Opinion
WR-95,648-01
05-15-2024
EX PARTE RAFAEL CEPTEIN JONES AKA RAFAEL CEPTAIN JONES, Applicant
Do not publish
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. 57,242-A-1 IN THE 30TH DISTRICT COURT FROM WICHITA COUNTY
ORDER
PER CURIAM
Applicant pleaded guilty to assault on a public servant and was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction. Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.
Applicant contends, among other things, that his plea was involuntary because trial counsel failed to properly admonish him of his rights, refused to conduct any meaningful investigation, and induced his plea. Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Accordingly, the record should be developed. The trial court is the appropriate forum for findings of fact. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 3(d). The trial court shall order trial counsel to respond to Applicant's claim. In developing the record, the trial court may use any means set out in Article 11.07, § 3(d). If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. If Applicant is indigent and wants to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent him at the hearing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.04. If counsel is appointed or retained, the trial court shall immediately notify this Court of counsel's name.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether trial counsel's performance was deficient and Applicant would have insisted on a trial but for counsel's alleged deficient performance. The trial court may make any other findings and conclusions that it deems appropriate in response to Applicant's claims.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from the date of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court's findings and conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things, affidavits, motions, objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcripts from hearings and depositions. See Tex. R. App. P. 73.4(b)(4). Any extensions of time must be requested by the trial court and obtained from this Court.
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion.
In 2017, Applicant pled guilty to the third-degree felony offense of assault on a public servant. Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(b)(1). He was convicted and was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction.
In March of 2024, Applicant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07. In his application, Applicant alleges (1) that the trial court failed to adequately inform him of his rights, and (2) that his plea of guilty was involuntary due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. He also alleges that Sections 22.01(a)-(b) and 9.53 of the Texas Penal Code are facially unconstitutional. Tex. Penal Code §§ 22.01(a)-(b) (defining assault and assault upon a public servant), 9.53 (permitting a corrections officer to use the force the officer "reasonably believes . . . necessary" to maintain security in a correctional facility).
Today, the Court remands this application to the convicting court to further develop the record. I join the Court's remand order But I write separately to address my thoughts concerning the doctrine of laches and its possible application to this case See Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661 (Tex Crim App 2014) (holding a convicting court has the authority to sua sponte consider the doctrine of laches); Ex parte Bazille, 663 S.W.3d 68 (Tex Crim App 2022) (Yeary, J, concurring).
The doctrine of laches ought to be considered in a case like this one. Applicant pled guilty in 2017, but he did not file this writ application until seven years later. The record is also silent regarding circumstances that may excuse Applicant's delay, and at least some explanation for the long delay in filing should be provided.
"Our revised approach will permit courts to more broadly consider the diminished memories of trial participants and the diminished availability of the State's evidence, both of which may often be said to occur beyond five years after a conviction becomes final." Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Ex parte Steptoe, 132 S.W.3d 434, 437-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting)).
Consistent with this Court's precedent, the convicting court "may sua sponte consider and determine whether laches should bar relief." Smith, 444 S.W.3d at 667. If the convicting court does so, it must give Applicant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the delay and give the State's prosecutors and/or former counsel for Applicant an opportunity to state whether Applicant's delay has caused any prejudice to their ability to defend against Applicant's claims. Id. at 670. And ultimately, the convicting court may include findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the doctrine of laches in its response to this Court's remand order.
With these additional thoughts, I join the Court's order.