Opinion
NO. 03-16-00424-CR
03-08-2017
Ex parte Joshua Tatroe
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY, 277TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 10-909-K277A , HONORABLE STACEY MATHEWS, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION
Joshua Tatroe allegedly sexually assaulted his two younger sisters when he was under the age of seventeen. He was not charged with the offenses until he was over the age of eighteen. The case was referred to juvenile court, but the State filed a petition requesting that the juvenile court waive its jurisdiction and transfer the case to district court. See Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(a) (providing that juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction). Following a hearing, the juvenile court signed an order transferring the case to district court. Tatroe eventually pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a child by contact. The district court sentenced Tatroe to five years' imprisonment for the aggravated sexual assault and eight years of deferred-adjudication community supervision for the indecency with a child.
Tatroe later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district court. In his petition, Tatroe contended that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to transfer the case to district court because the juvenile court "failed to make the requisite finding in its order that for a reason beyond the control of the state or that after due diligence of the state, it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before Mr. Tatroe's 18th birthday." Tatroe also contended that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to transfer the case because "its boilerplate findings are legally erroneous, unsupported by the evidence and inadequate under [Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)]." The district court denied Tatroe's petition, and Tatroe appealed. We will affirm.
In his appellate brief, Tatroe prays that this Court "reverse Appellant's conviction and remand back to the juvenile court and for any other relief that Appellant is entitled to." To the extent Tatroe seeks habeas relief related to a final felony conviction, we note that we lack jurisdiction over such a request. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07 § 3(a) ("After final conviction in any felony case, the writ must be made returnable to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas at Austin, Texas."); In re Wood, No. 03-16-000651-CV, 2016 WL 6575240, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 2, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("[W]e have no jurisdiction in matters pertaining to habeas corpus proceedings initiated under article 11.07."); Ex parte Beard, 494 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, no pet.) ("An intermediate court of appeals has no jurisdiction over post-conviction writs of habeas corpus in felony cases."). Therefore, we will only consider his prayer "for any other relief"—here, potential relief from the district court's order placing Tatroe on deferred-adjudication community supervision. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.072 (establishing "the procedures for an application for a writ of habeas corpus in a felony or misdemeanor case in which the applicant seeks relief from an order or a judgment of conviction ordering community supervision"); id. art. 11.072 § 8 (providing for appeal from denial of habeas application). In reviewing the trial court's decision to deny habeas corpus relief, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and uphold that ruling absent an abuse of discretion. See Ex parte Riley, No. 03-16-00350-CR, 2016 WL 6068254, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 11, 2016, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Ex parte Ali, 368 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. ref'd).
In one point of error, Tatroe argues on appeal that the district court never acquired jurisdiction over his case because the juvenile court's transfer order did not comply with Texas Family Code section 54.02. See Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02 ("Waiver of Jurisdiction and Discretionary Transfer to Criminal Court"). Specifically, Tatroe argues that the juvenile court's written order failed to make the finding required by section 54.02(j)(4). See id. § 54.02(j)(4)(A), (B) (providing that juvenile court may waive its exclusive jurisdiction and transfer person to district court if it finds that "for a reason beyond the control of the state it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the person" or that "after due diligence of the state it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the person because" of one of several reasons). The State responds that Tatroe has waived this complaint by not raising it before he pleaded guilty. The State further argues that Tatroe is not entitled to habeas relief because he could have raised this issue on direct appeal after he was sentenced.
We agree with the State that Tatroe waived his complaint. Article 4.18 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) A claim that a district court or criminal district court does not have jurisdiction over a person because jurisdiction is exclusively in the juvenile court and that the juvenile court could not waive jurisdiction under Section 8.07(a), Penal Code, or did not waive jurisdiction under Section 8.07(b), Penal Code, must be made by written motion in bar of prosecution filed with the court in which criminal charges against the person are filed.
(b) The motion must be filed and presented to the presiding judge of the court:
(1) if the defendant enters a plea of guilty or no contest, before the plea . . . .
(d) A person may not contest the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction if:
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 4.18(a), (b), (d). Here, Tatroe argues, in effect, that the juvenile court did not waive jurisdiction under section 8.07(b) of the Penal Code because its order did not contain the required findings and was invalid. See Tex. Penal Code § 8.07(b) ("Unless the juvenile court waives jurisdiction under Section 54.02, Family Code, and certifies the individual for criminal prosecution . . . a person may not be prosecuted for or convicted of any offense committed before reaching 17 years of age . . . .").(1) the person does not file a motion within the time requirements of this article . . . .
Tatroe, however, was required to bring this jurisdictional complaint to the attention of the district court before entering his plea. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 4.18(b)(1). The record before us contains no indication that he did so. For this reason, Tatroe may not now contest the district court's jurisdiction on this ground. See id. art. 4.18(d); see also Rushing v. State, 85 S.W.3d 283, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ("Likewise, a failure to comply with Article 4.18's requirements would prevent consideration of the claim on habeas corpus."); Mays v. State, No. 01-03-01345-CR, 2005 WL 1189676, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 19, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ("A plain reading of the statute indicates that jurisdictional objections must be made to the district court before entering a plea or they are waived."); Adams v. State, 161 S.W.3d 113, 114 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd) ("Here, appellant never filed a motion in bar of prosecution as required by article 4.18. Instead, appellant entered a plea of guilty without making any challenges to the district court's jurisdiction. As such, he cannot contest the court's jurisdiction for the first time on appeal."); Miller v. State, 981 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, pet. ref'd) ("We conclude that, because Miller failed to comply with the requirements of Article 4.18, he failed to preserve any complaint for appeal."). Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tatroe's habeas application.
Because we have concluded that article 4.18 bars Tatroe's claim, we need not address the State's contention that he had an adequate remedy on appeal.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court's order denying Tatroe's application for writ of habeas corpus.
/s/_________
Scott K. Field, Justice Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Field and Bourland Affirmed Filed: March 8, 2017 Do Not Publish