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Fata v. LA Fitness International, LLC

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Sep 15, 2008
2d Civil B202778 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 15, 2008)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Superior Court County of Ventura No. CIV243738, Frederick H. Bysshe, Jr., Judge

Ellison & Hinkle, David R. Ellison; Lascher & Lascher, Wendy C. Lascher and Eric R. Reed for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Yoka & Smith, LLP, Christopher E. Faenza, Christopher P. Leyel and Barbara S. Harper for Defendant and Respondent.


PERREN, J.

John La Fata appeals a summary judgment in favor of LA Fitness International, LLC (LA Fitness) on his complaint seeking damages for personal injuries he suffered while exercising at an LA Fitness health club. The trial court ruled that the action was barred by a release and waiver of liability clause in the agreement La Fata signed when he became a member of the club. La Fata contends (1) the release does not clearly exculpate LA Fitness from liability for his injuries; (2) the court erred in denying him leave to amend his complaint to add a claim for strict products liability; and (3) there are triable issues of fact supporting a claim of willful injury. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 16, 2002, La Fata signed a double-sided "Membership Agreement" for the LA Fitness health club in Ventura. The back of the agreement contains a bold-faced section in a box entitled "Release and Waiver of Liability and Indemnity" (the release) whereby La Fata agrees to release and hold LA Fitness harmless from any liability for injuries suffered while he "is in, upon, or about L.A. Fitness premises or using any L.A. Fitness facilities, services or equipment." The section immediately preceding La Fata's signature also provides in bold-face type that he had read and understood the entire agreement, including the release.

A copy of the agreement is attached as an appendix to this opinion.

On October 1, 2004, La Fata was injured at the club while using one of two weight benches LA Fitness had purchased from codefendant Cybex International, Inc. (Cybex). According to La Fata, the back of the bench collapsed when the cap on the metal pin securing the back to the bottom of the bench came off and the pin slipped out. La Fata subsequently learned that the other bench had broken in the same fashion earlier that year and that Cybex had repaired it pursuant to the warranty by replacing the pin and cap with a threaded bolt and nut.

On September 22, 2006, La Fata filed a complaint against LA Fitness for general negligence and "willful injury" pursuant to Civil Code section 1668. LA Fitness moved for summary judgment, alleging (1) that the claim for general negligence was barred by the release; and (2) that La Fata could not establish that LA Fitness had willfully caused his injury as contemplated by Civil Code section 1668. La Fata opposed the motion on both grounds, and further asserted that he should be granted leave to amend his complaint to add a claim for strict product liability. The trial court granted the motion, and judgment was entered accordingly.

La Fata's claim for willful injury was based on the allegation that the metal pin on the weight bench on which he was injured was actually "an unsecured door hinge pin" that had been installed by an LA Fitness employee. In moving for summary judgment, LA Fitness presented evidence directly refuting this allegation and demonstrating that the bench had not been modified in any manner prior to La Fata's injury.

DISCUSSION

I.

The Release

La Fata contends the court erred in finding that his claim for general negligence was barred by the release in the agreement he signed when he joined the LA Fitness health club. He argues that the release cannot be enforced against him because it is "buried" in the agreement among other unrelated provisions. He also asserts that the release does not cover "defective equipment or negligent maintenance of equipment."

We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether there are any triable issues of material fact. (Capri v. L.A. Fitness Intern., LLC (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1082.) In performing this review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to La Fata as the losing party. (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.)

We conclude that summary judgment was proper on La Fata's negligence claim. There is no merit to La Fata's assertion that the release was hidden, unclear, or ambiguous. Rather, it is prominently displayed in a box in bold-face type, in a font that is larger than the font for the rest of the agreement, with a capitalized heading identifying its purpose and characterizing it as "important." It is also expressly referenced in the bold-face, larger-type paragraph immediately preceding La Fata's signature, whereby he acknowledged having read and understood the provision. Under the circumstances, La Fata cannot be heard to complain that he did not actually read or understand the provision.

La Fata's citation to Leon v. Family Fitness Center (#107), Inc. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1227, is unavailing. In holding that the release in that case was ineffective, the court reasoned, among other things, that it "is in undifferentiated type located in the middle of a document. Although some other portions are printed in bold and in enlarged print, the releasing paragraph is not prefaced by a heading to alert the reader that it is an exculpatory release, contains no bold lettering, and is in the same smaller font size as is most of the document. No physical characteristic distinguishes the exculpatory clause from the remainder of the document." (Id., at p. 1233.) The release in this case bears all of these distinguishing characteristics.

Contrary to La Fata's claim that the release does not refer to defective equipment or negligent maintenance thereof, the provision plainly and unequivocally states that it is intended to apply to any damages incurred as a result of injuries suffered while "using any L.A. Fitness facilities, services or equipment," regardless of whether those injuries can be attributed to the negligence of LA Fitness. In any event, "'[w]here a participant in an activity has expressly released the defendant from responsibility for the consequences of any act of negligence, "the law imposes no requirement that [the participant] have had a specific knowledge of the particular risk which resulted in his death [or injury.]" . . . Not every possible specific act of negligence by the defendant must be spelled out in the agreement or discussed by the parties. . . . Where a release of all liability for any act of negligence is given, the release applies to any such negligent act, whatever it may have been. . . . "It is only necessary that the act of negligence, which results in injury to the releasor, be reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release is given."' [Citation.]" (Leon v. Family Fitness Center (#107), Inc., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1234-1235.)

Citing Zipusch v. LA Workout, Inc. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1281 (Zipusch), decided by our colleagues in Division Seven, La Fata argues that his injury and the release he signed "fall neatly within the ambit" of that decision. We disagree. The contractual provision at issue in Zipusch bears no meaningful resemblance to the release in this case. Rather, that provision involved an agreement to assume the risk of injuries suffered in using the defendant health club's facilities and to indemnify the club and hold it harmless for any injuries caused by the negligence of other club members. The provision by its express terms did not apply to acts of negligence that were solely attributable to the club. (Id., at pp. 1284-1285.) The court accordingly concluded that the plaintiff could proceed with her personal injury claims alleging that the defendant health club had negligently failed to maintain its exercise equipment. While the court concluded that this type of negligence was not included in the plaintiff's general assumption of risk, the court noted that "[i]n the recreational sports context, parties are free to contractually redistribute risk because release provisions 'do not implicate the public interest and therefore are not void as against public policy.' Unsurprisingly, a line of California cases have upheld unambiguous release provisions involving health clubs." (Id., at p. 1288, fn. omitted.) One such unambiguous release provision is presented here.

For the first time on appeal, La Fata also argues that the release should be deemed ineffective as a matter of public policy because "[t]here is a health care crisis in the United States arising from a mediocre level of physical fitness and increasing obesity" and exercise is "said to be essential to prevention of" various conditions. Because this argument was not raised below, it is waived. In any event, La Fata fails to identify any concrete policy that would compel us to deviate from the well-settled recognition that releases involving health clubs generally do not implicate the public interest, including those extending beyond injuries arising from the inherent risks of exercising. (See, e.g., Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica, LLC (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355-1358 [health club member validly released claim for injuries caused by falling television set]; Capri v. L.A. Fitness Intern., LLC, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1083-1085 [public policy did not bar release of ordinary negligence claim for injuries sustained when health club member slipped and fell on pool deck].)

II.

Strict Liability

La Fata contends the trial court erred in denying him leave to amend his complaint to add a cause of action against LA Fitness for strict products liability. While he acknowledges that LA Fitness did not manufacture, sell, or distribute the Cybex weight bench that allegedly caused his injuries, he asserts that "it remains vulnerable to product liability claims arising from injuries caused by defective machines at its California clubs" because the company "is a large fitness chain uniquely positioned to influence the manufacturers of its equipment." According to La Fata, LA Fitness is subject to strict liability as a licensor of the defective equipment and because it is in the best position to adjust the costs of liability and ensure product safety.

We agree with the trial court that La Fata cannot state a claim against LA Fitness for strict liability. It is well settled that such liability does not apply when the object of the transaction giving rise to the plaintiff's injury is a service as opposed to the sale of a product. (Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481, 487; see also Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 672, 678-681 [pharmacist not strictly liable for dispensing defective drug].) While La Fata refers to the strict liability factors first enunciated in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 256, those factors have no application where, as here, the plaintiff makes no showing that the defendant engaged in the sale or lease of a product and not merely the sale of a service. (Id., at pp. 262-263 [extending strict products liability to retailers].)

In holding that a landlord and hotel operator could not be held strictly liable for a guest's injuries that were allegedly caused by a defective bathtub, our Supreme Court reasoned that "a hotel owner is not a part of the chain of distribution of a bathtub that is installed in a hotel room, just as a restaurant owner is not the equivalent of a retailer of toilets simply because the restaurant provides restroom facilities to its patrons, and just as an owner of a business is not the equivalent of a retailer of ceiling fans simply because one is installed on the premises to promote the comfort of customers of the business. . . . The mere circumstance that it was contemplated customers of these businesses would use the products in question or be benefited by them does not transform the owners of the businesses into the equivalent of retailers of the products. [Citation.]" (Peterson v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1185, 1199-1200.) The same rationale applies here.

La Fata's reliance on Garcia v. Halsett (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 319 (Garcia), is unavailing. In Garcia, the court held that a plaintiff injured while using a defective coin-operated washing machine could bring a claim for strict liability against the owner of the Laundromat because the owner had effectively placed the machine in the stream of commerce. (Id., at pp. 325-326.) Subsequent cases have recognized that Garcia can be distinguished on the ground that the defendant in that case was not in the business of providing a service to his customers but rather merely leased his machines to them for a per-use fee. (See Ferrari v. Grand Canyon Dories (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 248, 259; Haynes v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (C.D. Cal. 2006) 423 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1085.) LA Fitness is in the business of providing a service to its customers, and La Fata's use of the equipment that allegedly caused his injuries was merely incidental to that service. Under the circumstances, there is no basis for holding LA Fitness strictly liable.

La Fata's reliance on Fakhoury v. Magner (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 58, is similarly misplaced in that the defendant in that case was the lessor of the furniture that allegedly injured one of his tenants. (Id., at pp. 62-64.)

III.

Civil Code Section 1668

La Fata argues that summary judgment was erroneously granted on his claim for willful injury under Civil Code section 1668. We disagree.

Civil Code section 1668 provides: "All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law."

Willful conduct is defined as "conduct by a person who may have no intent to cause harm, but who intentionally performs an act so unreasonable and dangerous that he or she knows or should know it is highly probable that harm will result. [Citations.]" (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 754, fn. 4.) The only evidence La Fata offered in support of his claim for willful injury consists of the deposition testimony of the LA Fitness employee who called Cybex to repair the other bench that broke several months prior to La Fata's injury. La Fata offers no evidence that this employee knew or should have known that the bench broke due to a design defect or that the other bench would subsequently break in the same manner. On the contrary, the employee testified he did not know how the first bench broke and that he had no reason to believe the second bench needed to be repaired prior to La Fata's injury. Because this evidence fails to create a triable issue of fact whether La Fata's injuries were caused by LA Fitness's willful conduct, summary judgment in favor of LA Fitness on the claim was proper.

The judgment is affirmed. LA Fitness shall recover its costs on appeal.

We concur: GILBERT, P.J., COFFEE, J.


Summaries of

Fata v. LA Fitness International, LLC

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Sep 15, 2008
2d Civil B202778 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 15, 2008)
Case details for

Fata v. LA Fitness International, LLC

Case Details

Full title:JOHN LA FATA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LA FITNESS INTERNATIONAL, LLC…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division

Date published: Sep 15, 2008

Citations

2d Civil B202778 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 15, 2008)