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Ex parte Walker

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Oct 30, 2024
WR-95,387-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2024)

Opinion

WR-95,387-01 WR-95,387-02

10-30-2024

EX PARTE GENE OLIVER WALKER, Applicant


Do not publish

ON APPLICATIONS FOR WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NOS. 1417851-A & 1417852-A IN THE 174TH DISTRICT COURT FROM HARRIS COUNTY

OPINION

PER CURIAM

Applicant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and tampering with evidence. He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for each offense, to run concurrently. He did not appeal his convictions. Applicant filed these applications for writs of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded them to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.

Applicant alleges that he was denied due process when the State used material false evidence to induce his guilty pleas. Applicant's single ground relates to the discovery of prior misconduct by former Houston Police Officer Gerald Goines, who was the primary witness against Applicant in his cases. Based on the record, the trial court found that Applicant's guilty pleas were involuntary because they were induced by false evidence provided by Goines. Ex parte Mathews, 638 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The State and trial court both recommend granting relief. We agree.

Relief is granted. Ex parte Chabot, 300 S.W.3d 768, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The judgments in cause numbers 1417851 and 1417852 in the 174th District Court of Harris County are set aside, and Applicant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Harris County to answer the charges as set out in the indictments. The trial court shall issue any necessary bench warrant within ten days from the date of this Court's mandate.

Yeary, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Keller, P.J., joined.

In February of 2014, Gerald Goines, then a Houston Police Department narcotics officer, purportedly provided cash to a confidential informant who purchased cocaine from Applicant at a home in Houston. Based on an affidavit from Goines that included these allegations, a magistrate issued a warrant to arrest Applicant and search the home for illegal drugs. The warrant was executed at the home, and Applicant was found by Goines and other narcotics officers to be in possession of cocaine. Goines also alleged that upon entering the home, he observed Applicant "at the kitchen sink releasing glass be[a]kers from his hand[,]" which were discovered during the search of the home to contain cocaine.

Applicant does not allege that Goines or any other officer planted the cocaine he pled guilty to possessing; nor does he otherwise challenge the evidence of his guilt of that offense. With respect to the possession offense, he alleges only that the statements Goines made in his warrant affidavit were false.

In May of 2017, Applicant pled guilty to (1) possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, with intent to deliver, and (2) tampering with physical evidence. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.112(d) (establishing knowing possession of between four and 200 grams of a penalty group one controlled substance with intent to deliver as a first-degree felony); Tex. Penal Code § 37.09(c) (establishing tampering with physical evidence as a third-degree felony). He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment on each offense, to run concurrently. Nearly six years after Applicant's plea, in March of 2023, the Harris County District Attorney sent a letter to Applicant. This letter disclosed that Goines had been relieved from duty and was under criminal investigation.

Applicant subsequently filed applications for writs of habeas corpus in July of 2023. In both applications, Applicant raises the same, single ground for relief: "The Applicant was denied due process where false evidence was used by the State to induce his guilty plea." In an accompanying unsworn declaration, Applicant asserts that, when police entered the home, he "offered no resistance whatsoever and never tried to destroy any cocaine or anything else." He claims to have "no knowledge of anyone ever buying drugs from that house" prior to his arrest. He also contends that, if he "could have shown that Goines was making up facts in order to get search warrants against other people during the same time[,]" he would not have pled guilty in either case but would have "insisted on a motion to suppress the evidence or even a trial in the drug case."

The convicting court recommends that we find Applicant's declaration to be credible and that, under the test established by this Court in Ex parte Coty and extended in Ex parte Mathews, Applicant has raised an inference that the facts alleged in Goines's warrant affidavit are false. 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); 638 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Invoking Ex parte Barnaby, 475 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), the convicting court finds that Goines's use of "false evidence[,]" in both his affidavit in support of the search warrant and his offense report accusing Applicant of tampering with the evidence, "induced Applicant to plead guilty, and that such plea was therefore involuntary." On that basis, the convicting court recommends that we grant Applicant relief. And this Court today, apparently endorsing the convicting court's recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, grants Applicant relief by setting aside the judgments in both his possession and tampering cases. Majority Opinion at 2.

It seems at least possible that Applicant might be entitled to relief in these cases. But I am convinced that, by its decision today, the Court again, at least implicitly and without sufficient diligence, extends the application of Coty, Mathews, and Barnaby-but without considering the distinctions between those cases and Applicant's cases that might prove important. I would file and set these writ applications to consider those issues.

I. Coty, Mathews, AND Barnaby

Coty established that when an applicant in a drug case can satisfy a five-part test, the applicant is entitled to a presumption that the evidence used against him-there, it was forensic testing of purported contraband-was false. 418 S.W.3d at 605. In Mathews, this Court extended the Coty presumption to "cases involving police officers who display a pattern of mendacity in obtaining drug arrests and convictions[.]" 638 S.W.3d at 690. Thus, an applicant is entitled to a presumption that the evidence used against him is false when he can show that: (1) the officer in question is a state actor; (2) the officer has committed multiple instances of intentional misconduct in another case or cases; (3) the officer is the same officer that worked on the applicant's case; (4) the misconduct is the type of misconduct that would have affected the evidence in the applicant's case; and (5) the officer handled and processed the evidence in the applicant's case within roughly the same period of time as the other misconduct. See id. at 690-91. When the State fails to rebut this presumption, the applicant will be deemed to have shown that the officer in question "has engaged in a pattern of misconduct sufficiently egregious in other cases that the errors could have resulted in false evidence being used in the applicant's case." See Coty, 418 S.W.3d at 605. And we will infer that false evidence was indeed used and go on to inquire whether that false evidence was material. Id.

The factors under Coty are:

(1) the technician in question is a state actor, (2) the technician has committed multiple instances of intentional misconduct in another case or cases, (3) the technician is the same technician that worked on the applicant's case, (4) the misconduct is the type of misconduct that would have affected the evidence in the applicant's case, and (5) the technician handled and processed the evidence in the applicant's case within roughly the same period of time as the other misconduct.
418 S.W.3d at 605.

The applicant, of course, continues to shoulder the exclusive burden of establishing the materiality of the false evidence. Mathews, 638 S.W.3d at 691. Accordingly, in Barnaby, the Court held that when an applicant claims he has entered an involuntary plea based on the use of false evidence, as established by an unrebutted Coty presumption, he must also prove that, "if applicant had known that the evidence was false (i.e., 'but for' the false evidence), he would not have plead guilty but would have insisted on going to trial." 475 S.W.3d at 318.

II. How Do Coty, Mathews, and Barnaby Apply Here?

Coty, Mathews, and Barnaby, however, involved only cases in which the applicants alleged that the evidence of his guilt was false. Here, with respect to his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, Applicant does not raise that kind of claim-indeed, he does not even deny that he is guilty of that offense. Rather, Applicant alleges that the evidence used to obtain a warrant-which was, in turn, used to obtain the evidence of his guilt-was false. In other words, Applicant is not claiming that the use of false evidence of his guilt induced him to plead guilty to possession of a controlled substance but that false statements used to obtain a warrant induced him to forgo a motion to suppress evidence. Before granting Applicant relief, the Court should consider whether the Coty/Mathews inference of falsity and the Barnaby standard of materiality ought to apply in circumstances such as these- and if so, how. What it should not do is grant Applicant relief without addressing these predicate questions.

With respect to his tampering conviction, Applicant does contest the evidence of his guilt. That is the kind of claim to which Coty, Mathews, and Barnaby clearly apply. However, I believe granting Applicant relief from that conviction is also premature.

To that end, it is not clear that Goines's history of reporting fictional drug transactions as the basis for an arrest is of the same "type of misconduct that would have affected the evidence in [this] case." See Coty, 418 S.W.3d at 605. In other words, I am not convinced that Goines's record of misconduct warrants the presumption that he falsified evidence in a tampering case. An officer's proven pattern of mendacity with respect to whether he discovered suspects to be in possession of illicit substances does not necessarily support an inference that his report that a suspect tampered with evidence is false-at least arguably not with sufficient force as to justify the Coty/Mathews presumption. The Court should not grant relief without first filing and setting Applicant's writ application with respect to his tampering charge to address the scope of that element (the same "type of misconduct" element) of the Coty/Mathews test.

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, I would not grant relief in either of Applicant's writ applications without first filing and setting them to address these outstanding issues. I respectfully dissent.


Summaries of

Ex parte Walker

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Oct 30, 2024
WR-95,387-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2024)
Case details for

Ex parte Walker

Case Details

Full title:EX PARTE GENE OLIVER WALKER, Applicant

Court:Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Date published: Oct 30, 2024

Citations

WR-95,387-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2024)