No. 05-04-01794-CR
Opinion issued March 22, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. WX04-02784-S. Affirmed.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, FITZGERALD, and RICHTER.
Opinion By Justice WHITTINGTON.
Rayfield Roper, Jr. pleaded guilty to failure to register as a sex offender. Punishment was assessed at two years' confinement in a state jail facility, probated for five years, and a $300 fine. After successfully completing the term of community supervision, appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus asserting he did not commit an offense because he was not required to register as a sex offender on the date alleged in the indictment. The trial judge denied appellant relief. In a single issue, appellant claims the trial judge erred in denying him relief. We affirm the trial court's order.
Background
In 1985, appellant was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual assault. Punishment was assessed at five years' confinement, probated for five years. Appellant's probation was revoked on November 26, 1986, and he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Over the next nine years, appellant was either in prison or on parole as a result of the conviction. He was paroled again in 1995 and was discharged from parole on March 21, 1998. Appellant was later indicted for failing to register as a sex offender. See generally Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 62.01-.14 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). The alleged offense date was October 22, 1998. On April 9, 1999, appellant pleaded guilty, and punishment was assessed at two years' confinement in a state jail facility, probated for five years, and a $300 fine. Appellant did not appeal. He successfully completed the terms of his community supervision and was discharged on April 9, 2004. Thereafter, appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus asserting that he was innocent of the offense because he was not subject to the sex offender registration requirements on October 22, 1998. Finding appellant was required to register on October 22, 1998 and that the conviction for failing to register was valid, the trial judge denied appellant relief. This appeal followed. Article 11.072
The State argues that appellant is procedurally barred from raising this complaint because he did not appeal his conviction for failing to register as a sex offender. Article 11.072 "establishes the procedures for an application for a writ of habeas corpus in a felony or misdemeanor case in which the applicant seeks relief from an order or a judgment of conviction ordering community supervision." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). An application may not be filed under article 11.072 if the applicant could obtain the requested relief by means of an appeal. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, § 3(a); Ex parte Townsend, 137 S.W.3d 79, 81 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) ("Great Writ should not be used" to obtain relief that should have been obtained on appeal) (quoting Ex parte Banks, 769 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989)). Rather, a writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy, available only when there is no other adequate remedy at law. Ex parte Townsend, 137 S.W.3d at 81. Initially, appellant does not present a claim to this Court that would entitle him to relief by writ of habeas corpus. Further, he does not argue he was prevented from raising this issue on direct appeal, nor does he brief us on why he had no other adequate remedy at law. Because we conclude appellant could have obtained the relief he now requests by filing a direct appeal of his April 1999 conviction for failing to register as a sex offender, we conclude the trial judge did not err in denying appellant relief. We resolve his sole issue against him. We affirm the trial court's order denying appellant the relief sought by his application for writ of habeas corpus.