Opinion
WR-79 132-02 79 132-03
09-15-2021
EX PARTE GABRIEL VILLARREAL, Applicant
Do not publish
ON APPLICATIONS FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NOS. 21, 484-A & 21, 485-A IN THE 258TH DISTRICT COURT FROM POLK COUNTY
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
A jury found Applicant guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child. Prior to the punishment phase, Applicant entered into a plea agreement and was sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment. Pursuant to that agreement, Applicant also pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault with a child (count I) and indecency with a child (count II) in another case and was sentenced to fifty-years' imprisonment for count I and twenty years' imprisonment for count II, to run concurrently. Applicant filed these applications for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded them to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.
Applicant contends, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to adequately investigate the facts and circumstances of the cases, to investigate Applicant's mental health history, and to request a competency hearing. Applicant also contends that his acceptance of the plea agreement was involuntary because counsel failed to fully inform him of the direct consequences of that agreement. Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Ex parte Argent, 393 S.W.3d 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Accordingly, the record should be developed. The trial court is the appropriate forum for findings of fact. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 3(d). The trial court shall order trial counsel to respond to Applicant's claims. In developing the record, the trial court may use any means set out in Article 11.07, § 3(d). If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. If Applicant is indigent and wants to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent him at the hearing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.04. If counsel is appointed or retained, the trial court shall immediately notify this Court of counsel's name.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether trial counsel's performance was deficient and Applicant was prejudiced. The trial court shall also make specific findings as to whether counsel adequately investigated the cases, whether counsel investigated Applicant's mental health history, and whether counsel fully informed Applicant of the consequences of accepting the plea agreement. Additionally, the trial court shall make specific findings as to Applicant's mental healthy history and whether a competency examination was conducted. The trial court may make any other findings and conclusions that it deems appropriate in response to Applicant's claims.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from the date of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court's findings and conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things, affidavits, motions, objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcripts from hearings and depositions. See Tex. R. App. P. 73.4(b)(4). Any extensions of time must be requested by the trial court and obtained from this Court.
CONCURRING OPINION
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Slaughter, J., joined.
Applicant, Gabriel Villarreal, was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual assault of a child. After the return of the verdict, Applicant entered into a plea agreement and was sentenced to confinement for fifty years for that offense. Pursuant to the same agreement, Applicant also pled guilty, in a separate case, to aggravated sexual assault of a child (count I) and indecency with a child (count II) and was sentenced to confinement for fifty-years for count I and twenty years for count II. Applicant filed this application for writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and it was forwarded to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.
Today, the Court remands this application to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. I agree that this application should be remanded, and so I join the Court's order doing so. But I write separately to address my thoughts concerning the doctrine of laches and its possible application to this case.
Laches is a common-law doctrine, defined as:
neglect to assert right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity. Also, it is the neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time under circumstances permitting diligence, to do what in law, should have been done.Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Black's Law Dictionary). Whether laches applies to bar a claim is determined on a case-by-case basis, by giving consideration to the length of the delay in seeking equitable relief, the reasons for the delay, and any prejudice to the opposing parties that results from the delay. Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661, 666-67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). And, importantly, the court may consider and determine whether an applicant's claims should be barred by laches sua sponte. Id. at 667.
In Ex parte Smith, we set out some of the principles that justify a court's sua sponte consideration of the doctrine of laches. We explained:
. . . the path to a habeas corpus remedy is a costly one, exacting enormous societal and administrative costs. Protracted habeas corpus litigation defers convictions' finality, undermines confidence in the integrity of our procedures and inevitably delays and impairs the orderly administration of justice. This in turn weakens the criminal law's deterrent and rehabilitative functions. There must come a time when a criminal conviction is final, when the deterrent effects of certainty and immediacy of punishment outweigh an inmate's right to endlessly litigate an appeal of his conviction. Moreover, a significant amount of judicial time, effort, and resources is expended in addressing the nearly 5, 000 applications for writs of habeas corpus this Court received just last fiscal year, to say nothing about the equally taxing obligations of the lower courts in conducting proceedings, entering findings of fact and conclusions of law, and making recommendations on an applicant's request for relief. When a court is called upon to issue equitable relief, the State's failure to formally plead laches does not restrict a court's ability to balance equities beyond those that the parties advocate. A court may consider sua sponte the interests of the judicial system and society generally because they implicate values that may stretch beyond the concerns of the parties. Permitting courts to freely inquire about an applicant's delay broadly effectuates the maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity.Id. at 667-68 (internal quotations and citations to authority omitted).
The Court also explained, however, that "the habeas court should act on its own sparingly, questioning only those applications demonstrating an excessive delay that undermines or obstructs the principles and virtues the criminal-justice system promotes." Id. at 668.
The doctrine of laches ought to be considered in a case like this one. Applicant's trial occurred in 2011, but this application was not filed until nearly ten years later. In addition, the record is silent with regard to circumstances that may excuse Applicant's delay.
Consistent with this Court's precedent, the trial court may, sua sponte, give Applicant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the delay. It may also give the State and/or former counsel for Applicant an opportunity to state whether Applicant's delay has caused any prejudice to their ability to defend against Applicant's claims. And ultimately, the trial court may include findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the doctrine of laches in its response to this Court's remand order.
With these additional thoughts, I join the Court's order.