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Executive Direction, Inc. v. Chubb Group of Insurance Companies

Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division Two.
Nov 14, 2003
No. A099108 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2003)

Opinion

A099108.

11-14-2003

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CHUBB GROUP OF INSURANCE COMPANIES et al., Defendants and Respondents.


Executive Direction, Inc. (Executive Direction), an employee search and consulting firm, appeals after the trial court granted the motion of Federal Insurance Company (Federal) for summary adjudication of issues on Executive Directions causes of action for breach of contract and bad faith. On appeal, Executive Direction contends the trial court erred in concluding that (1) Federal, Executive Directions insurance carrier, had no duty to defend Executive Direction in a lawsuit brought by a third party that alleged, inter alia, negligent recruitment of a candidate for employment, and (2) Federal did not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. According to Executive Direction, the third party lawsuit against it was covered by the computer software and services errors or omissions provisions of the Federal insurance policy because Executive Direction utilized computers in its allegedly negligent candidate search. We shall affirm the judgment.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 22, 2000, Executive Direction filed the present action against defendants Chubb Group of Insurance Companies; Federal Insurance Company; California Associated Insurance Brokers, Inc.; ISG International, Inc. (ISG); P&M Insurance Services; and Charlie Catania. Executive Direction alleged four causes of action in its complaint, including breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract to insure, and negligent and intentional misrepresentation.

Federal was mistakenly identified as Financial Insurance Companies in parts of the complaint. The trial court permitted Executive Direction to amend the complaint to correct the error on August 9, 2001.

On April 20, 2001, Federal filed a motion for summary adjudication of issues as to Executive Directions first and second causes of action, for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On July 17, 2001, the trial court granted Federals motion and dismissed the first two causes of action.

On December 26, 2001, the trial court granted Federals subsequent motion for summary adjudication of issues as to the remaining causes of action in Executive Directions lawsuit. This timely appeal followed.

Executive Direction brings this appeal only against Federal and only regarding the trial courts grant of summary adjudication on the first two causes of action, breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Executive Direction is a search and consulting firm that places temporary and permanent employees with clients in information systems, telecommunications, and computer-related industries. Approximately 80 percent of the employees it places are temporary, and 20 percent are permanent.

Beginning on March 14, 1996, Executive Direction obtained an insurance policy from Federal (written by ISG) that included coverage for general liability, employee benefits errors or omissions, and computer software and services errors or omissions. Charles Catania of P&M Insurance Services assisted Executive Direction in obtaining the policy, which Executive Direction renewed yearly until March 14, 1999. The policy was based on a special program of insurance for computer consulting businesses.

Federals computer software and services errors or omissions coverage provided in relevant part: "Subject to the applicable Limits of Insurance, we will pay damages the insured becomes legally obligated to pay for any claim arising out of a negligent act, error or omission, to which this insurance applies, by or on behalf of the insured:

· in the performance of or failure to perform electronic data processing;

· in the performance of or failure to perform other computer services; or

· in the failure of software products to perform the function or serve the purpose intended." (Emphasis omitted.)

The policy also set forth the following relevant definitions:" Electronic data processing means those activities usual to the processing of data or records of others." "Other computer services means electronic data processing hardware and software consulting, analysis or design; computer hardware maintenance for others; and your distribution or sale of computer hardware."" Software products means computer software or programming which you or others trading under your name created, manufactured, sold, licensed, handled or distributed." (Emphasis omitted.)

On December 15, 1998, the law firm of Bogle & Gates wrote a letter to Fred Naderi, president of Executive Direction, outlining a claim against Executive Direction, which it requested that Naderi forward to Executive Directions insurance carrier. The letter alleged that Bogle & Gates had retained Executive Direction in July 1996 to search for and recommend qualified individuals for the position of director of information services, pursuant to educational and other criteria Bogle & Gates had established. Executive Direction presented candidate Paula A. Baker to Bogle & Gates and made representations about her educational and other credentials. Bogle & Gates hired Baker based on the understanding that Executive Direction had confirmed her credentials and had otherwise evaluated and made appropriate inquiries into Bakers background, and had found her qualified for the position.

The letter further stated that Bogle & Gates subsequently discovered that Baker had embezzled over two million dollars from the firm, and that Baker had pleaded guilty to criminal charges related to the matter. During the investigation of Baker, Bogle & Gates discovered that information Executive Direction had provided it regarding Bakers credentials was false, including the representation that Baker had a B.S. degree and her supposed expertise for the position of director of information services.

The letter also alleged that Executive Direction had represented that it had expertise in locating qualified candidates and independently confirming their qualifications, would only present qualified candidates, and that its placement services were guaranteed. The letter alleged that if Executive Direction had inquired into Bakers credentials, it would have learned of her dishonesty and lack of expertise, and therefore Executive Direction should not have certified her as a fully qualified candidate. The letter concluded that Executive Directions failure to exercise reasonable care caused the firm to suffer losses, and demanded that Executive Direction pay the full amount of such losses. A copy of the information against Baker and her plea agreement were enclosed with the letter.

On December 19, 1998, Naderi sent the materials from Bogle & Gates to Executive Directions insurance broker, Charles Catania, and asked that the claim be forwarded to Federal. The claim was forwarded to Federal shortly thereafter.

On January 21, 1999, Federal claims examiner Frank Lukins denied coverage for the claim on various bases, including that the damages did not arise "out of a negligent act, error or omission in the performance or failure to perform electronic data processing, . . . other computer services[, or] . . . the failure of software products to perform the function or service or serve the function intended. Therefore, there are no claims made or damages sought that would fall within the Insuring Agreement of your Computer Software and Services Errors or Omissions coverage." (Emphasis omitted.) Lukins informed Naderi that Federal was prepared to reevaluate its position should there be any material change in the allegations or facts, and requested that Naderi advise him immediately of any additional information that might have a bearing on the question of coverage.

On November 1, 1999, Bogle & Gates filed suit against Executive Direction in United States District Court for the Western District of Washington at Seattle, alleging causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. The complaint specifically alleged that Executive Direction had breached its contract with Bogle & Gates and had failed to exercise reasonable care "by failing to properly screen Baker and verify her references and qualifications," and, further, had provided information to Bogle & Gates regarding Baker that Executive Direction knew or should have known was false.

On November 11, 1999, Executive Directions general counsel, Shelly C. Goodwin, wrote to Charles Catania, requesting that he forward the Bogle & Gates complaint to the insurance carrier for "a pinpointed analysis as to where in our coverage it says that such a situation would not be covered." Goodwin specifically referred to the employee benefits errors and omission coverage, arguing this coverage would apply because an Executive Direction employee was negligent in referring Baker to Bogle & Gates. Goodwin further noted that "[i]n the previous denial, I understand that the Insurer was discussing the errors and omissions protection that deals with software, etc. I understand that those issues do not apply."

On December 7, 1999, Jack D. Farrell, a regional casualty suit examiner for Federal, wrote a letter to Goodwin stating that he had reviewed the complaint to determine whether any of the allegations implicated a potential for coverage, and had found nothing to alter the previous conclusions and denial of coverage. Farrell wrote that the employee benefits errors or omissions coverage did not appear to be implicated because that coverage applied "to claims arising from a negligent act, error or omission in the administration of employee benefit programs." Farrell said he would refer the matter to the appropriate unit for a formal analysis regarding that coverage. Referencing a recent telephone conversation with Goodwin, he also wrote, "We are in agreement that Computer Software and Services E&O coverage is not applicable to this matter." Finally, he requested that Goodwin notify him should any additional information arise that could have a bearing on coverage.

On December 23, 1999, Eugene M. Dominique of Federal also wrote to Goodwin specifically addressing her argument about the employee benefits errors or omissions coverage. He explained that the claim, as reported by Executive Direction and alleged in the Bogle & Gates demand letter and complaint, did not allege any errors or omissions in the administration of Executive Directions employee benefit program. Dominique concluded that, accordingly, the employee benefits errors or omissions coverage was inapplicable to the Bogle & Gates claims.

On April 26, 2000, attorney Amy Bach wrote to Federal on behalf of Executive Direction, requesting reconsideration of the prior claim decision. She argued that the Bogle & Gates claim was covered because it involved "property damage" and "products/completed operations," both of which were covered by the Federal insurance policy.

On June 30, 2000, Farrell responded to Bachs letter, explaining why her two theories of coverage (for property damage and for products/completed operations) were not applicable to the Bogle & Gates claim. He again noted that Federal was prepared to reevaluate its position in case of a change of pleadings or facts that might bear on the question of coverage.

Executive Direction ultimately hired a law firm to represent it in the Bogle & Gates litigation, spending over $300,000 to defend itself. The case settled before trial "for a pittance."

DISCUSSION

Executive Direction now contends that the Bogle & Gates matter was covered by the computer software and services errors or omissions provisions of the Federal policy and that Federal was therefore obligated to defend it. The claimed basis for coverage is Executive Directions utilization of computers and data entry in the Bogle & Gates candidate search and, in particular, an error in an Executive Direction employees entry of data related to the search. Executive Direction further contends Federal breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to investigate the claim before denying coverage.

Standard of Review

A motion for summary adjudication "shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant moving for summary adjudication "bears the burden of persuasion that `one or more elements of the `cause of action in question `cannot be established, or that `there is a complete defense thereto. [Citation.]" (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Corp. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849, quoting § 437c, subds. (o)(1) and (o)(2).) We review a ruling for summary adjudication de novo. (Marie Y. v. General Star Indemn. Co. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 928, 949.)

All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

Executive Directions Use of Computers in Employee Searches

For the first time, in a declaration dated July 11, 2001, and filed in support of Executive Directions motion for reconsideration of the courts order granting Federals motion for summary adjudication, Executive Direction president Fred Naderi claimed that a data entry error by an Executive Direction employee caused Executive Directions failure to discover Paula Bakers false educational representations.

Specifically, Naderi declared that, in searching for candidates for employment for its clients, an Executive Direction employee must utilize various "electronic data processing" functions, including inputting information on potential professional candidates; creating an electronic job order for each client; and processing the information and electronically searching its database to match the clients information with potential candidates information. Errors in this electronic data processing can occur when, inter alia, client information, including comments or special instructions, is inaccurately entered into the electronic job order. Such an error could cause Executive Direction to recommend a candidate who fails to meet the clients requirements or specifications.

Naderi further declared that, in the present case, an Executive Direction employee did not include in the electronic job order the fact that Bogle & Gates wanted candidates educational references independently verified. Because of this error, Executive Direction neglected to independently verify Paula Bakers educational references, and Executive Direction recommended her even though she did not possess a computer science degree. Naderi "was shocked to learn after submitting this claim that defendants Federal and ISG International, Inc. never intended to include the `electronic data processing functions that EDI relied upon in conducting a search."

General Principles Regarding Insurance Law and the Duty to Defend

"[The i]nterpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law. [Citation.] While insurance contracts have special features, they are still contracts to which the ordinary rules of contractual interpretation apply. [Citation.] Thus, the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract is formed governs interpretation. [Citation.] If possible, we infer this intent solely from the written provisions of the insurance policy. [Citation.] If the policy language is clear and explicit, it governs. [Citation.] [¶] When interpreting a policy provision, we must give its terms their ordinary and popular sense, unless used by the parties in a technical sense or a special meaning is given to them by usage. [Citations.] We must also interpret these terms in context [citation], and give effect to every part of the policy with each clause helping to interpret the other. [Citations.]" (Marie Y. v. General Star Indemn. Co., supra, 110 Cal.Ap.4th 928 at p. 950, internal quotation marks omitted.)

"`In general, an insurers "duty to defend is broad and insurance policies must be interpreted so as to protect the reasonable expectations of the insured. [Citation.] . . . An insurer must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy. . . . The obligation to defend is measured by the terms of the policy and the allegations of the complaint against the insured and where the complaint reveals potential liability within the policy, the duty to defend arises. [Citation.] If there is a doubt as to whether the insurer must defend, the doubt should be resolved in the insureds favor." [Citation.] [Citations.] However, `this duty, while broad, is not unlimited; where there is no potential for recovery on a covered claim, there is no duty to defend. [Citations.]" (Tana v. Professionals Prototype I Insurance Co., Ltd. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1612 at p. 1616, italics in original.)

An insurers duty to defend is determined in the first instance by comparing the allegations of the third party complaint with the terms of the policy. (Swain v. California Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1, 7.) Facts extrinsic to the allegations of the complaint may give rise to a duty to defend "when they reveal a possibility that the claim may be covered by the terms of the insurance policy. On the other hand, the Supreme Court also reaffirmed [in Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 295-296] that the extrinsic facts which may create a duty to defend must be known by the insurer at the inception of the third party lawsuit; and that the duty to defend ceases as soon as it has been shown that there is no potential for coverage. [Citations.]" (Gunderson v. Fire Insurance Exchange (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1113-1114, italics in original.)

Analysis

Nothing on the face of the Bogle & Gates complaint, which focused on Executive Directions allegedly negligent recruiting effort, remotely indicated that the claim potentially could be covered by the computer software errors and omissions provisions of the Federal policy. (See Gunderson v. Fire Insurance Exchange, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1113.) Nor was there any basis to suppose that Bogle & Gates might later amend its claim to allege negligent computer use. (See Hurley Construction Co. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 533, 538 ["insured may not speculate about unpled third party claims to manufacture coverage"].)

Furthermore, Executive Direction provided no information whatsoever to Federal regarding its use of data processing in the Bogle & Gates search on the three occasions that it tendered the Bogle & Gates claim and/or lawsuit. Neither of the letters from Executive Directions counsel at the times of the second two tenders even hinted at a factual or legal ground for coverage under the terms of the computer software and services errors or omissions provisions of the policy. On the contrary, while Executive Direction had argued that the Bogle & Gates claim was covered by various parts of the Federal policy, counsel for Executive Direction specifically stated her understanding that there was no coverage under the computer software and services errors or omissions portion of the policy.

Although Executive Direction is not bound by counsels statements, her comment underscores the fact that Executive Direction provided no information that would assist Federal in determining whether Executive Direction was covered under the computer software and services errors or omissions portion of the policy.

The extrinsic facts related to Executive Directions use of data processing in its search for a candidate for Bogle & Gates were not brought to Federals attention until after Executive Direction filed the present action, and the facts related to the employee error in the computer search were not raised until even later. Hence, the extrinsic facts that Executive Direction now argues created a duty to defend were not known by Federal until long after the tender of Bogle & Gatess claim and the inception of the Bogle & Gates lawsuit. (See Gunderson v. Fire Insurance Exchange, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1113-1114, citing Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 295-296 [extrinsic facts that may create duty to defend must be known by insurer at time of tender or by inception of third party lawsuit].)

Federal observes that Executive Direction waited until after the hearing on the summary adjudication motion (although before the court signed or entered its order) to file the declaration by Fred Naderi, attached to the purported motion for reconsideration, in which Naderi stated for the first time that he had failed to verify Bakers qualifications because of an Executive Direction employees failure to note Bogle & Gatess verification requirements in its computer system. Federal argues that we should not consider Naderis late declaration as it was not timely filed and Executive Direction offered no reasonable explanation for failing to produce this evidence earlier. (See Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674; § 1008.) As will be discussed, however, even if we consider this late-produced evidence, the result remains unchanged: Federal had no duty to defend Executive Direction in the Bogle & Gates lawsuit.

Executive Direction asserts that Federal had a duty to investigate to determine whether there was a potential for coverage, noting that Federal never asked about the use of data processing in the Bogle & Gates search. (See Ins. Code, § 790.03, subd. (h)(3).) Federal, however, reviewed all documents and correspondence Executive Direction sent to it, engaged in telephone discussions with Executive Directions counsel, responded to each tender and to Executive Directions queries about possible bases for coverage, and repeatedly expressed its willingness to revisit the question of coverage if Executive Direction could provide it with any additional facts. Federals investigation was reasonable in the circumstances. (See, e.g., American International Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.of Maryland (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1558, 1571 [insurers review of complaint and insurance policy, which suggested no potential for liability, was reasonable investigation in circumstances of case].)

Nothing in the information made available to Federal at the inception of the Bogle & Gates lawsuit regarding Executive Directions allegedly negligent search for a director of information services could reasonably have been expected to alert Federal to the potential for coverage under the policy for "electronic data processing." Consequently, because neither the Bogle & Gates lawsuit nor the extrinsic facts known to Federal at the time(s) of tender demonstrated any potential for coverage under the policy, Federal had no duty to defend Executive Direction in the Bogle & Gates lawsuit. (See Tana v. Professionals Prototype I Insurance Co., Ltd., supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1616; Gunderson v. Fire Insurance Exchange, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1114.)

In any event, even were we to consider the extrinsic facts not produced at the inception of the Bogle & Gates lawsuit, we still would find as a matter of law that the Federal policy did not cover Executive Directions candidate search for Bogle & Gates.

Executive Directions strained attempt to fit its circumstances into the definition of electronic data processing in the computer software and services errors or omissions provisions of the policy is unpersuasive. (See Marie Y. v. General Star Indemn. Co., supra, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 151; see also Ray v. Valley Forge Ins. Co. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1044 ["Courts do not engage in forced construction of insuring clauses to find coverage, nor will they strain to create an ambiguity where none exists."].) Read in context, "electronic data processing" and its definition, "activities usual to the processing of data or records of others," plainly refer to situations in which a client hires Executive Direction, and one of its employees or independent contractors performs the temporary professional computer services for that client.

This conclusion is supported by a review of the other errors or omissions covered by the relevant provisions of the Federal policy, which include "other computer services," such as hardware or software consulting, computer hardware maintenance "for others," and "software products," such as software or programming the insured created, sold, or distributed. It is evident that the computer software and services errors or omissions provisions of the policy, read as a whole, was intended to apply to the listed specific professional computer services hired out to (or software provided to) others, and cannot reasonably be construed to cover internal administrative functions such as Executive Directions use of a computer to perform an employment search. (See, e.g., Inglewood Radiology Medical Group, Inc. v. Hospital Shared Services, Inc. (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 1366, 1370.)

We find unconvincing Executive Directions assertion that the term "others" in the definition of electronic data processing "both logically and by definition must refer to any person or entity other than Executive Direction." According to Executive Direction, "others" can refer not only to an Executive Direction client, but also to a professional candidate such as Baker, whose data Executive Direction entered into its computer system. We agree with the statement, in a similar context, by the appellate court in Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sayble (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1562, 1569: "We reject the simplistic literalism urged on us by appellants: using the word `others instead of `clients is not significant. To hold otherwise would do violence to the obvious intent of the parties."

In this way, the Federal errors and omissions coverage resembles professional malpractice insurance, which "provides coverage for errors and omissions in professional services. The very nature of professional services is that they are rendered for others." (Johnson v. First State Ins. Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1084 (Johnson).) Accordingly, as the appellate court explained in Johnson, supra, where the plaintiff argued that his malpractice insurer had a duty to defend him in a malicious prosecution action, there can be "no objectively reasonable expectation for coverage when there is only a remote relationship between a claim for [in that case] damages and an act, error, or omission in connection with representation of others." (Id. at p. 1083; see also Tana v. Professionals Prototype I Insurance Co., Ltd., supra, 47 Cal.App.4th1612, 1619 [reaching same conclusion as Johnson court where third party lawsuit involved attorney-client fee arrangements]; Inglewood Radiology Medical Group, Inc. v. Hospital Shared Services, Inc., supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1370 [same conclusion, where third party lawsuit involved alleged wrongful termination, finding "the character of this act was an administrative one rather than rendering professional services"]; Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sayble, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1568-1569 [same conclusion, where third party lawsuit involved business conflict between members of a law firm].) Thus the language of the Federal policy, in context, shows that the incidental use of a computer in the Bogle & Gates search was not covered by the policy. (See Marie Y. v. Grand Star Indemn. Co., supra, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 151; see also Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1265 [interpretation of policy language must be made in context, not "as a matter of abstract philology"]; American Motorists v. Allied-Sysco Food Services, Inc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1350-1351 [same].) Because there was no potential for coverage here, there was no duty to defend. (See Tana v. Professionals Prototype I Insurance Co., Ltd., supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1616.)

In addition, even if we look beyond the written provisions of the policy, there is undisputed evidence that the mutual intention of the parties was to provide errors and omissions coverage for Executive Directions employees when they were performing temporary data processing services for Executive Directions clients. (Cf. Waller v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 18.) Sources for this evidence include the deposition testimony of Charles Catania, the insurance broker who assisted Executive Direction in obtaining the Federal policy and Richard Decker, a former partner in Executive Direction, who was involved in selecting the Federal policy.

Catania testified that he told Decker in 1996 that the computer software and services errors or omissions provisions "covered computer work that [Executive Direction] farmed out . . . ." Decker testified that he understood when Executive Direction obtained the Federal policy, that it would cover the "temp division" and that "[i]t wasnt geared towards perm business and they didnt have a product, I dont think, that provided errors and omissions for the perm business. . . . [¶] We had operated for years without errors and omissions insurance in our perm division and we had—I know we discussed it quite a bit and we felt that we could do without it. . . . [¶] [O]ne of the reasons we picked it [the Federal policy] up, it had an errors and omissions for the temp division and had the automobile insurance that we needed." Decker further testified that he and Naderi had discussed the fact that Executive Directions permanent employee placement operation would not be covered by the Federal policy.

Naderis deposition testimony did not contradict Catanias or Deckers specific recollections. His general recollection was that Catania had said that Federals errors or omissions coverage "would cover negligence act [sic] on behalf of my firm, or something to that effect." Moreover, while he said that Catania had said the coverage was "comprehensive" and "proper," Naderi had no recollection whether Catania discussed the types of actions that would trigger coverage under the errors or omissions provisions of the policy. He also recalled seeing a brochure or other document that "was telling me their product was for my industry." Naderis very general testimony does not conflict with the specific recollections of both Catania and Decker regarding what the policy provisions in question covered.

Hence, the facts to which Catania and Decker testified are undisputed, and this evidence further demonstrates that Executive Directions incidental use of computers in its internal employment search for Bogle & Gates was not covered by the Federal policy. (See Marie Y. v. General Star Indemn. Co., supra, 2 Cal. Rptr.3d at p. 151.)

In conclusion, the Federal policy did not cover errors or omissions in Executive Directions candidate search process, and the trial court properly granted Federals motion for summary adjudication against Executive Direction on the breach of contract and bad faith causes of action.

Since it had no duty to defend Executive Direction in the Bogle & Gates action, it naturally follows that Federal cannot be found liable for breaching the covenant of good faith and fair dealing for failing to defend Executive Direction. (See American International Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1570-1571.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Federal.

We concur: Haerle, J., Ruvolo, J.


Summaries of

Executive Direction, Inc. v. Chubb Group of Insurance Companies

Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division Two.
Nov 14, 2003
No. A099108 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2003)
Case details for

Executive Direction, Inc. v. Chubb Group of Insurance Companies

Case Details

Full title:EXECUTIVE DIRECTION, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CHUBB GROUP OF…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division Two.

Date published: Nov 14, 2003

Citations

No. A099108 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2003)