Opinion
Docket No. 25318.
Filed: April 13, 2000. Petition for review granted July 13, 2000.
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bonneville County. Hon. Ted V. Wood, District Judge.
Order summarily dismissing application for post-conviction relief, reversed and case remanded.
Woolf, Combo Thompson, Idaho Falls, for appellant.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; T. Paul Krueger, II, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Eric Evensiosky appeals from an order of the district court summarily dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
A jury found Evensiosky guilty of grand theft, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), and -2407(1)(b), and being a persistent violator, I.C. § 19-2514. On December 21, 1995, the district court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Evensiosky to a unified term of twenty-one years, with six years fixed. Evensiosky's trial counsel filed motions for a new trial and for judgment of acquittal. After these motions were filed, Evensiosky's counsel of record changed several times. On May 22, 1996, the district court denied Evensiosky's motions.
On May 15, 1997, in response to his inquiry regarding a direct appeal, Evensiosky received a letter from the clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court indicating that there had been no direct appeal filed in his case. On May 20, Evensiosky requested clarification because he did not believe that letter accurately reflected the procedural posture of his case. On June 2, Evensiosky was sent confirmation that no direct appeal had ever been filed. On June 3, Evensiosky wrote a letter to the district court that presided over his criminal case. Evensiosky informed the district court that he had requested that each one of his counsel file a direct appeal and that no direct appeal had been filed by any of his attorneys. Later in June, Evensiosky was transferred to a prison facility in Louisiana.
On September 17, 1997, Evensiosky filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA). In that application, he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a direct appeal in his criminal case after counsel was requested to do so. On November 20, the district court appointed post-conviction counsel to represent Evensiosky. On that same date, the district court issued a notice of its intent to dismiss Evensiosky's post-conviction application because it was time-barred. The district court permitted Evensiosky twenty days to respond. Pursuant to a stipulation, an order extending the time to respond to the district court's notice was granted.
Evensiosky filed an amended application for post-conviction relief on December 12, 1997. In that amended application, Evensiosky again alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal after being requested to do so. The amended application also included Evensiosky's response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss.
Evensiosky also requested new post-conviction counsel, alleging that a conflict of interest existed. On January 12, 1998, Evensiosky's then post-conviction counsel was permitted to withdraw. On January 22, Evensiosky's present post-conviction counsel was appointed.
The state filed an answer to the application for post-conviction relief on April 24, 1998, asserting, inter alia, that Evensiosky's application was time-barred. On July 20, Evensiosky moved to have his request for relief granted, alleging that there was no issue of material fact concerning his post-conviction application. A hearing on Evensiosky's motion was held. The district court requested additional briefing which both Evensiosky and the state submitted. On November 5, 1998, the district court summarily dismissed Evensiosky's application. Evensiosky unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the dismissal. Evensiosky appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
The limitation period for post-conviction relief actions is specified in I.C. § 19-4902, which provides that an application "may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later." The district court denied Evensiosky's motions for new trial and judgment of acquittal on May 22, 1996. Therefore, the expiration of the time to file a direct appeal was July 3, 1996. In the absence of any tolling of the limitation period, Evensiosky's application for post-conviction relief needed to be filed by July 3, 1997, in order to have been timely.
Evensiosky argued before the district court that he had learned that no direct appeal had been filed in his case on approximately June 2, 1997, and, therefore, the limitation period on his UPCPA claim began to run on that date. Additionally, Evensiosky asserted that he was denied meaningful access to the Idaho courts when he was transferred to Louisiana and, thus, the limitation period was tolled. The district court determined that Evensiosky's application was time-barred and summarily dismissed the action.
A. Standard of Review
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct.App. 1992). Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. § 19-4907; Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1990). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, for an application must contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application. I.C. § 19-4903. In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal.
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for post-conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct.App. 1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374, 376 (Ct.App. 1987). Summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief may be appropriate, however, even where the state does not controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct.App. 1986). On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, we determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file; moreover, the court liberally construes the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct.App. 1993).
In his response to the district court's notice of its intent to dismiss his application, Evensiosky alleged that he became aware of the fact that no direct appeal had been filed in his case on June 2, 1997. Evensiosky argued that the limitation period began to run on that date pursuant to a "discovery exception" to the running of the limitation period. He also asserted that he had been transferred to an out-of-state facility, arriving there "on or about June 26, 1997," and, as a result, was denied meaningful access to the Idaho courts. Evensiosky asserted that this denial tolled the limitation period of I.C. § 19-4902. The district court found that the discovery exception was not available to Evensiosky because he knew that no direct appeal had been filed in his criminal case approximately four weeks before being transferred out of the state. Additionally, in its order summarily dismissing Evensiosky's application, the district court found that, due to the approximate four-week period during which Evensiosky knew of his cause of action and was present in Idaho, he was not denied meaningful access to the Idaho courts. The district court's determination was based on Evensiosky's uncontroverted factual assertions. Therefore, the issue of whether Evensiosky's claim is barred by the statute of limitation is one of law. See Mason v. Tucker and Assocs., 125 Idaho 429, 434, 871 P.2d 846, 851 (Ct. App. 1994).
For the purposes of this opinion, we will utilize approximately four weeks as the period of time that Evensiosky was both aware that no direct appeal had been filed in his underlying criminal case and was incarcerated in Idaho. However, this number is only an approximation because, as explained later in this opinion, the district court failed to determine the exact date that Evensiosky was transferred out of state.
B. Tolling of the Limitation Period
1. Discovery exception
Evensiosky contends that, because he discovered that an appeal had not been filed in his criminal case on approximately June 2, 1997, a "discovery exception" should have been applied by the district court to toll the limitation period. Accordingly, Evensiosky argues that the limitation period for his UPCPA claim began to run on that date and, thus, his application was timely.
The issue of whether a discovery exception should be applied to the limitation period contained in I.C. § 19-4902 has never been squarely decided by the Idaho courts. See Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530, 537, 944 P.2d 127, 134 (Ct.App. 1997); Chapman v. State, 128 Idaho 733, 735, 918 P.2d 602, 604 (Ct.App. 1996). However, this Court has recognized that a discovery exception "may have merit in some cases." Housley v. State, 119 Idaho 885, 888, 811 P.2d 495, 498 (Ct.App. 1991). If such an exception does apply, the UPCPA cause of action would accrue and the limitation period begin to run when the plaintiff knew or should have known the relevant facts giving rise to that cause of action. Chapman, 128 Idaho at 735, 918 P.2d at 604.
In LaFon v. State, 119 Idaho 387, 807 P.2d 66 (Ct.App. 1991), the district court applied a discovery exception to the then five-year limitation period contained in the UPCPA.
In order to determine whether a discovery exception is available to Evensiosky, this Court must analyze whether such an exception is consistent with the legislative intent of the UPCPA. When the UPCPA was initially adopted in Idaho, it contained no time limit on when actions could be initiated. See 1967 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 25 at 43. In 1979, the legislature saw fit to impose a five-year limitation period. See 1979 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 133 at 428. The legislative purpose of imposing the five-year period was to decrease the cost of record storage. Statement of Purpose H.B. 83 (1979).
Thereafter, the legislature reduced the limitation period during which a UPCPA application could be timely filed to one year. See 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 265 at 898. The legislative purpose behind this further reduction in the limitation period was to make the post-conviction remedy available to noncapital prisoners more consistent with that afforded to capital prisoners. In addition, the legislature desired to provide trial counsel with timely notice if there was an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. Statement of Purpose S.B. 1116 (1993).
The post-conviction procedure in a capital case requires that a defendant file any legal or factual challenge, that is known or reasonably should be known, to his or her sentence or conviction within forty-two days of the judgment imposing the punishment of death. I.C. § 19-2719(3). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that issues may be raised outside of the forty-two day period permitted by I.C. § 19-2719 in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated that the issues raised were not known and reasonably could not have been known within the time frame allowed by statute. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 807, 820 P.2d 665, 677 (1991). In such a case, I.C. § 19-2719 places a heightened burden on a prisoner, requiring a prima facie showing that the issues raised were not known and could not reasonably have been known within the statutory period. Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758, 760, 852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (1993). Thus, it appears that the legislature has recognized that there are certain unique cases in which a capital defendant will not know or reasonably could not have known of his or her claim prior to the expiration of the limitation period. In such cases, the legislature has also recognized that those claims should not be barred if the capital defendant meets his or her heightened burden concerning those claims. Therefore, Evensiosky's request for the application of a discovery exception to the limitation period contained in I.C. § 19-4902 in his case would be consistent with the legislative intent underlying the enactment of the one-year limitation period contained in I.C. § 19-4902.
Additionally, when interpreting a statute, the particular words of that statute should be read in context, and the statute should be read as a whole. Bastian v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 307, 310, 658 P.2d 978, 981 (Ct.App. 1983). The UPCPA contains two provisions that are consistent with Evensiosky's request for the application of a discovery exception in this case. Idaho Code Section 19-4901(b) permits an applicant to raise an issue that could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not if "it appears to the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier." (Emphasis added.). Furthermore, I.C. § 19-4908 permits a successive application for post-conviction relief where the court "finds a ground for relief asserted [in a successive application] which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application." (Emphasis added.). Thus, the legislature has determined that certain post-conviction claims should be permitted, even though those claims were either not raised on direct appeal or in an initial UPCPA application. Therefore, it appears that a discovery exception which permits an applicant to raise a claim, in an initial application, challenging the validity of his or her conviction or sentence that was theretofore unknown and reasonably could not have been known would be consistent with the UPCPA, when read as a whole. Accordingly, Evensiosky's request for a discovery exception to the limitation period contained in I.C. § 19-4902 would not be contrary to the intent of the legislature as expressed in other provisions within the UPCPA.
Finally, the UPCPA encompasses and replaces all other common law, statutory and other remedies, including the writ of habeas corpus, that were previously available to collaterally challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence. Eubank v. State, 130 Idaho 861, 863, 949 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Ct.App. 1997). The UPCPA is an expansion of the writ of habeas corpus. Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 401, 973 P.2d 749, 753 (Ct.App. 1999). There is no limitation period for a habeas corpus action. See I.C. §§ 19-4201 to 4236. Furthermore, this Court has held that the failure to provide a post-conviction relief applicant with a meaningful opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process. Hernandez v. State, ___ Idaho ___, ___, 992 P.2d 789, 794 (Ct.App. 1999). In Mellinger v. State, 113 Idaho 31, 740 P.2d 73 (Ct.App. 1987), it was recognized that "[f]ederal intervention might also be invited by a prisoner who is barred under the literal terms of I.C. § 19-4902 from seeking post-conviction relief upon a ground that was unknown" during the statutory period. Id. at 35 n. 1, 740 P.2d at 77 n. 1 (Burnett, J., concurring). If a discovery exception is not applied in this case, Evensiosky may be forever precluded from bringing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that a discovery exception to the one-year limitation period contained in I.C. § 19-4902 should be applied in certain limited circumstances. Such an exception would permit an applicant to file an initial post-conviction relief application only if the applicant makes a prima facie showing that he or she did not know and could not reasonably have known of the factual basis underlying that particular claim. See Paz, 123 Idaho at 760, 852 P.2d at 1357; Rhoades, 120 Idaho at 807, 820 P.2d at 677.
However, an inmate may not have an unlimited time within which to assert his or her UPCPA claim after the date on which the district court determines he or she knew or reasonably should have known of the fact giving rise to the claim. Such an unlimited period would thwart the express legislative intent expressed in I.C. § 19-4902. As stated above, the legislative intent underlying the imposition of the one-year period was to make the post-conviction remedy available to noncapital prisoners more consistent with that afforded to capital prisoners. When a capital prisoner asserts a claim that was not known or reasonably could not have been known within the period permitted by I.C. § 19-2719, such a claim must be raised within a "reasonable time." Paz, 123 Idaho at 760, 852 P.2d at 1357. When determining whether such a claim was brought within a reasonable time, the Supreme Court has determined that a four-year period is unreasonable. Id. However, forty-two days, the original period permitted by I.C. § 19-2719, was held to have been a reasonable time within which to file such a claim. See Dunlap v. State, 131 Idaho 576, 577, 961 P.2d 1179, 1180 (1998).
In Hernandez, this Court addressed the limitation period within which a successive application for post-conviction relief must be filed. We determined that, considering the limitation period contained in I.C. § 19-4902, one year was a reasonable time within which to file a successive post-conviction application if the initial claim was dismissed due to ineffective assistance of counsel in the initial post-conviction proceeding. Hernandez, ___ Idaho at ___, 992 P.2d at 794. We find our reasoning in Hernandez applicable in our analysis of the period within which to file an initial post-conviction application after it is determined that a discovery exception to the limitation period is appropriate. The legislature has seen fit to impose a one-year limitation period for claims pursued under the UPCPA. I.C. § 19-4902. Giving full weight to this express legislative intent, we hold that one year is a reasonable period for an inmate to file a UPCPA claim after the factual basis of the claim became known or reasonably should have been known to the applicant.
The state argues that the discovery exception should not be available to Evensiosky because he discovered the facts giving rise to his UPCPA claim before the expiration of the limitation period. The state relies on Reyes v. State, 128 Idaho 413, 913 P.2d 1183 (Ct.App. 1996) in support of its assertion. In Reyes, this Court stated:
If a "discovery" exception should apply to the filing of an application for post-conviction relief, the exception must relate to facts learned by the applicant after expiration of the time limit established by I.C. § 19-4902. See, e.g., Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 801 P.2d 1283 (1990).
Reyes, 128 Idaho at 415, 913 P.2d at 1185. This comment in Reyes is not controlling.
In Reyes, the sole ground for relief sought in the UPCPA application was a claim that Reyes's trial counsel was ineffective during her trial. Thus, the claim was based upon facts known to the applicant before the limitation period began to run. Reyes asserted that she did not learn that the limitation period contained in I.C. § 19-4902 had been shortened to one year and argued that a discovery exception should have been applied in her case. As stated above, it is the discovery of facts giving rise to a UPCPA claim that permits the application of a discovery exception. The discovery of the amendment of the statutory period of limitation is not a fact giving rise to post-conviction relief. See generally Chapman, 128 Idaho at 736-37, 918 P.2d at 604-05 (unawareness of the law did not postpone the limitation period in a UPCPA cause of action). Thus, the Court's statement in Reyes was intended to emphasize the distinction between the delayed discovery of facts and the delayed discovery of the law. The Court's comment, as it pertains to the timing of the discovery of facts giving rise to the application of the discovery exception, is dicta.
In this case, the district court determined that Evensiosky knew of the factual basis underlying his UPCPA claim in the beginning of June 1997. The district court also found that the discovery exception was unavailable to Evensiosky, focusing exclusively on the approximate four-week period prior to the expiration of the limitation period during which Evensiosky knew about facts giving rise to his UPCPA claim. Finally, the district court concluded that Evensiosky's UPCPA application was time-barred. However, the district court made no finding of whether Evensiosky reasonably should have known of the facts underlying his claim at an earlier date. Therefore, a remand is necessary to allow a hearing at which Evensiosky's evidence regarding when he knew or reasonably should have known of the factual basis for his UPCPA claim can be weighed against any countervailing evidence presented by the state. Based on the evidence presented, the district court must determine if the discovery exception is available to Evensiosky and, if so, the exact date on which he either knew or should have known that his attorneys failed to file a direct appeal. Evensiosky would have a reasonable period — one year — from that date to timely file his UPCPA.
2. Meaningful Access to the Idaho courts
Evensiosky also contends that the statute of limitation within which he was permitted to file his application should have been tolled because he had been transferred to an out-of-state facility and was, therefore, without meaningful access to the Idaho courts. This Court has previously held that the constitutional right of access to the Idaho courts is violated when a prisoner is housed in an out-of-state facility without either access to Idaho legal reference books or the availability of assistance from persons trained in Idaho law and procedure. Martinez, 130 Idaho at 536, 944 P.2d at 133. When an applicant sustains his or her burden of demonstrating such a violation, the limitation period for his or her post-conviction relief action will be deemed tolled until the applicant is again afforded meaningful access to the Idaho courts. Id.
In his amended application for post-conviction relief, Evensiosky alleged that he was moved to a Louisiana prison facility on June 26, 1997. Evensiosky asserted that the facility he was transferred to had neither Idaho law books, nor an inmate law clerk or other individual familiar with Idaho law available to assist him. Based on these allegations, Evensiosky made a prima facie showing that he was deprived of meaningful access to the Idaho courts, to which he is entitled pursuant to Article I, Section 18 of the Idaho Constitution, during his incarceration in Louisiana. See Martinez, 130 Idaho 536, 944 P.2d 133.
The order of the district court dismissing Evensiosky's application states:
The sequence of . . . dates demonstrates that [Evensiosky] learned that no appeal had been filed approximately six weeks before the time period for filing a petition for post-conviction relief ended. It also demonstrates that approximately four weeks elapsed between the date [Evensiosky] learned that no appeal had been filed and the date on which he was transfered [sic] to Louisiana. Therefore, the Court finds that [Evensiosky] was not deprived of meaningful access to the Idaho court with regard to his petition for post-conviction relief when he was transfered [sic] to Louisiana . . .
The district court focused on the period that Evensiosky was incarcerated in Idaho during which he was aware of the basis for his application for post-conviction relief in finding that meaningful access to the Idaho courts was not denied when Evensiosky was transferred out of state.
Thereafter, Evensiosky filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court's summary dismissal. At the close of the hearing on the motion, the district court stated:
[G]iven the circumstances, that the four-week window was adequate for [Evensiosky] to prepare and submit a petition . . . . He failed to do that, and I adhere to my decision that the time frame which he had to file his petition was adequate. There is no proof that he was precluded in some way from doing it within that four-week window . . .
(Emphasis added.). In reaching its decision to deny Evensiosky's motion for reconsideration of the summary dismissal of his application, the district court again focused on the time wherein Evensiosky was aware of his UPCPA claim and was housed in Idaho.
However, whenever some paramount authority prevents a person from exercising his or her legal remedy, the time during which he or she is prevented from doing so is not to be counted against that person in determining whether the statute of limitation has barred his or her cause of action. See 51 AM. JUR.2d Limitation of Actions § 140 (1970). This rule prevents the limitation period from running during the time the claimant is prevented, without fault on his or her part, from suing, so that he or she can have the full benefit of the time permitted under the statute of limitation. Id.
The Martinez court held that the limitation period for a post-conviction action is deemed tolled until the applicant is afforded meaningful access to the Idaho courts. Martinez, 130 Idaho at 536, 944 P.2d at 133. Today, we hold that meaningful access to the Idaho courts is necessary for the entire statutory one-year period set forth in I.C. § 19-4902. To hold otherwise would permit the state to simply transfer a prisoner out of state, detain him or her there until the statute of limitation period has elapsed, and then rely on that same statute of limitation to argue that the cause of action is time barred. Therefore, we conclude that the period of time during which an inmate is denied meaningful access to the Idaho courts is not counted against the one-year limitation period, but remains for the inmate to utilize when such access is reinstated.
The district court's methodology of focusing on the approximately four-week period during which Evensiosky was both aware of the factual basis for his cause of action and housed in Idaho in determining that meaningful access to the Idaho courts was not denied was error. The abridgement of the right to access to the Idaho courts, a right specifically guaranteed by Article I, Section 18 of the Idaho Constitution, cannot be the subject of such a calculation. Additionally, the method utilized by the district court would dilute the one-year limitation period set forth in I.C. § 19-4902. Such a result would also thwart the legislative intent expressed in that statute, a result the Idaho appellate courts cannot endorse. See Allen v. Blaine County, 131 Idaho 138, 141, 953 P.2d 578, 581 (1998); Corder v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 133 Idaho 353, 358, 986 P.2d 1019, 1024 (Ct.App. 1999). Therefore, we hold that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Evensiosky's application for post-conviction relief on the ground that Evensiosky was aware of the basis for his UPCPA cause of action for four weeks prior to being transferred to an out-of-state facility allegedly without either access to Idaho legal reference books or the availability of assistance by persons trained in Idaho law and procedure.
Our disposition of this case renders it unnecessary for this Court to address whether Evensiosky's letter to the district court, dated June 3, 1997, should have been construed as an application for post-conviction relief. If it had been so construed, Evensiosky's application would have been made both before his transfer to Louisiana and within the limitation period of I.C. § 19-4902.
In this case, absent application of the discovery exception, the one-year limitation period began to run on July 3, 1996. As we stated above, Evensiosky made a prima facie showing — a showing sufficient to preclude summary dismissal — that he was denied meaningful access to the Idaho courts. However, because the district court summarily dismissed Evensiosky's UPCPA application, the state was not afforded the opportunity to contradict Evensiosky's claim by introducing evidence to the contrary. Therefore, a remand is necessary to permit a hearing at which Evensiosky's evidence regarding the denial of meaningful access to the Idaho courts can be weighed against any countervailing evidence from the state. Based on the evidence presented, the district court must determine when Evensiosky was denied meaningful access to the Idaho courts — the date that the limitation period began to be tolled. The district court must then determine when meaningful access to the Idaho courts was reacquired by Evensiosky. The number of days between those two dates is the number of days by which the otherwise applicable limitation period is extended due to the deprivation of meaningful access to the Idaho courts. Based on its factual findings regarding these two dates, the district court must finally determine whether Evensiosky's UPCPA application was time-barred.
If the district court determines that the discovery exception is available to Evensiosky, the date on which district court finds that Evensiosky either knew or reasonably should have known that his attorney failed to file a direct appeal in his criminal case would be the date on which the one-year limitation period began to run.
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that in certain limited circumstances, a discovery exception should be applied to toll the limitation period contained in I.C. § 19-4902. Under the application of such an exception, an inmate must be allowed one year from the time that he or she either knew or reasonably should have known of the facts giving rise to a post-conviction claim within which to file an initial UPCPA application. We further hold that meaningful access to the Idaho courts is necessary for the entire statutory one-year period set forth in I.C. § 19-4902. Therefore, the order of the district court, summarily dismissing Evensiosky's application for post-conviction relief, is reversed. This case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judge LANSING, and Judge SCHWARTZMAN, CONCUR.