Summary
In Faulkner v. McCormick, 2002 WL 31465892 (E. D. La., November 1, 2002) (Zainey, J.), the court was faced with the situation in which the plaintiff, Faulkner, had filed his § 1983 claims with his retrial pending.
Summary of this case from Bush v. StrainOpinion
Civil Action No. 02-0326, Section "A" (5)
October 31, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 16.) filed by defendants, William McCormick, Patrick Canulette, and Rodney Jack Strain, Jr. Plaintiff, Charles Faulkner, opposes the motion. The motion, set for hearing on October 23, 2002, is before the Court on briefs without oral argument.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Charles Faulkner (Faulkner) and Frederick Kirkpatrick (Kirkpatrick) were convicted in state court of murdering Steven Radoste (Radoste). Faulkner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence.
At trial, it was revealed that Faulkner and Kirkpatrick had been hitchhiking from Mississippi to New Orleans when Radoste picked them up and offered to let them stay at his house for the night. Faulkner's defense at the murder trial was that Radoste had made unwanted homosexual advances towards Kirkpatrick after they arrived at Radoste's home, and that out of anger Kirkpatrick had been driven to murder. Faulkner testified that he helped Kirkpatrick destroy Radoste's belongings after the murder because he was afraid of him, but that he did not assist Kirkpatrick in the actual murder.
At trial the State presented evidence that Radoste was a heterosexual so as to defeat the defense's theory that the murder had occurred following a homosexual advance. It was later revealed however, that the State had suppressed the fact that a drawer of rubber gloves known to be used in certain homosexual activity as well as pornographic magazines depicting nude men were found in Radoste's home. Further, the State had presented evidence that a crutch had been found next to the victim's body and this revelation tended to undermine the assertion of self-defense or that Faulkner feared Radoste. The State had also suppressed, however, the fact that officers of the Pearl River Police Department were actually the first to arrive at the crime scene and that they later admitted having seen no crutch next to the body.
In February 2001, this Court granted Faulkner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus finding that the State had suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Court ordered the State to either release Faulkner or retry him. The State elected to retry Faulkner.
With his retrial pending, Faulkner filed the instant suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Rodney Jack Strain, Jr., the sheriff of St. Tammany Parish, Patrick Canulette, the former sheriff of the Parish, and William McCormick, the former detective who testified at trial against Faulkner, seeking monetary damages for his unlawful conviction. The defendants now move for summary judgment.
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS
Defendants contend the Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), and its progeny. They contend that the Heck line of cases bars a section 1983 suit where success in the section 1983 would imply the invalidity of a pending criminal prosecution. In the alternative, they argue the Plaintiff's claim should be stayed pending the outcome of his retrial in the state criminal system.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that a section 1983 cause of action accrued when the district court granted his habeas petition and reversed his conviction. He points out that under the facts of this case, a victory in the section 1983 action would not invalidate a potential criminal conviction on retrial because the exculpatory evidence is now available and any tainted evidence will not be used by the prosecution. In the alternative, Plaintiff does not oppose a stay pending the outcome of the retrial.
DISCUSSION
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.477, 486, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a section 1983 plaintiff seeking to recover money damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction invalid, must prove that the conviction has either been reversed on appeal or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The Heck Court emphasized that its holding grew out of a concern that a prisoner should not be permitted to collaterally attack a conviction by means of a civil suit brought under section 1983. Id. at 482, 114 S.Ct. at 2369-70. Thus, at the core of Heck is a proscription against allowing a civil tort suit to cast doubt on a criminal conviction. Id. at 487, 114 S.Ct. at 2372-73. Where no conflict exists between the conviction and the claims involved in the civil complaint, however, the section 1983 suit should be allowed to proceed. Id.
Although Heck did not address the situation where a prisoner has had his conviction reversed but then faces retrial, the Fifth Circuit has squarely addressed that situation on more than one occasion. See, e.g., Clay v, Allen, 242 F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 2001); Davis v. Zain, 79 F.3d 18, 19 (5th Cir. 1996). Cases like Clay and Davis demonstrate that there is no per se rule against allowing a 1983 suit that grew out of an invalid conviction to move forward when plaintiff faces retrial. Rather, applyingHeck, the district court must look to the facts of the specific case at hand to determine whether a victory in the 1983 suit would impact the pending retrial or potentially lead to inconsistent results. See Clay, 242 F.3d at 680. If no such conflict exists under the facts of the case, then the 1983 suit should go forward. See id. Where doubts exist, however, the district court has the discretion to stay the civil suit while the state criminal trial goes forward. Davis, 79 F.3d at 19 (citing Heck, 114 S.Ct. at 2373 n. 8)
As Faulkner points out, the crucial inquiry in this motion for summary judgment is whether his section 1983 damage claims would "challenge" any potential criminal conviction following the retrial. Faulkner's section 1983 suit is based upon Defendants' allegedly unlawful suppression of exculpatory evidence and alleged conspiracy to manufacture evidence. A victory on the Brady claims in the section 1983 suit would have no foreseeable impact on the retrial because Faulkner now has full knowledge of all the evidence and will have that evidence at his disposal during his second trial. Less clear, however, is the potential for conflict regarding the allegation that Defendants manufactured evidence of the crutch found next to the victim's body. Although Faulkner now has the benefit of the testimony of the Pearl River officers, first to arrive on the scene, who do not recall seeing a crutch, it is unclear whether the St. Tammany officers who later arrived nevertheless plan to testify that a crutch was in fact found at the scene. Thus, the Court is less clear as to whether a finding in the section 1983 suit that evidence of the crutch was manufactured would be inconsistent with the State's case during the retrial.
Based on the foregoing, the Court declines to decide one way or the other at this time whether Heck and its progeny pose a bar to Faulkner's suit. If Faulkner is ultimately acquitted, it would seem that the prior reversal would permit him to freely pursue his claims. If he is ultimately convicted, however, the Court will then have to examine his complaint allegation by allegation to determine what claims, if any, might tend to cast doubt on his conviction. Therefore, out of an abundance of caution the Court concludes that a stay of this matter is warranted so that the retrial can go forward in state court without any concerns of conflict between the cases or potential for inconsistent results. Both parties agree that a stay is an acceptable disposition at this time.
Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 16) should be and is hereby GRANTED insofar as this matter is STAYED pending the outcome of Faulkner's retrial in state court;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court mark this action CLOSED for statistical purposes. The Court shall retain jurisdiction and the case shall be restored to the trial docket upon motion of a party if circumstances change, so that it may proceed to final disposition; this order shall not prejudice the rights of the parties to this litigation.