Opinion
No. 07-20-00110-CR
12-08-2020
EX PARTE CHANSE SMITH, APPELLANT
On Appeal from the 140th District Court Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2020-001,021, Honorable Jim Bob Darnell, Presiding
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and DOSS, JJ.
Appellant Chanse Smith appeals the district court's denial of his pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus seeking release because of delay. We affirm the district court's order denying habeas relief.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.151, § 1(1) (West Supp. 2020).
Background
On July 5, 2019, Appellant was arrested and jailed for the second-degree felony offense of sexual assault. He was indicted for said offense eleven days later.
On February 27, 2020, Appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus seeking release from confinement, alleging the State was not ready for trial within ninety-days of the commencement of Appellant's detention. The district court conducted a hearing of Appellant's application on March 11, 2020; it verbally denied Appellant's application the same day. The district court signed an order denying Appellant's application on April 17, 2020. Appellant then brought a complaint to this Court.
Analysis
First Issue
Appellant first complains that the district court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's application for writ of habeas corpus challenging the State's readiness for trial. We review the district court's order for an abuse of discretion. Jones v. State, 803 S.W.2d 712, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Appellant seeks relief under article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal procedure which provides in part:
A defendant who is detained in jail pending trial of an accusation against him must be released either on personal bond or by reducing the amount of bail required, if the state is not ready for trial of the criminal action for which he is being detained within . . . 90 days from the commencement of his detention if he is accused of a felony[.]TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.151, § 1(1). When a defendant complains that the State was not ready within the statutory time period, the State assumes the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it was ready for trial within the applicable time period. Jones, 803 S.W.2d at 717; Ex parte Landrum, No. 07-18-00301-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 8571, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). An announcement by the State that it was ready for trial within the applicable time period, even if made at the hearing of the defendant's habeas corpus petition, satisfies the State's initial burden. Jones, 803 S.W.2d at 717-18 (article 17.151); Behrend v. State, 729 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (Speedy Trial Act).
Cases decided under the Speedy Trial Act are "instructive" regarding procedures under article 17.151. Jones, 803 S.W.2d at 717 (citing Kernahan v. State, 657 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)).
Upon the State's satisfactory showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the State's prima facie showing of readiness. Jones, 803 S.W.2d at 718. "Evidence that rebuts a prima facie showing of readiness may consist of, among other things, a demonstration that the state did not have a key witness or piece of evidence available by the last day of the applicable time limit so that the state was not ready for trial within that time limit." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "In the absence of a sufficient rebuttal, the trial court has the discretion to find the State was timely ready for trial." Ex parte Brosky, 863 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, no pet.).
During the hearing of Appellant's habeas corpus petition, the prosecutor announced on the record in open court the State's readiness from the time of indictment. As noted, the indictment was secured eleven days after Appellant was jailed. Thus, the prosecutor's declaration "was all the State needed" to sufficiently make a prima facie showing of readiness. Behrend, 729 S.W.2d at 721. See also Applewhite v. State, 872 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.) (holding that trial court was free to interpret the prosecutor's statement at hearing "'the State is ready now, as it has been at all times'" as meaning the State was ready for trial within the ninety-day statutory period).
Consequently, the burden shifted to Appellant to rebut the State's prima facie showing of readiness. Appellant relied on two factors for rebuttal: (1) the State's non-receipt of Appellant's medical records within the ninety-day statutory period, and (2) that the State had not contacted the complainant and determined her availability for trial. The prosecutor responded to these points, answering that the State was prepared to go to trial without the medical records: "In the event of a court date, yes." As for the complainant's availability for trial, the prosecutor responded, "I can in good faith say that I am ready to contact my witnesses in the event of a court date, which is what is required," and "I did not ask [the complainant] whether she was going to be ready for court on some date that did not exist."
We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's habeas corpus application. After the State satisfied its prima facie burden, nothing in the rebuttal indicated that the State was indeed unprepared to try the case. For example, even if the State did not obtain the medical records within the statutory period, nothing indicates that such records were essential to the State's case. Appellant's reliance on Jones for showing the unavailability of a key witness is misplaced. In that case, the key witness was imprisoned in California, subject to a Texas detainer, and no mechanism had been pursued in the ninety-day statutory period to secure the witness's presence. 803 S.W.2d at 718. Without evidence that the complainant in the present case was either not present or unavailable to testify if a trial date had been set, the Appellant failed to sufficiently rebut the State's prima facie showing of readiness. See Applewhite, 872 S.W.2d at 34 (concluding because the defendant did not show the complainants were not present or readily available to testify during the ninety-day statutory period, he failed to carry his burden of rebutting the State's prima facie proof of readiness); Dixon v. State, 866 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. App.—Waco 1993, no pet.). Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the district court's ruling, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's habeas corpus application. Appellant's first issue is overruled. Second Issue
By his second issue, appellant seeks remand for the district court to determine the constitutionality of Governor Greg Abbott's executive order GA-13 that purports to have "suspended" article 17.151 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Because we have determined sufficient evidence demonstrates the State was ready for trial pursuant to article 17.151, it is unnecessary to consider this issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Conclusion
Having overruled Appellant's issue necessary for disposition of the appeal, we affirm the district court's order.
Lawrence M. Doss
Justice Do not publish.