Opinion
23A-CR-2431
04-23-2024
Gregory P. Fields, II, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Ana M. Quirk Muncie, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Daylon L. Welliver Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Delaware Circuit Court The Honorable Thomas A. Cannon, Jr., Judge Trial Court Cause No. 18C05-2006-F6-424
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Ana M. Quirk Muncie, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General
Daylon L. Welliver Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
KENWORTHY, JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] Gregory P. Fields, II, appeals the trial court's order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence in the Delaware County Jail. He raises two issues for our review. First, did the trial court abuse its discretion by revoking Fields' probation and ordering him to execute his previously suspended sentence? Second, did the trial court err when calculating Fields' credit time? We affirm and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In October 2020, Fields pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony escape. The trial court sentenced Fields to two years suspended to supervised probation. Fields' sentence was to run consecutive to his three-year sentence in cause number 18C03-1705-F5-85 ("F5-85"). Fields began serving his probation in this case in October 2021-after completing his sentence in cause F5-85.
[¶3] In January 2022, the State petitioned to revoke Fields' probation, alleging he had committed new criminal offenses. Fields admitted to the violations in July 2022. After Fields failed to appear at his sentencing hearing, the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest. Fields was arrested in June 2023, and the State amended the petition to revoke, claiming Fields had committed additional criminal offenses. In August 2023, Fields admitted to the amended petition's allegations. Throughout the case, Fields wrote several letters to the trial court detailing his substance abuse problem and requesting the trial court extend his probation and order him to participate in substance abuse treatment.
[¶4] In September 2023, the trial court revoked Fields' probation and ordered him to execute his previously suspended two-year sentence with credit for time served. The trial court awarded Fields eighty-one days of credit for the time he served between June and September 2023 and an additional eighty-one days for Class A, or good time, credit. During his sentencing hearing, Fields argued he was also entitled to 303 days of credit time for a period between June 2020 and April 2021. The trial court determined Fields was already awarded 249 days of credit for part of this period by the F5-85 court, and the remaining fifty-four days were to apply to the time left on Fields' sentence in the F5-85 cause. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 18; see also Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 88. Neither party nor the trial court mentioned credit time for July 11, 2022, to July 15, 2022, at the sentencing hearing.
See Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.1(b) (2023) (granting one day of good time credit for each calendar day a person assigned to Class A spends imprisoned for a crime or confined while awaiting trial or sentencing); see also I.C. § 35-50-6-4 (2023) (initially assigning a person accused of committing a Level 6 felony or misdemeanor Class A status).
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Fields' probation and ordering him to execute his previously suspended sentence.
[¶5] Fields first argues the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and ordered him to serve two years in the Delaware County Jail. Probation is a matter of grace, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). The trial court has discretion to determine probation conditions and to revoke probation if the conditions are violated. Id. Without this discretion, trial courts may be less inclined to order probation for future defendants. Id. "The probationary scheme is deliberately designed to give trial judges the flexibility to make quick, case-by-case determinations." Clark Cnty. Council v. Donahue, 873 N.E.2d 1038, 1039 (Ind. 2007).
[¶6] We review appeals from probation violation determinations and sanctions for abuse of discretion. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. "An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the trial court misinterprets the law." Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013) (internal citation omitted). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment without reweighing evidence or judging the credibility of the witnesses. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind. 2008).
[¶7] Probation revocation is a two-step process. First, the trial court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation occurred. Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 616. Second, if a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the appropriate sanctions for the violation. Id. When a probationer admits to violating the terms of probation, the court can proceed to the second step and determine the appropriate sanctions for violating probation. See Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 640. The array of available sanctions includes:
(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.
(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.
(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.
I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h) (2015). "[T]he selection of an appropriate sanction will depend upon the severity of the defendant's probation violation[.]" Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 618.
[¶8] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Fields' probation and ordered him to execute his previously suspended sentence. Fields repeatedly violated the terms of his probation by committing new criminal offenses, failing to report to his probation officer, and failing to appear for his sentencing hearing. Fields also has an extensive criminal history, including nine prior felony convictions and five probation violations. See Puckett v. State, 183 N.E.3d 335, 339 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (acknowledging a defendant's criminal record is a relevant fact in assessing a proper sanction), trans. denied. Fields' argument that the trial court should have extended his probation and ordered substance abuse treatment asks us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, which we cannot do. See Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 639. By not complying with the conditions of his probation, Fields squandered the grace extended by the trial court. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by revoking Fields' probation and ordering him to execute his previously suspended sentence.
2. Fields is entitled to only five days of additional credit time.
[¶9] Fields also contends the trial court erred when awarding him credit time. Trial courts have no discretion in awarding or denying credit time, because it is a matter of statutory right. Moon v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1156, 1160 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018). Trial courts must calculate two types of credit time: "(1) the credit toward the sentence a prisoner receives for time actually served, and (2) the additional credit a prisoner receives for good behavior and educational attainment." Purcell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 220, 222 (Ind. 1999).
[¶10] If a person commits a new crime before being discharged from probation or parole for a different crime, the sentences in each must be served consecutively. See I.C. § 35-50-1-2(e) (2020). Credit time should be applied only once when dealing with consecutive sentences, otherwise courts may "effectively enable [a defendant] to serve part of the consecutive sentences concurrently." State v. Lotaki, 4 N.E.3d 656, 657 (Ind. 2014) (per curiam). Because a person may have different credit time classifications in different cases, courts must allocate credit time to a specific sentence. See Paul v. State, 177 N.E.3d 472, 476 n.3 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021).
[¶11] Fields' sentence in this case was to run consecutively to his sentence in cause F5-85. Fields argues the trial court failed to give him credit for a total of 308 days-303 days for a period between June 2020 and April 2021 plus five days for July 11, 2022, to July 15, 2022. The State agrees Fields is entitled to five days of credit time for the stint in July, but argues he is not entitled to an additional 303 days of credit time in this case.
[¶12] The trial court properly determined Fields was not entitled to an additional 303 days of credit in this case. The trial court in cause F5-85 awarded Fields 249 days of credit at sentencing encompassing time between late-June 2020 and February 2021. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 88. And because Fields did not finish serving his sentence in cause F5-85 until October 2021, the trial court properly determined the remaining fifty-four days for March through mid-April 2021, applied to Fields' remaining sentence in the F5-85 cause. If this time were also applied to this case, Fields would receive double credit-which he may not do. See Paul, 177 N.E.3d at 476.
[¶13] But because the State concedes Fields is entitled to five days of credit time for July 11, 2022, to July 15, 2022, we remand to the trial court with instructions to award Fields these five accrued days, plus any additional credit that results. See I.C. § 35-50-6-3.1.
Conclusion
[¶14] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Fields' probation and ordered him to execute his previously suspended sentence. But the State concedes Fields is entitled to five days credit from July 11, 2022, to July 15, 2022. We affirm and remand with instructions to allocate credit time consistent with this opinion.
[¶15] Affirmed and remanded.
May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.