Opinion
WR-94,775-01
05-17-2023
EX PARTE MICHAEL RENE VANWINKLE, Applicant
Do not publish
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. FR 74088-A IN THE 264TH DISTRICT COURT FROM BELL COUNTY
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
Applicant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment. Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.
Applicant contends that his plea was involuntary. The trial court entered an order designating issues, appointed habeas counsel, and conducted an evidentiary hearing. The habeas record was later forwarded to this Court, but it does not contain findings of fact and conclusions of law from the trial court resolving the disputed factual issues.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether Applicant's plea was involuntary.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from the date of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court's findings and conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things, affidavits, motions, objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcripts from hearings and depositions. See Tex. R. App. P. 73.4(b)(4). Any extensions of time must be requested by the trial court and obtained from this Court.
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Applicant was convicted in 2016 of aggravated sexual assault of a child and sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment. The Third Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in 2016. VanWinkle v. State, No. 03-16-00278-CR, 2016 WL 3974650 (Tex. App.-Austin July 22, 2016) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In June of 2022, Applicant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07. In his application, he alleges that his guilty plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Today, the Court remands this application to the convicting court to further develop the record. I join the Court's remand order. But I write separately to address my thoughts concerning the doctrine of laches and its possible application to this case. See Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding a convicting court has the authority to sua sponte consider the doctrine of laches); Ex parte Bazille, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. WR-89,851-02, 2022 WL 108348 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2022) (Yeary, J., concurring).
The doctrine of laches ought to be considered in a case like this one. Applicant's appeal was finalized in 2016, but he did not file this writ application until more than five years later. The record is also silent regarding circumstances that may excuse Applicant's delay, and at least some explanation for the long delay in filing should be provided.
"Our revised approach will permit courts to more broadly consider the diminished memories of trial participants and the diminished availability of the State's evidence, both of which may often be said to occur beyond five years after a conviction becomes final." Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Ex parte Steptoe, 132 S.W.3d 434, 437-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting)).
Consistent with this Court's precedent, the convicting court "may sua sponte consider and determine whether laches should bar relief." Smith, 444 S.W.3d at 667. If the convicting court does so, it must give Applicant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the delay and give the State's prosecutors and/or former counsel for Applicant an opportunity to state whether Applicant's delay has caused any prejudice to their ability to defend against Applicant's claims. Id. at 670. And ultimately, the convicting court may include findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the doctrine of laches in its response to this Court's remand order.
With these additional thoughts, I join the Court's order.