Opinion
100587/2014
04-16-2015
Andrew FESLER, Petitioner, v. William J. BRATTON, as the Police Commissioner of the City of New York, and as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, Article II and the Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, Article II, Respondents.
Jeffrey Goldberg, Esq., Port Washington, for Petitioner. Zachary W. Carter, Esq., Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, for Respondents.
Jeffrey Goldberg, Esq., Port Washington, for Petitioner.
Zachary W. Carter, Esq., Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, for Respondents.
Opinion
ALEXANDER W. HUNTER JR., J.The application by Andrew Fesler (“petitioner”) for an order pursuant to C.P.L.R. Article 78: (1) annulling the determination by respondents, denying the petitioner's application for Accident Disability Retirement (“ADR”) benefits pursuant to section 13–352.1 of the New York Administrative Code (“WTC Law”); (2) directing and ordering the respondents to grant petitioner's ADR retirement application as a matter of law; and (3) for an order pursuant to section 2307(a) of the C.P.L.R. directing the respondents to serve and file: (a) all reports, recommendations,certificates and all other documents submitted to the Police Pension Fund in connection with the retirement of the petitioner; (b) copies of the minutes of each meeting where the Board of Trustees considered, discussed or acted with regards to petitioner's ADR application; and (c) copies of any and all medical records, reports or notes relating to petitioner which are on file with Police Pension Fund and/or the New York City Police Department Medical Division including all pre-employment documentation, is denied.
Petitioner was appointed as a uniformed police officer in the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) on January 4, 1984 and served continuously until his retirement in 2004. Throughout his entire service, the petitioner was a member of the Pension Fund, and made all contributions thereto, as required by law. On September 11, 2001, the petitioner was a first responder to the World Trade Center (“WTC”) site, and participated in rescue, recovery, and clean-up operations for several days. The petitioner filed a Notice of Participation form with the Pension Fund indicating that he worked at WTC-designated sites for more than 40 hours between September 11, 2001 and September 12, 2002.
On February 4, 2009, the petitioner was diagnosed with Crohn's Disease (“ileocolitis ”) and gastroesphogeal reflux disease (“GERD”). As a result, on November 9, 2009, the petitioner filed an application for ADR benefits under the WTC Law, claiming that his condition prevented him from fully performing his police officer duties. Thereafter, on three separate occasions, the Police Pension Fund Article II Medical Board (the “Medical Board”) considered the application and examined both the petitioner's physical condition and the evidence submitted in support of his application, and found that (1) the GERD was mild and (2) the ileocolitis may be debilitating however, that condition is not recognized as being caused by exposure at the WTC. Accordingly, the respondents denied the petitioner's application for ADR benefits. Soon thereafter, the petitioner commenced an Article 78 proceeding in the Supreme Court of New York, New York County. On January 11, 2013, the Honorable Justice Louis B. York remanded the matter to the Medical Board, finding that the determination lacked affirmative evidence to support its finding of lack of causation and failed to analyze whether ileocolitis could constitute a qualifying condition. Fessler v. Kelly, 2013 WL 288244 (N.Y.Sup.).
Upon remand, the Medical Board reviewed the ADR and new evidence provided by the petitioner and found that ileocolitis is generally caused by a genetic predisposition. The Medical Board deferred the case in order to research the literature further for a possible connection between WTC toxins to the development of ileocolitis. On September 27, 2013, the Medical Board issued their final report finding that the research did not support a link of known toxins released at the WTC site to ileocolitis. Further they noted that ileocolitis is not among the various conditions quoted in the registries of individuals exposed to the WTC site, nor have they found an increased number of ileocolitis reported cases amongst persons exposed to the WTC site. Accordingly, on February 12, 2014, the Board of Trustees adopted the recommendation of the Medical Board and finalized the denial of the petitioner's ADR application.
Petitioner now seeks to annul the February 12, 2014 determination by the Board of Trustees on that grounds that it was arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law. Specifically, the petitioner avers that: (1) the action of the Medical Board failed, neglected and refused to use the proper legal test of entitlement to an ADR pension applicable in the circumstances; and (2) the action of the Medical Board was contrary to the competent evidence establishing that the petitioner is entitled to ADR pension under the WTC Law. Respondents oppose the petition and request that this court deny the petition on the grounds the Medical Board made a determination based on credible evidence in the record that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of establishing that his disability should be considered a qualifying condition pursuant to the WTC Law.
Pursuant to New York City Administrative Code, N.Y., Code § 13 –252, ADR benefits require that an applicant establish that he or she is “a member in city-service” who “is physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of city-service, as a natural and proximate result” of an “accidental” injury received in city-service. The determination of physical incapacity shall be made by the Medical Board. See Borenstein v. New York City Emples. Ret. Sys., 88 N.Y.2d 756, 760, 650 N.Y.S.2d 614, 673 N.E.2d 899 (1996). Ordinarily, the burden is on the applicant to establish that his or her disabling injury constitutes an accident for ADR purposes. Danyi v. Board of Trustees of New York City Emples. Ret. Sys., 176 A.D.2d 451, 574 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1st Dept.1991). However, in response to the WTC tragedy, “a new statute was enacted creating a presumption in favor of ADR benefits for police officers who performed rescue, recovery or cleanup operations at specified locations, including the World Trade Center.” Bitchatchi v. Bd. of Trustees of New York City Police Dept. Pension Fund, 20 N.Y.3d 268, 276, 958 N.Y.S.2d 680, 982 N.E.2d 600 (2012) ; See New York City Administrative Code, N.Y., Code § 13 –252.1. As amended, the WTC Law established a presumption that “if any condition or impairment of health is caused by a qualifying World Trade Center condition as defined in section two of the Retirement and Social Security Law [“RSSL”], it shall be presumptive evidence that it was incurred in the performance and discharge of duty and the natural and proximate result of an accident not caused by such member's own willful negligence, unless the contrary be proved by competent evidence.” New York City Administrative Code, N.Y., Code § 13 –252.1. Pursuant to N.Y. RSSL §§ 2(36)(c)(iii) and 2(36)(v), a qualifying medical condition shall include “diseases of the gastroesophageal tract, including esophagitis and reflux disease, either acute or chronic, caused by exposure or aggravated by exposure, or a new onset disease resulting from exposure as such diseases occur in the future including cancer, asbestos-related disease, heavy metal poisoning, and musculoskeletal disease ” See N.Y. RSSL § 2.
To take advantage of the presumption, the petitioner must establish that: (1) he worked the requisite hours at the WTC site; and (2) he suffers from a statutorily defined qualifying condition. See Bitchatchi, 20 N.Y.3d 268, 276–277, 958 N.Y.S.2d 680, 982 N.E.2d 600 (2012) ; N.Y. RSSL § 2(36)(c)(v). Here it is uncontested that the petitioner worked the requisite hours as required by law. Thus, the only issue to be decided is whether the petitioner has sufficiently established that his condition is a “qualifying condition” under WTC Law, and if so, whether the Medical Board successfully rebutted the presumption in denying the petitioner's ADR application.
It is well settled that a court will not interfere with the determination of an administrative agency unless there was no rational basis for the decision or if the action was arbitrary and/or capricious. See Rosenkrantz v. McMickens, 131 A.D.2d 389, 517 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1st Dept.1987) ; Pell v. Board of Education, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 313 N.E.2d 321 (1974). Where there is a rational basis to support the findings and conclusions of an administrative agency, a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Howard v. Wyman, 28 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 322 N.Y.S.2d 683, 271 N.E.2d 528 (1971) (“The judicial function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusion approved by the administrative body.”). When, as here, the petitioner is challenging the medical board's finding, such recommendation will not be disturbed if it is based on substantial evidence, which has been construed to require some credible evidence. Borenstein v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 88 N.Y.2d 756, 760–61, 650 N.Y.S.2d 614, 673 N.E.2d 899 (1996).
In the case at bar, the petitioner has failed to establish that his condition constitutes a WTC qualifying condition. Further, this court finds sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the Medical Board's finding that the petitioner's ileocolitis is not, nor was it caused by a WTC qualifying condition. The petitioner, in reliance on Bitchatchi and Dement avers that the Medical Board failed to specify or include the medical literature on which they relied, thus the petition should be granted. See generally Bitchatchi, 20 N.Y.3d 268, 276–277, 958 N.Y.S.2d 680, 982 N.E.2d 600 (2012) ; Matter of Dement v. Kelly, 97 A.D.3d 223, 947 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1st Dept.2012). In both those actions, the threshold issue before the court was whether the respondents had presented substantial evidence to overcome the WTC Law presumption. Here, the central issue is whether ileocolitis is a statutory qualifying condition that will enable the petitioner to take advantage of the presumption. Id. Thus, the petitioner's reliance on Bitchatchi and Dement is misplaced and the petitioner, not the respondent has the burden of establishing that he suffers from a statutorily defined qualifying condition. See Bitchatchi, 20 N.Y.3d 268, 276–277, 958 N.Y.S.2d 680, 982 N.E.2d 600 (2012) ; N.Y. RSSL § 2(36)(c)(v).
Based on the record, it is clear that: (1) the petitioner has failed to submit credible evidence linking ileocolitis to WTC exposure; and (2) the determination by the Board was based on “some credible evidence” and was not arbitrary nor capricious. Credible evidence refers to evidence that “proceeds from a credible source and reasonably tends to support the proposition for which it is offered.” Meyer v. Bd. of Trustees of the New York City Fire Dept., Art. 1–B Pension Fund by Safir, 90 N.Y.2d 139, 147, 659 N.Y.S.2d 215, 681 N.E.2d 382 (1997). At the outset it is noted that ileocolitis is not listed as a qualifying condition under RSSL § 2(36). Moreover, the record reflects that the Medical Board based their determination on petitioner's ADR application and supporting evidence, relevant medical literature, the petitioner's case history, and trends in the WTC worker registries, none of which support a finding that ileocolitis is linked to exposure to WTC toxins.
Petitioner argues that the determination is baseless and that the Board ignored the evidence presented to them. This claim however is without merit as it is clear from the record that the Board considered the nature and circumstances surrounding petitioner's complaint, as well as the medical evidence he presented to the Board. It is well established that “courts cannot weigh medical evidence or substitute their own judgment for that of the Medical Board. Only if the Board of Trustees' determination is wholly irrational' should the court step in and upset the Board's determination.” Appleby v. Herkommer, 165 A.D.2d 727, 563 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1st Dept.1990) (internal citations omitted). Here, the Medical Board has presented credible evidence to support the position that the petitioner's illness is not a statutory qualifying condition. See Meyer v. Bd. of Trustees of the New York City Fire Dept., Art. 1–B Pension Fund by Safir, 90 N.Y.2d 139, 147, 659 N.Y.S.2d 215, 681 N.E.2d 382 (1997) ; Guerra v. Scoppetta, 25 Misc.3d 1207(A), 901 N.Y.S.2d 906 (Sup.Ct.2009) ; Triola v. Kelly, 2011 WL 2743134.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ADJUDGED that, the application by petitioner for an order pursuant to C.P.L.R. Article 78 annulling the determination by respondents, which denied petitioner's application for ADR benefits pursuant to the WTC Law, is denied and the proceeding is dismissed without costs or disbursements to either party.