Opinion
WR-84 487-03
09-29-2021
EX PARTE CLINTON MANNING DAVIS, Applicant
Do not publish
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. 22, 163-A IN THE 258TH DISTRICT COURT FROM POLK COUNTY
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
Applicant was convicted of indecency with a child and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.
Applicant contends that plea was involuntary because counsel told him that he would receive a sixty year sentence if he did not take the State's plea offer of fifteen years. Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Accordingly, the record should be developed. The trial court is the appropriate forum for findings of fact. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 3(d). The trial court shall order trial counsel to respond to Applicant's claim. In developing the record, the trial court may use any means set out in Article 11.07, § 3(d). If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. If Applicant is indigent and wants to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent him at the hearing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.04. If counsel is appointed or retained, the trial court shall immediately notify this Court of counsel's name.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether Applicant's plea was involuntary. The trial court may make any other findings and conclusions that it deems appropriate in response to Applicant's claim.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from the date of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court's findings and conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things, affidavits, motions, objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcripts from hearings and depositions. See Tex. R. App. P. 73.4(b)(4). Any extensions of time must be requested by the trial court and obtained from this Court.
CONCURRING OPINION
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Slaughter, J., joined.
In 2013, Applicant, Clinton Manning Davis, pled guilty and was convicted of indecency with a child and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. In 2020, Applicant filed this application for writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, alleging his plea was involuntary because counsel told him he would receive a sixty-year sentence if he did not take the State's plea offer of fifteen years. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.
Today, the Court remands this application to the trial court to further develop the record. I agree this application should be remanded, and so I join the Court's order doing so. But I write separately, as I have previously, to address my thoughts concerning the doctrine of laches and its possible application to this case. See Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding a trial court has the authority to sua sponte consider the doctrine of laches); Ex parte Sepeda, No. WR-92, 711-01, 2021 WL 2450089 (Tex Crim App June 16, 2021) (per curiam) (not designated for publication) (Yeary, J, concurring) (reviewing Ex parte Smith's holding and the principles that justify a trial court's sua sponte authority to consider laches).
The doctrine of laches ought to be considered in a case like this one. Applicant's trial occurred in 2013, but this application was not filed until almost six and a half years later. In addition, the record is silent with regard to circumstances that may excuse Applicant's delay.
"Our revised approach will permit courts to more broadly consider the diminished memories of trial participants and the diminished availability of the State's evidence, both of which may often be said to occur beyond five years after a conviction becomes final." Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Ex parte Steptoe, 132 S.W.3d 434, 437-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting)).
Consistent with this Court's precedent, the trial court may, sua sponte, give Applicant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the delay. It may also give the State and/or former counsel for Applicant an opportunity to state whether Applicant's delay has caused any prejudice to their ability to defend against Applicant's claims. And ultimately, the trial court may include findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the doctrine of laches in its response to this Court's remand order.
With these additional thoughts, I join the Court's order.