Opinion
WR-93 603-01
04-13-2022
EX PARTE ANTONIO ALCARAZ, Applicant
Do not publish
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. 1344704-A IN THE 209TH DISTRICT COURT FROM HARRIS COUNTY
ORDER
Per curiam.
Applicant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction. Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.
On October 18, 2021, the trial court entered an order designating issues. The district clerk properly forwarded this application to this Court under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 73.4(b)(5). However, the application was forwarded before the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law. We remand this application to the trial court to complete its evidentiary investigation and make findings of fact and conclusions of law. 1
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from the date of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court's findings and conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things, affidavits, motions, objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcripts from hearings and depositions. See Tex. R. App. P. 73.4(b)(4). Any extensions of time must be requested by the trial court and obtained from this Court. 2
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Slaughter, J., joined.
Applicant pled guilty and was convicted in 2013 of aggravated sexual assault of a child and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction.
In September 2021, Applicant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1 11.07. In his application, he alleges his plea was involuntary because trial counsel failed to inform him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty.
Today, the Court remands this application to the trial court to further develop the record. I join the Court's remand order. But I write separately to address my thoughts concerning the doctrine of laches and its possible application to this case. See Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding a trial court has the authority to sua sponte consider the doctrine of laches); Ex parte Bazille, __ S.W.3d __, No. WR-89, 851-02, 2022 WL 108348 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2022) (Yeary, J., concurring).
The doctrine of laches ought to be considered in a case like this one. Applicant's trial occurred in 2013, but this writ application was not filed until almost eight years later. The record is also silent regarding circumstances that may excuse Applicant's delay, and at least some explanation for the long delay in filing should be provided.
Applicant cites to Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), and Padilla has been in existence since before Applicant's trial began.
Consistent with this Court's precedent, the trial court may, sua sponte, give Applicant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the delay. It may also give the State's prosecutors and/or former counsel for Applicant an opportunity to state whether Applicant's delay has caused any prejudice to their ability to defend against Applicant's claims. And 2 ultimately, the trial court may include findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the doctrine of laches in its response to this Court's remand order.
"Our revised approach will permit courts to more broadly consider the diminished memories of trial participants and the diminished availability of the State's evidence, both of which may often be said to occur beyond five years after a conviction becomes final." Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Ex parte Steptoe, 132 S.W.3d 434, 437-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting)).
With these additional thoughts, I join the Court's order. 3