Opinion
WR-81 078-05
06-08-2022
EX PARTE MIGUEL MARTINEZ, Applicant
Do not publish
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. 1374263-C IN THE 184TH DISTRICT COURT FROM HARRIS COUNTY
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion. Hervey, J., not participating.
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
Applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Martinez v. State, No. 14-15-00731-CR (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] Nov. 17, 2016) (not designated for publication). Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.
Applicant contends, among other things, that his plea was involuntary because trial counsel incorrectly advised him to reject a 10-year plea offer, pressured him into taking a 20-year plea offer, and failed to explain how the law applied to his case. Because the application was forwarded to this Court after the trial court had issued a timely order designating issues but before it had made findings of fact and conclusions of law, we remanded the application to the trial court to complete its evidentiary investigation and to make findings and conclusions. The trial court has done so and recommends that the Court deny relief. However, the trial court's findings do not address all of Applicant's ineffective assistance of counsel allegations and were made without the benefit of an affidavit from counsel. Additionally, the trial court relies on the reporter's and clerk's records in its findings, therefore they must be forwarded to this Court.
Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Ex parte Argent, 393 S.W.3d 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In these circumstances, additional facts are needed. The trial court is the appropriate forum for findings of fact. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 3(d). The trial court shall order trial counsel to respond to Applicant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In developing the record, the trial court may use any means set out in Article 11.07, § 3(d). If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. If Applicant is indigent and wants to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent him at the hearing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.04. If counsel is appointed or retained, the trial court shall immediately notify this Court of counsel's name.
The trial court shall make supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether trial counsel's performance was deficient and Applicant would have insisted on a trial but for counsel's alleged deficient performance. The trial court may make any other findings and conclusions that it deems appropriate in response to Applicant's claim.
The trial court shall make supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from the date of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court's findings and conclusions; copies of the reporter's and clerk's records; and the record developed on remand, including, among other things, affidavits, motions, objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcripts from hearings and depositions. See Tex. R. App. P. 73.4(b)(4). Any extensions of time must be requested by the trial court and obtained from this Court.
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Applicant was convicted in 2013 of murder and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in 2016. Martinez v. State, No. 14-15-00731-CR (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 17, 2016) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
In October 2018, Applicant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07. In his application, he alleges, among other things, that his plea was involuntary because his trial counsel was ineffective.
Today, the Court remands this application to the trial court to further develop the record. I join the Court's remand order. But I write separately to address my thoughts concerning the doctrine of laches and its possible application to this case. See Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding a trial court has the authority to sua sponte consider the doctrine of laches); Ex parte Bazille, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. WR-89, 851-02, 2022 WL 108348 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2022) (Yeary, J., concurring).
The doctrine of laches ought to be considered in a case like this one. Applicant's trial occurred in 2013, but this writ application was not filed until over five years later. The record is also silent so far regarding circumstances that may excuse Applicant's delay, and at least some explanation for the long delay in filing should be provided.
"Our revised approach will permit courts to more broadly consider the diminished memories of trial participants and the diminished availability of the State's evidence, both of which may often be said to occur beyond five years after a conviction becomes final." Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Ex parte Steptoe, 132 S.W.3d 434, 437-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting)).
Consistent with this Court's precedent, the trial court "may sua sponte consider and determine whether laches should bar relief." Smith, 444 S.W.3d at 667. If the trial court does so, it must give Applicant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the delay, and give the State's prosecutors and/or former counsel for Applicant an opportunity to state whether Applicant's delay has caused any prejudice to their ability to defend against Applicant's claims. Id. at 670. And ultimately, the trial court may include findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the doctrine of laches in its response to this Court's remand order.
With these additional thoughts, I join the Court's order.