Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-2836, SECTION "I" (3)
May 21, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) filed by the defendants, Sheriff Rodney Jack Strain, Jr., Detective Dale Galloway and Deputy Ronald Plaisance. For the following reasons, the defendant's motion is DENIED AS PREMATURE and a STAY OF THE PROCEEDINGS is ordered awaiting the outcome of the pending criminal charges.
BACKGROUND
On October 9, 2003, plaintiff, Holly Bush ("Bush"), brought the instant civil rights claim pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages for an alleged beating she received at the hands of St. Tammany Parish Detective Dale Galloway after she was placed in restraints. Plaintiff specifically alleges, to wit: "While the plaintiff was handcuffed with her wrists behind her back, the defendant, Galloway, grabbed the plaintiff behind the neck and slammed her face into the back of a parked car, causing permanent injury to her teeth, mouth, face, head, neck and jaw." See Plaintiff's Complaint at ¶ 8. The plaintiff further alleges that Deputy Plaisance observed the use of excessive force but failed to intervene and subsequently conspired with Galloway to cover up the use of excessive force by failing to report it and by misrepresenting that the force deployed was necessary to effect her arrest and place her in restraints. See id. at ¶¶ 8-9. Plaintiffs' claims of constitutional magnitude include false arrest, excessive force and conspiracy.
Defendants' version of the events varies in significant particulars. Defendants contend that on the date in question, Plaisance and Galloway were responding to a call reporting that two females were causing a disturbance in the parking lot of the Blue Harbor Car Wash in Mandeville, Louisiana. After arriving on the scene, the officers submit that they proceeded to interview Ms. Beyl and instructed the plaintiff to leave the area so that they could complete the interview. According to the officers, plaintiff returned to the area and threw a cup of ice on Ms. Beyl, whereupon Detective Galloway arrested the plaintiff for simple battery. The defendants' contention is that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by her own combative behavior in resisting their efforts to place her in handcuffs. More particularly, defendants aver that the plaintiff's own forceful actions caused her to strike her mouth against the rear of a vehicle. After she was restrained, plaintiff was placed in Detective Galloway's patrol car, transported to St. Tammany Parish Jail and charged with simple battery and resisting arrest.
Plaintiff's criminal trial on both charges of simply battery and resisting arrest was originally set to commence on February 20, 2004, but the matter was continued and reset for April 19, 2004. Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss in the interim, arguing that the plaintiff's claims are barred by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), highlighting the aforesaid criminal charges that are presently pending against the plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed a formal opposition memorandum noting that she has not pled guilty, nor has she been convicted on either charge. Plaintiff submits that her claims of false arrest and excessive force are not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), there being no guilty pleas or conviction to date.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the pleading party. The complaint should only be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt that the pleading party can prove no set of facts in support of the claims raised that would entitle her to relief. The question is whether in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in her behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief. Although there are exceptions to the mandate, generally a court should consider only the pleadings when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. When a court considers matters outside of the pleadings, Rule12(b) requires that the motion be treated as if it were one for summary judgment and that the matter be disposed of as provided in Rule 56.
See Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom, Cloud v. United States, 536 U.S. 960 (2002); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995).
See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995); Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868 (1994).
See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1999).
The principal purpose of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 is to "isolate and dispose" of factually unsupported claims. Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. . . ." There is no "genuine issue" when the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmovant. Summary judgment will be granted against "a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." On a motion for summary judgment, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Notwithstanding the absence of a conviction on either pending charge, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs claims for damages under § 1983 are Heck-barred. As aforestated, plaintiff counters that Heck does not technically address pending criminal charges.In Heck the Court stated its holding as follows, to wit:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. . . . Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 1994) (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court imposed this requirement on § 1983 plaintiffs in order to avoid their collateral attacks on convictions that are still outstanding, finding that the principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damage actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement.
Id.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744 (5th Cir. 1995) appears to have addressed the Heck-bar in the context of pending charges. Although it is not clear, it appears that the plaintiff Mackey had been confined after his indictment but had not yet been tried or convicted. Consequently, the court could not determine whether Heck would or would not apply. The Mackey court observed:
The record does not clearly reflect that a successful attack on Mackey's arrests will implicate the validity of his confinement. It is not clear whether or not Mackey has been tried or convicted. When his suit was filed, it appears that he was confined pursuant to the March 21 indictment, the validity of which would not necessarily be implicated by any illegality of his earlier arrests. If Mackey is tried and convicted and in his contested criminal case no evidence is presented resulting directly or indirectly from any of his arrests, it is difficult to see how any illegality in any of his arrests could be inconsistent with his conviction. On the other hand, if he is convicted and evidence is presented by the prosecution at his criminal trial which is a direct or indirect product of one or more of his arrests, then his section 1983 damage claims challenging the validity of his arrests would appear to undermine the validity of his conviction and hence be barred by Heck. . . .
At this point it is simply premature to determine whether or not Mackey's damage claims are barred under Heck. Accordingly, the district court erred in dismissing the claims on the basis of Heck The court may — indeed should — stay proceedings in the section 1983 case until the pending criminal case has run its course, as until that time it may be difficult to determine the relation, if any, between the two.
Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995).
In Guillory v. Wheeler, 303 F. Supp.2d 808 (M. D. La., February 6, 2004), the issue of Heck's applicability to pending criminal charges was addressed, albeit in the context of a defense motion to stay further proceedings on Guillory's § 1983 false arrest and excessive force claims pending the resolution of the criminal charge for battery of a police officer. Noting out-of-circuit precedents holding that Heck applies to potential convictions on pending criminal charges, Guillory observed that, while Heck technically does not apply because the plaintiff has not been convicted, sentenced or imprisoned, it makes good sense to apply the rationale to a pending conviction. Nevertheless, the Guillory court opted to steer the course "strongly suggested by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals" and stayed the proceedings until the pending criminal case was finally determined,
See Washington v. Summerville, 127 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1073 (1998); Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3 rd Cir. 1996).
Guillory v. Wheeler, 303 F. Supp.2d 808, 810 (M. D. La., February 6, 2004).
Id. at 811.
In Faulkner v. McCormick, 2002 WL 31465892 (E. D. La., November 1, 2002) (Zainey, J.), the court was faced with the situation in which the plaintiff, Faulkner, had filed his § 1983 claims with his retrial pending. Prior to filing his § 1983 claims, the court had granted Faulkner's petition for habeas corpus finding that the State had suppressed exculpatory evidence and ordered the State to either release Faulkner or retry him. The State elected to retry Faulkner.
The Faulkner court recognized that "the core of Heck is a proscription against allowing a civil tort suit to cast doubt on a criminal conviction." The court further noted:
Faulkner v. McCormick, 2002 WL 31465892 * 2 (E. D. La., November 1, 2002) ( citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487).
Although Heck did not address the situation where a prisoner has had his conviction reversed but then faces retrial, the Fifth Circuit has squarely addressed that situation on more than one occasion. See e.g., Clay v. Alien, 242 F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 2001); Davis v. Zain, 79 F.3d 18, 19 (5th Cir. 1996). Cases like Clay and Davis demonstrate that there is no per se rule against allowing a 1983 suit to move forward when the plaintiff faces retrial. Rather, applying Heck, the district court must look to the facts of the specific case at hand to determine whether a victory in the 1983 suit would impact the pending retrial or potentially lead to inconsistent results. See Clay, 242 F.3d at 680. If no such conflict exists under the facts of the case, then the 1983 suit should go forward. See id. Where doubts exist, however, the district court has the discretion to stay the civil suit while the state criminal trial goes forward. Davis, 79 F.3d at 19 ( citing Heck, 114 S.Ct. at 2373 n. 8).
Id. See also Somerville v. Hagood, 2002 WL 31246773 * 4 (N.D. Tex., August 12, 2002) (noting that the Fifth Circuit has held that the reversal of a conviction with a remand for new trial may be sufficient to overcome the Heck bar).
Considering the applicable law discussed above, the crucial inquiry in this motion to dismiss is whether the § 1983 damage claims would "challenge" any potential criminal conviction resulting from the trial on the charges of simple battery and resisting arrest presently pending against Bush. In her complaint, plaintiff, Holly Bush ("Bush") contends that (1) excessive force was used during her arrest (2) her head was bashed into the rear of a vehicle after she was placed in restraints i.e., with her hands cuffed behind her back and (3) that the defendant officers conspired to cover up the excessive force employed after she was subdued by falsely arresting her for resisting arrest.
If the Court were to grant plaintiff damages for the alleged false arrest under the facts of this case, such ruling would necessarily implicate the validity of any potential conviction for simple battery. If there is probable cause for any charge made, then the arrest was supported by probable cause and the claim for false arrest would fail.
See Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that Heck bars recovery under a false arrest theory, because a conviction for aggravated assault necessarily implies that there was probable cause for his arrest at that point in time); Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995).
The Court now turns to plaintiff's claims of excessive force deployed during and/or after her arrest. In Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth Circuit held that Heck barred the plaintiffs § 1983 claims alleging excessive force. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs excessive force claim was barred because it necessarily implied his conviction under Louisiana law. The plaintiff in Hudson was convicted of battery on an officer.
Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 1996)
In the case at bar, the defendants aver that the plaintiff's head injuries occurred while law enforcement officers attempted to subdue her and to effect her arrest. Defendants further claim that that the plaintiffs' injuries were the direct result of plaintiffs own forceful actions in the act of resisting arrest. Under the facts alleged, plaintiff claims that the brutality occurred after she was restrained with her hands cuffed behind her back.
Louisiana Revised Statute § 14:108 defines resisting an officer as the "intentional interference with, opposition or resistance to, or obstruction of any individual acting in his official capacity and authorized by law to make a lawful arrest . . . when the offender knows or has reason to know that the [officer] is acting in his official capacity." In addition to its common meaning, the phrase "obstruction of means" [a]ny violence toward or any resistance or opposition to the arresting officer after the arrested party is actually placed under arrest and before he is incarcerated in jail."
La.Rev.Stat. § 14:108A.
Id. at § 14:108B.
If the plaintiffs allegations were proved, they may imply the invalidity of any conviction for resisting arrest. In Hudson, supra, the Fifth Circuit observed that whether the police applied reasonable force in arresting him depends on the degree of his resistance, which in turn will place at issue whether his resistance was justified, which, if it were, necessarily undermines that conviction.
Id.
A § 1983 claim that a police officer used excessive force after an arrest does not necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction for resisting arrest or for battery, when the alleged beating occurred after the battery was over and after the plaintiff was placed in restraints. Additionally, the plaintiff is also alleging an after-the-fact conspiracy to cover up what allegedly occurred in this case, i.e., excessive force being deployed after the plaintiff was placed in restraints. The facts and circumstances surrounding the claimed conspiracy may be adduced in the pending criminal prosecution to counter the charge of resisting arrest.
See Howard v. Del Castillo, 2001 WL 1090797 * 3 (E. D. La. September 17, 2001) (Clement, J.) ( citing Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952-53 (9th Cir. 1996) and Swangin v. California State Police, 168 F.3d 501 (9th Cir. 1999)).
The Court cannot determine at this time exactly how the plaintiff's excessive force claim would be affected by a criminal conviction on the charge of resisting arrest. The issue of whether force was used only while the officer was in the process of subduing Bush or after she had already been subdued is clearly disputed. This Court cannot rule out the possibility that Bush was beaten after her battery on Beyl and after she was placed in handcuffs and no longer resisting arrest. It may not be possible to determine what effect, if any, the conviction would have without considering the evidence offered at the criminal trial.
In the circumstances of this case, the better course is to stay the proceedings until the pending criminal case has run its course.
See Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995); Faulkner v. McCormick, 2002 WL 31465892 * 2 (E. D. La. November 1, 2002) (Zainey, J.); Guillory v. Wheeler, 303 F. Supp.2d 808, 811 (M. D. La. 2004).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED AS PREMATURE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court mark this action CLOSED for statistical purposes. The Court shall retain jurisdiction and the case shall be restored to the trial docket upon motion of a party should circumstances change, so that it may proceed to final disposition.