Opinion
January 19, 1999.
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Coppola, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the facts, by deleting from the second decretal paragraph thereof the year "1987" and substituting therefor the year "1988"; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (d) (12) provides that in determining the equitable distribution, of marital property, the court may consider "any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration". Here, the evidence adduced at trial supported the court's conclusion that the transfer of the plaintiff's interest in A.J. Land Development Corporation to a trust for the parties' son, some two months before the commencement of this action, was made in contemplation of the matrimonial action and in order to remove the asset from his holdings. Although both parties challenge the court's valuation of this asset, we decline to disturb that determination on appeal. Similarly, the evidence before the trial court was sufficient, to support its conclusion that the pension plan distribution made to the plaintiff's mother constituted a wasteful dissipation of a marital asset within the meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (d) (11).
The amount and duration of maintenance to be awarded in a divorce action is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court ( see, O'Sullivan v. O'Sullivan, 247 A.D.2d 597; Matter of Kornfeld v. Kornfeld, 224 A.D.2d 620). Here, the court properly concluded that the defendant, who was 40 years old at the time of trial and whose last employment outside the home was eight years earlier as a promotional model at Neiman Marcus, was in need of rehabilitative maintenance to become self-supporting ( see, Sperling v. Sperling, 165 A.D.2d 338). Under the circumstances of this case, the amount and duration of maintenance awarded to the defendant were neither excessive nor inadequate.
The award of reasonable counsel fees is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and is controlled by the equities of the case and the financial circumstances of the parties ( see, Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]; DeCabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879; Lee v. Oi Wa Chan, 245 A.D.2d 270). Here, considering the disparity in the parties' resources and the size of the distributive award to the defendant, it cannot be said that the court improvidently exercised its discretion in requiring the plaintiff to pay the sum of $212,000 as reasonable counsel fees to the defendant's attorney. Nor do we find the total amount of the award to be either excessive as the plaintiff contends, or inadequate as the nonparty law firm maintains.
The defendant's contention that the court erred in rejecting the valuation testimony of her expert must fail. In a nonjury trial, evaluating the credibility of the respective witnesses and determining which of the proffered evidence was most credible are matters committed to the trial court's sound discretion ( see, Matter of Adirondack Hydro Dev. Corp., 205 A.D.2d 925, 926). "The determination of a fact-finder as to the value of a business, if it is within the range of the testimony presented, will not be disturbed on appeal where valuation of the business rested primarily on the credibility of expert witnesses and their valuation techniques" ( Dempster v. Dempster, 236 A.D.2d 582, quoting Matter of Penepent Corp., 198 A.D.2d 782, 783).
The parties agree that the judgment of divorce incorrectly states the year of birth of the parties' son. We, therefore, have modified the judgment accordingly.
The remaining contentions of the parties are without merit or do not warrant modification of the judgment.
Bracken, J.P., Miller, Ritter and Thompson, JJ., concur.