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Ferreira v. Cornelius

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Placer
Aug 8, 2023
No. C096627 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2023)

Opinion

C096627

08-08-2023

JOSEPH K. FERREIRA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WILLIAM CORNELIUS, as Trustee, etc., Defendant and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

(Super. Ct. No. S-PR-0010635)

DUARTE, J

This is the second appeal arising out of the administration of the Joseph R. Ferreira 2017 Revocable Trust (trust). In 2021, plaintiff Joseph K. Ferreira, a self-represented litigant and nominal trust beneficiary, petitioned to compel an accounting of the trust. Plaintiff's petition also raised claims for breach of duty by the attorney-in-fact, breach of trust, and elder abuse, and it sought various forms of relief, including reimbursement to the trust and other sanctions, removal of the trustee, invalidation of the trust document, and imposition of a constructive trust over the proceeds of the sale of certain real property.

Respondent and trustee William Cornelius distributed the first interim accounting and petitioned the trial court for approval of the accounting. Plaintiff filed numerous objections to the petition for approval. Plaintiff's petition and Cornelius's petition for approval proceeded to trial. As trial was set to begin, plaintiff moved to continue trial on his petition, and the parties conducted a bench trial only on the petition for approval. The trial court issued an order approving the first interim accounting, but plaintiff stopped participating in the proceedings before the court could rule on his motion to continue. The court scheduled a conference to set a trial date for the claims raised in plaintiff's petition.

Plaintiff appealed from the order approving the first interim accounting.

At the trial setting conference, the parties agreed that they were prepared to proceed to trial on the claims raised in plaintiff's petition. However, shortly thereafter plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the trial on the basis that Code of Civil Procedure section 916 and Probate Code section 1310 automatically stayed the proceedings during the pendency of his appeal from the order approving the first interim accounting. The trial court denied that motion and entered judgment against plaintiff after he was unwilling to proceed with trial.

Plaintiff appeals. He contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment against him because the filing of his prior appeal stayed postorder proceedings that could have affected the order on appeal. He also claims the judgment must be reversed due to various defects in the judgment. We disagree with plaintiff's arguments and will affirm the judgment.

After plaintiff filed his opening brief in this case, we issued a nonpublished opinion affirming the trial court's order approving the first interim accounting. (Ferreira v. Cornelius (Nov. 29, 2022, C095849) [nonpub. opn.] (Ferreira I).

On our own motion, we take judicial notice of this prior decision. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Factual Background

In 2017, plaintiff's father (father) created the trust, which entitled plaintiff to a distribution of $2,000 from father's estate upon his death, and plaintiff's sister, Karen Ferreira Sordillo, to the entire balance of the residue of the estate after other specified distributions were made. The trust document further provided Sordillo with discretion to provide living expenses for plaintiff for the remainder of his life. (See Ferreira I, supra, C095849.)

The trust designated Cornelius as the successor trustee should specified circumstances occur. In June 2018, Cornelius began acting as the successor trustee, and was also acting as father's attorney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney. A conservator was appointed for father in October 2018; he died in April 2020. (See Ferreira I, supra, C095849.)

In March 2021, plaintiff filed a verified first amended petition to compel accounts (first amended petition). The petition also claimed that Cornelius had breached his duty as attorney-in-fact, and that Cornelius and Sordillo had committed multiple breaches of trust and elder abuse. The petition sought various forms of relief, including reimbursement to the trust or imposition of other sanctions to redress breaches of duty and trust, "a substantial penalty" and invalidation of the trust related to his elder abuse claims, imposition of a constructive trust over the proceeds of the sale of certain real property that plaintiff alleged was improperly sold, removal of Cornelius as trustee, and replacement of the provisions of the trust with what plaintiff characterized as a "fair and reasonable arrangement." (See Ferreira I, supra, C095849.)

In June 2021, Cornelius distributed the first interim accounting. After receiving a copy of Cornelius's unfiled petition for approval of that accounting, plaintiff filed two documents asserting numerous objections to it. (See Ferreira I, supra, C095849.)

In August 2021, Cornelius responded and objected to plaintiff's first amended petition and separately filed the petition for approval of the first interim accounting (petition for approval), which encompassed the time period from June 20, 2018, to December 31, 2020. In October 2021 and January 2022, plaintiff filed additional oppositions and objections to the accounting. (See Ferreira I, supra, C095849.)

Bench Trial

Plaintiff's first amended petition and Cornelius's petition for approval were set for trial beginning January 27, 2022. At trial, plaintiff--appearing via video conference--orally moved to continue trial on his first amended petition, and trial on Cornelius's petition for approval proceeded. (See Ferreira I, supra, C095849.)

Cornelius testified that all entries listed in the first interim accounting were" 'appropriate and correct'" aside from one entry regarding the trust's interest in certain real property. Plaintiff cross-examined Cornelius about issues related to the written objections he made to the accounting prior to trial. In response to plaintiff's questioning, Cornelius testified that he was authorized to act as successor trustee as of June 2018 and had authority to make disbursements from the trust prior to October 2018 because he was acting as father's attorney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney. No other witness testified at trial, and plaintiff did not offer any evidence. (See Ferreira I, supra, C095849.)

Plaintiff argued in closing that Cornelius did not become the successor trustee until a conservator was appointed for father in October 2018, and thus was not authorized to make trust disbursements from June to October 2018. When asked whether he objected to any "specific expenses," plaintiff responded that he had already expressed his objections and stated that he had "nothing further" to add. (See Ferreira I, supra, C095849.)

The trial court approved the first interim accounting aside from one modification related to the trust's interest in certain real property, as Cornelius testified. The court found that Cornelius was authorized to act as successor trustee and as father's attorneyin-fact during the challenged time period (i.e., June 2018 to October 2018). The court also found that plaintiff made no substantial objections to the accounting. (See Ferreira I, supra, C095849.)

Before the trial court could address plaintiff's motion to continue trial on his first amended petition, plaintiff disconnected from the video due to an unspecified health issue that he asserted required him to be hospitalized immediately. The court continued trial as to those claims and subsequently issued a written order and judgment approving the first interim accounting. Plaintiff timely appealed from that order. (See Ferreira I, supra, C095849.)

Postorder Proceedings

A week after plaintiff filed his appeal, the parties participated in a conference at which they confirmed they were ready to proceed to trial on the claims raised by plaintiff's first amended petition. The trial court directed the parties to file witness lists and trial briefs by April 14 and set the one-day trial for April 21. Plaintiff did not file a trial brief or witness list.

On March 17, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the trial, which argued the postorder proceeding was automatically stayed pending his appeal of the trial court's order approving the first interim accounting. A week later, plaintiff filed a "supplemental argument" in support of his motion to vacate, which indicated that he would not participate in a trial that he asserted would threaten the viability of the pending appeal. The trial court set the hearing on the motion for the same date trial was scheduled to take place.

As we will explain in greater detail, post, postorder proceedings are automatically stayed where the postorder proceedings on the matter" 'would have any effect on the "effectiveness" of the appeal.'" (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189 (Varian).)

Cornelius argued in opposition to plaintiff's motion to vacate that the postorder proceedings were not automatically stayed because the order on appeal only involved his petition for approval, not the claims raised by plaintiff in his "wholly separate" first amended petition. However, Cornelius acknowledged that plaintiff's request for imposition of constructive trust was connected to the sale of certain real property that was listed in the approved accounting, and he stated that he did not intend to put that matter at issue during trial.

In reply to Cornelius's opposition, plaintiff pointed to Cornelius's concession that there was some overlap between the issues to be decided in the second trial and those on appeal and argued that the possible outcomes of the postorder proceeding could potentially affect the order on appeal. Plaintiff also filed a document entitled "further argument in support of motion to vacate April 21, 2022 court trial," which contended in part that adjudicating his breach of trust claims and his challenge to Cornelius's authority to act as trustee from June to October 2018 could potentially affect the order on appeal.

On April 21, 2022, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion to vacate the trial; it concluded the postorder proceeding was not automatically stayed because the issue on appeal did not meaningfully affect the matters set for trial. Plaintiff refused to proceed with trial, and the court ruled against him and thereafter entered judgment. Plaintiff timely appealed.

Our Prior Opinion

After plaintiff filed his opening brief in this appeal, we issued our opinion affirming the trial court's order approving the first interim accounting. (Ferreira I, supra, C095849.) In setting out the relevant legal background, we noted that a trustee seeking approval of an accounting" 'must present to the trial court satisfactory evidence of the accuracy and propriety of the items in his account.'" (Ibid., quoting Estate of McLaughlin (1954) 43 Cal.2d 462, 465-466.) A contested accounting must be resolved at an evidentiary hearing, at which "the evidence submitted by the trustee must show that the' "disbursements were correct in amount and that the disbursements claimed were for proper purposes." '" (Ibid., quoting Neel v. Barnard (1944) 24 Cal.2d 406, 420.) We recognized, however: "While a trustee may have the initial burden of establishing the correctness of the accounting, the trustee does not have the burden of disproving charges of dereliction of duty and malfeasance which do not arise from anything on the face of the accounting but are grounded in other matters." (Ibid., citing Neel v. Barnard, supra, 24 Cal.2d at p. 420 and LaMonte v. Sanwa Bank California (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 509, 517 [the beneficiary of the trust has the initial burden of proving the existence of a fiduciary duty and the trustee's failure to perform it; the burden then shifts to the trustee to justify its actions].)

Turning to plaintiff's primary arguments on appeal, we concluded that the trial court did not erroneously shift the burden of proof to him to establish the inaccuracy of the first interim accounting, and sufficient evidence supported the accounting. (Ferreira I, supra, C095492.)

We then rejected plaintiff's argument that, because Cornelius did not have authority to act as successor trustee from June to October 2018, the trial court committed reversible error by approving disbursements occurring during that time. (Ferreira I, supra, C095492.) We reiterated that the trial "only concerned" the approval of the first interim accounting, and thus "[t]he question before the court was whether the items in the accounting were correct and for a proper purpose." (Ibid..) Because Cornelius did not bear the burden to defend against charges of dereliction of duty or malfeasance not arising from the face of his accounts, the trial court did not need to reach the issue of whether Cornelius had authority to act as successor trustee during the challenged time period. (Ibid.) Accordingly, we concluded plaintiff had failed to demonstrate reversible error "[r]egardless of the accuracy of [his] point." (Ibid.)

We also rejected plaintiff's arguments that the trial court failed to rule on his specific objections to the accounting, and the accounting omitted trust assets. (Ferreira I, supra, C095492.)

Plaintiff's current (second) appeal was fully briefed in May 2023 and was assigned to the current panel on May 31, 2023.

DISCUSSION

I

Staying Postorder Proceedings

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to vacate the trial and instead entering judgment against him because Code of Civil Procedure section 916 and Probate Code section 1310 automatically stayed the postorder proceeding concerning his first amended petition during the pendency of his appeal. But as we will explain, the postorder proceeding was not automatically stayed because the claims raised in plaintiff's first amended petition would not have affected the "effectiveness" of the pending appeal.

A. Applicable Law

Probate Code section 1310 provides in pertinent part: "[A]n appeal pursuant to Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 1300) stays the operation and effect of the judgment or order." Probate Code section 1300 provides that an appeal may be taken from an order "[s]ettling an account of a fiduciary" or an order "[a]uthorizing, instructing, or directing a fiduciary, or approving or confirming the acts of a fiduciary." (Id., subds. (b), (c).)

Similarly, Code of Civil Procedure section 916 provides in relevant part that "the perfecting of an appeal stays [the] proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order." (Id., subd. (a).)

The order appealed from here arose out of a dispute over a trust and involved the trustee's accounting, and therefore Probate Code section 1310 is the more specific provision and must be applied, as opposed to the stay provision contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 916, which generally applies in civil actions. (Blumberg v. Minthorne (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1392.) However, while the pertinent language in Probate Code section 1310 differs from that in Code of Civil Procedure section 916, both statutes essentially stay the effect of a judgment. (Compare Prob. Code, § 1310, subd. (a) [appeal "stays the operation and effect of a probate judgment"]; with Code Civ. Proc. § 916 [stays "proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby"].) Because the effect of the provisions is sufficiently similar, authorities discussing the automatic stay provision contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 916 may inform our application of that provision of Probate Code section 1310.

Our Supreme Court construed the automatic stay provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 916 in Varian. There, the court recognized that the purpose of the statute's automatic stay provision" 'is to protect the appellate court's jurisdiction by preserving the status quo until the appeal is decided' "; that is, to" 'prevent[] the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by altering the appealed judgment or order by conducting proceedings that may affect it.'" (Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 189.) "In determining whether a proceeding is embraced in or affected by the appeal, [courts] must consider the appeal and its possible outcomes in relation to the proceeding and its possible results. '[W]hether a matter is "embraced" in or "affected" by a judgment [or order] within the meaning of [Code Civ. Proc. § 916] depends on whether postjudgment [or postorder] proceedings on the matter would have any effect on the "effectiveness" of the appeal.' [Citation.] 'If so, the proceedings are stayed; if not, the proceedings are permitted.'" (Ibid.)

The Varian court clarified, however: "The fact that the postjudgment or postorder proceeding may render the appeal moot is not, by itself, enough to establish that the proceeding affects the effectiveness of the appeal and should be stayed under [Code Civ. Proc.] section 916. Rather, something more is needed. For example, the trial court proceeding must directly or indirectly seek to 'enforce, vacate or modify [the] appealed judgment or order.' [Citation.] Or the proceeding must substantially interfere with the appellate court's ability to conduct the appeal." (Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 189190, footnote omitted.) Other examples include where the potential outcomes on appeal and the actual or potential results in the subsequent proceeding are irreconcilable, and where the purpose of the appeal is to avoid the need for the subsequent proceeding. (Id. at p. 190.)

"By contrast, an appeal does not stay proceedings on 'ancillary or collateral matters which do not affect the judgment [or order] on appeal' even though the proceedings may render the appeal moot." (Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 191.) "A postjudgment or postorder proceeding is . . . ancillary or collateral to the appeal despite its potential effect on the appeal, if the proceeding could or would have occurred regardless of the outcome of the appeal." (Ibid.) Thus, for example, "an appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction does not stay further trial court proceedings on the merits" because the injunction is merely a" 'preliminary or interlocutory order to keep the subject of litigation in status quo pending the determination of the action on its merits,'" and "the affirmance or reversal of its denial does not and cannot eliminate the need for additional proceedings on the merits." (Ibid.)

When a party contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to make a challenged order, we review de novo the issue of whether the trial court had the requisite jurisdiction. (In re Marriage of Jensen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 587, 592.)

B. Analysis

To reiterate, the first trial (and order on appeal) "only concerned the issue of whether the first interim accounting should be approved." (Ferreira I, supra, C095849.) There, Cornelius bore the burden of proving the accuracy and propriety of the items listed in the first interim accounting, but all claims regarding dereliction of duty or malfeasance not arising from anything on the face of the trustee's accounts were not before the court. (Ibid.; see Estate of de Laveaga (1958) 50 Cal.App.2d 480, 487 [settlement of an account "is not conclusive except as to such items as are included in it and are actually passed upon by the probate court"]; Estate of Howard (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 250, 258 [decree settling account not conclusive upon issues of misconduct not determined by the probate court]; Lazzarone v. Bank of America (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 581, 591 [approval of accounting res judicata on issue of misconduct where results of misconduct are evident on the face of the accounting].)

The postorder proceeding, on the other hand, was expected to address claims of dereliction of duty or malfeasance not before the court in the first trial: plaintiff's claims of breach of duty by the attorney-in-fact, breach of trust, and elder abuse.

Plaintiff argues that the postorder proceeding was automatically stayed because possible outcomes of that proceeding could have affected the status quo upon which the appeal was premised. Specifically, he notes that the first interim accounting listed proceeds from the sale of certain real property, and his first amended petition claimed that Cornelius had improperly sold that property and requested that the trial court impose a constructive trust over the proceeds of that sale. In support of his argument, he observes that Cornelius conceded that his claim for imposition of constructive trust "would be connected to the accounting" and that Cornelius "[did] not intend on putting that matter at issue during [the second] trial."

Plaintiff's position appears to be that the postorder proceeding was automatically stayed because it could potentially alter the status of a trust asset that was listed in the accounting approved by the court. However, the issue before us is whether the postorder proceeding could have altered the appealed order itself. (See Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 189.) Examination of our prior opinion helps to illustrate this key distinction. In his first appeal, plaintiff challenged the trial court's conclusion that Cornelius was authorized to act as successor trustee from June to October 2018. (Ferreira I, supra, C095849.) In rejecting the argument, we concluded that we did not need to reach the merits of plaintiff's claim because the first trial "only concerned the issue of whether the first interim accounting should be approved," and Cornelius's authority to act as successor trustee had no bearing on that narrow issue. (Ibid.) In other words, while Cornelius's authority to act as successor trustee was undoubtedly relevant to the status of trust assets listed in the first interim accounting, his authority to act in that capacity was not relevant to the narrow issue on appeal.

Similar reasoning can be applied to each of the claims that were set to be addressed in the postorder proceeding. Trial court determinations regarding each of plaintiff's claims could have affected the status of items listed in the first interim accounting that was approved by the court. However, such determinations would not have had any effect on appealed order because none of them challenged the correctness or propriety of the accounting itself, which was the issue on appeal. Instead, each claim asserted issues related to Cornelius's and Sordillo's conduct, which were not at issue on appeal, and determinations on these topics would not have affected the validity of the order on appeal.

Plaintiff's next argues that inherent conflicts between the appeal and the issues set to be adjudicated in the postorder trial could have led to irreconcilable results. (See Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 190 [postorder proceeding affects the effectiveness of the appeal "if the possible outcomes on appeal and the actual or possible results of the proceeding are irreconcilable"].) He contends that irreconcilable results were possible because his first amended petition alleged that Cornelius lacked authority to act either as father's attorney-in-fact or as successor trustee from June to October 2018, and the trial court concluded that Cornelius did have such authority. However, as we have discussed, Cornelius's authority to act as successor trustee was not at issue in the first appeal (Ferreira I, supra, C095849), and therefore any postorder determination regarding that issue would not have had potential to cause irreconcilable results.

Plaintiff asserts that such inherent conflicts were "numerous" and that his examples are merely "illustrative," but we will address only those arguments he adequately raises. (See Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [judgment or order of the trial court is presumed to be correct, and it is the appellant's burden to affirmatively demonstrate reversible error]; Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [we are not required to consider undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for an appellant]; Kaufman v. Goldman (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 734, 743 [appellate court may treat as forfeited any argument not "supported by both coherent argument and pertinent legal authority"].)

Based on our conclusion, we do not need to decide whether litigation (or relitigation) of these issues would have been precluded based on the trial court's prior decision on that issue. (See Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 327 [issue preclusion prevents relitigation of previously decided issues].)

Plaintiff also asserts that irreconcilable results were possible because his first amended petition claimed that specific disbursements listed in the first interim accounting were misappropriations of trust assets. But as we have discussed at length, ante, a postorder determination regarding alleged asset misappropriation would not affect the effectiveness of the appeal, given the nature of the issue on appeal.

A postorder proceeding is ancillary or collateral to the appeal, and thus does not stay proceedings, if the proceeding could or would have occurred regardless of the outcome on appeal. (Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 191.) That is the case here. Plaintiff's first amended petition raised claims regarding Cornelius's and Sordillo's conduct that the trial court expressly declined to address in the first trial, and those claims would have been litigated irrespective of the outcome of the first appeal. (See ibid. [affirmance or reversal of order on appeal "does not and cannot eliminate the need for additional proceedings on the merits"].)

The postorder proceedings at issue here would have had no effect on the effectiveness of the pending appeal, and thus those proceedings were not automatically stayed. The trial court did not err by denying his motion to vacate the trial or by entering judgment against him.

Plaintiff further claims that the order approving the first interim accounting failed to address his objections to the accounting, including that the accounting failed to satisfy the content requirements set forth in Probate Code section 16063, and omitted various trust assets. (See Estate of McMillin (1956) 46 Cal.2d 121, 128 [objections to an accounting "may include exceptions not only to what is affirmatively stated in an account, but also to what is omitted therefrom"].) Plaintiff was required to raise these challenges in his direct appeal from the order approving the first interim accounting, and he may not raise them here.

II

Alleged Defects in the Judgment

Plaintiff contends that the judgment must be reversed because it suffers from various defects. We disagree.

Plaintiff first argues that the judgment denied relief that he did not request, including "Duty As Agent" and "Expunge Instruments." The judgment stated that it concerned plaintiff's March 23, 2021, petition "to compel trustee and agent accounts, re breach of trust and breach of duty as agent, re elder abuse, and to expunge instruments." Plaintiff's first amended petition sought relief "to redress breaches of duty by the attorney in fact," which is reasonably shortened to "breach of duty as agent." (Capitalization omitted.) The judgment's reference to "expunge instruments" reasonably refers to plaintiff's request to invalidate the trust document. Plaintiff's claim lacks merit.

Plaintiff next characterizes the judgment's statement that he "did not file . . . any pre-trial filings motions or other filings" as "blatantly false." He asserts that he filed "numerous pre-trial documents," including his motion to vacate the trial, his arguments in favor of the motion to vacate, and his reply to Cornelius's opposition to his motion to vacate. However, plaintiff's argument misrepresents the judgment, which reads in relevant part: "Despite his participation in [the March 10, 2022, trial setting conference], [plaintiff] did not file a witness list, a trial brief, or any pre-trial filings motions or other filings for the April 2022 trial, and was unprepared to proceed." (Italics added.) None of the documents to which plaintiff refers was filed "for the April 2022 trial"; they were each filed to vacate the trial. Indeed, plaintiff concedes that his" 'pre-trial filings' clearly disclosed that he would not participate in any court trial for strategic [§] 916 reasons which explains his failure to submit a witness list or trial brief--both acts that would have been pointless." This argument, too, clearly lacks merit.

Plaintiff also cites to his declaration and supplemental declaration in support of his request for an emergency continuance of the first trial, which are irrelevant to his claim.

Finally, plaintiff observes that judgment was entered "for respondents," but the clerk's minutes from the hearing reflected that judgment "[was] in favor of the Trustee." (Italics added.) He argues that the judgment "cannot be allowed to remain as if it [were] a legitimate enforceable court process" because it "completely misstates the outcome of an important contested proceeding." Plaintiff fails to explain how a written judgment can misstate the outcome of a proceeding. The court's order is that which is written, signed, and filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1003.) A court's oral statement cannot impeach a written judgment or order. (Smith v. City of Napa (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 194, 199; In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 756, fn. 1 [dependency court's written visitation order controls over potentially conflicting statements regarding visitation made during the hearing].) If the clerk's minutes diverged from the court's oral statements (which do not appear in the record provided to us), any discrepancy is presumed to be a clerical error in the minutes. (See People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324 [" 'To the extent a minute order diverges from the sentencing proceedings it purports to memorialize, it is presumed to be the product of clerical error' "].) This claim also fails to persuade.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)

We concur: Robie, Acting P. J., Mesiwala, J.


Summaries of

Ferreira v. Cornelius

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Placer
Aug 8, 2023
No. C096627 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2023)
Case details for

Ferreira v. Cornelius

Case Details

Full title:JOSEPH K. FERREIRA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WILLIAM CORNELIUS, as…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Third District, Placer

Date published: Aug 8, 2023

Citations

No. C096627 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2023)