Opinion
04-24-00198-CR 04-24-00199-CR
07-31-2024
EX PARTE Liam Malik MCCORMICK
DO NOT PUBLISH
From the Criminal District Court, Magistrate Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 2024W0138 and 2024W0139 Honorable Andrew Carruthers, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM
These are appeals challenging the trial court's orders denying appellant Liam Malik McCormick's pretrial applications for writ of habeas corpus. In his applications, McCormick asserted he was being unlawfully restrained by the Bexar County Sheriff based on a warrant issued by Dallas County, and he should be released on personal bond pursuant to article 15.21 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. On March 19, 2024, the trial court considered McCormick's applications and denied the relief requested. McCormick then filed notices of appeal, and the trial court clerk filed the clerk's records in both appeals on March 21, 2024. Thereafter, the trial court clerk filed several supplemental clerk's records. The most recent supplemental clerk's records contained orders signed on April 16, 2024, granting McCormick the relief requested in each application and ordering his release on personal bond.
Article 15.21 provides when "the proper office of the county where the offense is alleged to have been committed does not . . . take charge of the arrested person before the 11th day after the date the person is committed to the jail of the county in which the person is arrested, a magistrate in the county where the person was arrested shall: (1) release the arrested person on personal bond without sureties or other security." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 15.21.
"Habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy and is available only when there is no other adequate remedy at law." Ex parte Cruzata, 220 S.W.3d 518, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). "The longstanding rule in Texas regarding habeas corpus is that where the premise of a habeas corpus application is destroyed by subsequent developments, the legal issues raised thereunder are rendered moot." Bennet v. State, 818 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (quoting Saucedo v. State, 795 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ex parte Sifuentes, 639 S.W.3d 842, 845 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2022, pet. ref'd). In particular, issues regarding pretrial bail are moot when the accused is no longer subject to pretrial confinement. See Martinez v. State, 82 S.W.3d 620, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc). "A court of appeals has no jurisdiction to decide moot controversies and issue advisory opinions." Ex parte Huerta, 582 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. App.- Amarillo 2018, pet. ref'd).
Here, the relief requested in McCormick's pretrial applications has now been granted by the trial court's April 16, 2024 orders. As a result, McCormick is no longer subject to pretrial confinement, making his appeals appear moot. We therefore ordered McCormick to file a written response by May 16, 2024, explaining why these appeals should not be dismissed as moot. In lieu of a response, McCormick filed a brief, arguing the appeals are not moot even though "the trial court's April 16, 2024 recission of its erroneous March 19, 2024 ruling would appear to leave appellant without a specific adverse ruling to appeal." McCormick further argues his appeals are not moot because his underlying claim concerning the trial court's alleged violation of article 15.21 is subject to the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception of the mootness doctrine. In other words, if he is confined again by Bexar County for the same charges and subsequently released before we complete a review of the trial court's ruling, then he has been subjected to the same action without a chance of review.
In response, the State filed a letter, contending these appeals are moot because McCormick has received the relief sought in his applications, and by McCormick's own admission, there is no longer an adverse ruling to appeal. McCormick filed a reply, asserting this court's jurisdiction "did not suddenly evaporate simply because the trial court fixed its own error on April 16, 2024." McCormick further asserts the trial court's April 16, 2024 orders are essentially void because under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(g), once the appellate record is filed, all proceedings in the trial court are suspended until the trial court receives the appellate court mandate.
We note appellant filed an amended reply brief along with a motion to amend his reply brief. In response, the State filed a motion to strike the reply brief or alternatively respond to the amended reply brief. After consideration, we grant appellant's motion to amend and deny the State's motion to strike.
We begin with McCormick's assertion his appeals are not moot because the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine applies. The United States Supreme Court has said "the 'capable of repetition but evading review' doctrine [is] limited to the situation where two elements combined: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again." Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). And, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has adopted and applied this doctrine in Pharris v. State, 165 S.W.3d 681, 687-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
There, the court addressed whether an appeal of the trial court's denial of bail became moot because the trial court's "no bond" order had expired after sixty days pursuant to article 1, section 11a of the Texas Constitution, and the trial court subsequently set bail. Id. at 687. The court held the appeal of the "no bond" order was not moot because the "capable of repetition but evading review" doctrine applied. Id. at 688. It reasoned (1) the requirement to automatically set aside a "no bond" order after sixty days was "too short a time period in which to fully and fairly litigate a 'no bond' order" and (2) there was a reasonable expectation the defendant would be subject to the same action again because the prosecutor stated on the record it was going to file additional charges against the defendant for other actions and continue to request "no bond" orders. Id. at 688-89. Here, even assuming McCormick's challenge to the March 19, 2024 orders was susceptible to evading review, McCormick has not shown there was a reasonable expectation he would be subjected to the same action again. Unlike in Pharris, where the prosecutor stated on the record it would be filing additional charges and continue to request similar "no bond" orders, there is nothing in this record indicating Bexar County would place McCormick in custody again for the same charges. See id. at 688-89; Ex parte Sewell, 495 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (reasoning "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine not satisfied because appellant could not show he would be subjected to same action again even assuming challenged action too short in duration to be fully litigated). We therefore conclude the "capable of repetition, but evading review" exception does not apply.
McCormick next argues his appeals are not moot because the trial court's April 16, 2024 orders were essentially void under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(g). This rule provides, "Once the record has been filed in the appellate court, all further proceedings in the trial court - except as provided otherwise by law or by these rules - will be suspended until the trial court receives the appellate - court mandate." Tex.R.App.P. 25.2(g). According to McCormick, the trial court did not have authority to enter its April 16, 2024 orders granting his requested relief and ultimately ordering his release on personal bond. However, McCormick's argument ignores Rule 25.2(g)'s express recognition that exceptions exist to its suspension on all further proceedings. And the longstanding rule in Texas regarding habeas has consistently been subsequent developments in a case can destroy the underlying premise of a habeas application, rending those claims moot. See Bennet, 818 S.W.2d at 200; see also Sifuentes, 639 S.W.3d at 845 (dismissing appeals from orders denying pretrial writs of habeas corpus seeking release on personal bond as moot because applicants had "bonded out" or pled "no contest or guilty," leading to their release); see Ex parte Guerrero, 99 S.W.3d 852, 853 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal challenging trial court's order setting bond at $100,000 on pretrial application for habeas corpus as moot after supplemental clerk's record established trial court reduced bond and defendant was released). And if we were to accept McCormick's argument, we would be construing Rule 25.2(g) as a bar to providing a person habeas relief. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.04 ("Every provision relating to the writ of habeas corpus shall be most favorably construed in order to give effect to the remedy, and protect the rights of the person seeking relief under it."). We therefore conclude McCormick's contention concerning Rule 25.2(g) is without merit, and we dismiss the appeals as moot.