, Hodgson, J.).
In a case against the same defendants, the court held that it violates public policy to operate on Connecticut roadways with no coverage for underinsured (and uninsured) motorist benefits. See Acosta v. Western Express, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-15-6057427-S (May 23, 2017, Wilson, J.) (64 Conn.L.Rptr. 602). In Acosta, the plaintiff driver filed a complaint against the defendants seeking underinsured motorist benefits arguing that the tortfeasor’s $25,000 per person liability insurance policy was inadequate to compensate him for his injuries. The defendants initially argued in their motion for summary judgment that all vehicles that operate in Connecticut, even out-of-state vehicles, must provide the minimum level of underinsured motorist coverage imposed by statute. Thereafter, however, they filed a supplemental memorandum changing their position to make essentially the same argument that they make in the present case, that is, that Connecticut’s minimum coverage requirements for uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits only apply to vehicles that are principally registered or garaged in Connecticut. For all the reasons articulated elsewhere in this memorandum, the court finds the defendants’ arguments persuasive.
Similarly, under Tennessee law "[t]he intent and purpose of the Uninsured Motorist Act is to provide protection by making the insurance carrier stand as the insurer of the uninsured motorist ... Uninsured motorist insurance coverage is an adjunct to the automobile liability insurance policy ... Thus, the insured is allowed to purchase uninsured motorist coverage for the protection that he would have had if the alleged tortfeasor had assumed his own financial responsibility by purchasing liability insurance." (Internal citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stallcup v. Duncan, 684 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tenn.App. 1984). Although public policy in Connecticut favors uninsured motorist coverage for the reasons stated in the previous paragraphs, it cannot be said that it would violate a fundamental public policy or be offensive to our sense of justice to apply Tennessee law and thereby allow an out of state vehicle to operate without such coverage. Accordingly the special presumption established by the principal location of the vehicle has not been overcome, and Tennessee law applies.
III. Uninsured Motorist Requirements
Tennessee Statutes § 56-7-1201(a) establishes the requirement of uninsured motorist coverage for policies delivered, issued, or renewed in the state. Section 56-7-1201(a)(2) provides in relevant part that "any named insured may reject in writing the uninsured motorist coverage completely ..." Accordingly, the defendants were not required to purchase uninsured motorist coverage. The plaintiff argues that General Statutes § § 38a-371(a)(2) and 33a-336(a)(1) require the defendants to carry uninsured motorist coverage. It has already been determined that Tennessee law applies and the defendants were not required to carry such coverage. Applying these statutes, however, would not change the outcome.
Section 38a-371(a)(2) provides in relevant part that "[t]he owner of a private passenger motor vehicle not required to be registered in this state shall maintain security in accordance with this section ..." Section 38a-371(b) further provides in relevant part that the security required by that section may be provided, "if the vehicle is registered in another state, by a policy of insurance issued by or on behalf of an insurer licensed to transact business in either this state or the state in which the vehicle is registered." Section 38a-371(c) provides that the security required under that section may be provided through self-insurance. Thus, section 38a-371 prescribes only that motor vehicles not required to be registered in Connecticut be insured; it does not mandate that an out of state vehicle carry uninsured motorist coverage.
General Statutes § 38a-336(a)(1)(A) provides: "Each automobile liability insurance policy shall provide insurance, herein called uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, in accordance with the regulations adopted pursuant to section 38a-334 ..." Section 38a-334(a) in turn provides: "The Insurance Commissioner shall adopt regulations with respect to minimum provisions to be included in automobile liability insurance policies ... covering private passenger motor vehicles ... motor vehicles with a commercial registration ... and vanpool vehicles ... registered or principally garaged in this state." As it has been established that the defendants’ vehicle was neither registered nor principally garaged in this state, § 38a-336(a)(1)(A) does not apply to it.
The defendants were not required to purchase uninsured motorist coverage for their vehicle, and the uncontested sworn copy of the defendants’ insurance policy indicates that their vehicle did not carry such coverage. See Def. Mem., Tab 3. Therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendants’ vehicle was not covered by uninsured motorist insurance.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.