Opinion
No. 05-07-01432-CR
Filed May 14, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 001-230-90.
Before Justices WRIGHT, BRIDGES, and MAZZANT.
OPINION
Stephen Christopher Sem filed an application for writ of habeas corpus challenging his 1990 conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The trial court denied appellant the relief sought. We affirm the trial court's order. In his application, appellant asserted his guilty plea to the 1990 DWI was involuntary because he was not represented by counsel during the hearing, and nothing in the judgment shows he was admonished of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation or that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The State responded that both the trial court's judgment and the documents supporting the plea show appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. In reviewing the trial court's decision to grant or deny habeas corpus relief, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 819 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (per curiam), overruled in part on other grounds by Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335, 371 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). We afford almost total deference to the court's determination of the historical facts that are supported by the record, especially when the fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. We afford the same amount of deference to the trial court's application of the law to the facts if the resolution of the ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. If the resolution of the ultimate questions turns on an application of legal standards, we review the determination de novo. Id. The record before the Court contains appellant's "waiver of rights," which includes a paragraph entitled "waiver of attorney." The attorney waiver paragraph specifically states appellant has been advised of his right to counsel, that counsel would be appointed if he could not afford it, and that appellant "hereby waives the right to counsel." Appellant signed the waiver of rights form, and the waivers were approved by the trial court on June 19, 1990. As applicant, appellant had the burden to show he was entitled to the relief sought by his application for writ of habeas corpus. See id. at 818. Nothing in the record, other than appellant's self-serving affidavit, shows he was not aware of his right to counsel or that the waiver of counsel was not knowingly and voluntarily made. As fact finder, the judge was free to reject the claims made in the affidavit. See Bustamante v. State, 106 S.W.3d 738, 741 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (fact finder free to reject self-serving statements). We conclude the trial court did not err in denying appellant habeas corpus relief. We affirm the trial court's order denying appellant the relief sought by his application for writ of habeas corpus.
No hearing was conducted on appellant's application. Neither appellant nor the State filed briefs in this appeal.
According to the application, appellant has been charged with felony driving while intoxicated, and the 1990 conviction is one of the two prior convictions alleged in the indictment.