No. 05-05-01398-CR
Opinion Filed November 15, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 336th Judicial District Court, Grayson County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 53278-336. Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part.
Before Justices MOSELEY, RICHTER, and LANG-MIERS.
Opinion By Justice MOSELEY.
Jean Romero is charged with driving while intoxicated with a child under fifteen years of age in the vehicle. Pretrial bond was set at $2500, which appellant posted on April 9, 2005. The trial court subsequently amended the conditions of appellant's bond. Appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus challenging some of the amended conditions. The trial court denied appellant's request for relief without conducting a hearing. In one issue, appellant contends the trial judge abused her discretion in denying habeas corpus relief.
Applicable Law
The primary object of an appearance bond is to secure the accused's presence at trial on the offense charged. Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980). It is within the trial judge's discretion to determine the proper amount of bail. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15 (Vernon 2005). It is also within the trial judge's discretion to impose conditions on the bail. See Ex parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d 398, 401 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). That discretion, however, is not unlimited. See Smith v. State, 829 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dis.] 1992, pet.ref'd). Conditions of pretrial bail must meet three standards: (1) they must be reasonable; (2) they must be to secure the defendant's attendance at trial; and (3) they must be related to the safety of the alleged victim or the community. See Ex parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d at 401-02; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 17.15, 17.40. To be reasonable, conditions of bail must bear a rational relationship to the purpose of bail, that is, to secure the accused's presence in court. See Smith, 829 S.W.2d at 887; cf. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1951) (bail set in figure higher than amount reasonably calculated to ensure accused's presence at trial excessive). Analysis
Appellant complains about two conditions of bail set by the trial court judge. Condition number (1) requires appellant to report to the community supervision officer twice monthly. Condition number (12) requires that appellant "maintain gainful employment/provide full time child care for dependants/or be enrolled in and participating in a full time education program." Appellant asserts the conditions that she report twice monthly and that she either maintain gainful employment or continue to provide day care for her granddaughter are not authorized by statute, are not rationally related to securing her appearance at future court proceedings, and act as instruments of oppression. Appellant has the burden of demonstrating the conditions of bond were unreasonable. See Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d at 550. The trial court denied habeas corpus relief without conducting a hearing and appellant did not bring forward a record of the September 8, 2005 hearing at which the judge imposed the conditions. Moreover, although appellant claims the conditions operate as an instrument of oppression, she does not specify in what way they are oppressive and presents no record showing she is unable to comply with them. A condition of bond need not relate to directly securing the defendant's presence in court. See Ex parte Elliott, 950 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref'd). The condition is sufficient if it indirectly increases the likelihood the defendant will appear. See id. The conditions that appellant report twice monthly to a community supervision officer and that she keep gainful employment serve to maintain appellant's ties to the community, thereby indirectly increasing the likelihood that she will appear at future court appearances. See id. We conclude, therefore, that these conditions bear a rational relationship to securing appellant's appearance at future court proceedings. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief on these grounds. We overrule appellant's complaint as to these conditions. We cannot, however, reach the same conclusion with regard to the alternative condition that appellant continue to provide day care for her granddaughter. This condition does not bear a rational relationship to securing appellant's presence at future court proceedings. See Smith, 829 S.W.2d at 887 (condition that defendant satisfy civil judgment in sister court bears no rational relationship to objective of securing presence at trial). We sustain appellant's complaint as to this alternative condition. We reverse the trial court's order denying habeas corpus relief in part. We strike that portion of condition (12) of the order setting bond that requires appellant to continue providing day care for her granddaughter. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court's order denying appellant the relief sought by her application for writ of habeas corpus.