Opinion
No. 2 CA-CV 2017-0154
08-21-2018
IN RE THE ESTATE OF JULIA M. ROSS, DECEASED JULIA L. ROSS, Appellant, v. KATHERINE ISNER, Appellee.
Julia L. Ross, Bisbee In Propria Persona Katherine Isner, Bisbee In Propria Persona
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f). Appeal from the Superior Court in Cochise County
Nos. PB201100078 and PB201100087 (Consolidated)
The Honorable Karl E. Elledge, Judge
AFFIRMED
Julia L. Ross, Bisbee
In Propria Persona Katherine Isner, Bisbee
In Propria Persona
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Staring authored the decision of the Court in which Chief Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Brearcliffe concurred. STARING, Presiding Judge:
¶1 Julia Ross appeals the trial court's order distributing her mother's estate. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 Ross and her sister, Katherine Isner, were involved in lengthy, adversarial proceedings concerning the distribution of their mother's estate. The trial court issued its ruling concerning the distribution of the estate in an unsigned minute entry entered on June 13, 2017. On July 13, 2017, Ross filed a notice of appeal from the June 13 minute entry.
¶3 On August 10, 2017, the estate lodged a proposed form of distribution order with the trial court. On August 31, the court entered a signed distribution order, requiring the distribution described in the June 13 minute entry and ordering the estate's counsel to close the estate.
Jurisdiction
¶4 "We have an independent duty to examine our jurisdiction." Riendeau v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 223 Ariz. 540, ¶ 4 (App. 2010). "Our jurisdiction is defined by statute, and we must dismiss an appeal over which we lack jurisdiction." Baker v. Bradley, 231 Ariz. 475, ¶ 8 (App. 2013). Section 12-2101(A)(9), A.R.S., provides that an appeal may be taken "[f]rom a judgment, decree or order entered in any formal proceeding[] under title 14," which, among other things, governs estates. See A.R.S. §§ 14-1101 to 14-13118. Section 14-1201(21) defines a formal proceeding as a "proceeding[] conducted before a judge with notice to interested persons." See also In re Guardianship of Sommer, 241 Ariz. 308, ¶ 7 (App. 2016) (jurisdiction exists over "judgment, decree or order" entered in probate matter after notice to interested persons).
¶5 Generally, however, our jurisdiction is limited to appeals from final judgments that dispose of all parties and claims. Garza v. Swift Transp. Co., 222 Ariz. 281, ¶ 17 (2009); see also § 12-2101(A)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(c). In this instance, the August 31 order was not appealable initially because it did not contain the recitation of finality required by Rule 54(c), "that no further matters remain pending and that the judgment is entered under Rule 54(c)." See Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, L.L.C., 240 Ariz. 420, ¶ 13 (App. 2016) (Rule 54(c) applies to probate appeals). Accordingly, we revested jurisdiction with the trial court to permit the entry of a Rule 54(c) compliant order. The trial court timely entered such an order.
¶6 We turn now to the effect of Ross's notice of appeal being filed on July 13, which was after the issuance of the unsigned minute entry but before the entry of an appealable order. When a notice of appeal is filed before the entry of final judgment, it is premature and "this court lacks jurisdiction to determine the appeal unless the prematurity of the notice of appeal is overcome by the narrow 'Barassi exception.'" Camasura v. Camasura, 238 Ariz. 179, ¶ 6 (App. 2015). In Barassi, our supreme court held that "a premature appeal from a minute entry order in which no appellee was prejudiced and in which a subsequent final judgment was entered over which jurisdiction may be exercised need not be dismissed." Barassi v. Matison, 130 Ariz. 418, 422 (1980). Subsequent cases have clarified that Barassi "create[d] only a limited exception to the final judgment rule that allows a notice of appeal to be filed after the trial court has made its final decision, but before it has entered a formal judgment, if no decision of the court could change and the only remaining task is merely ministerial." Craig v. Craig, 227 Ariz. 105, ¶ 13 (2011), quoting Smith v. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm'n, 212 Ariz. 407, ¶ 37 (2006) (alteration and emphasis in Craig).
¶7 To ascertain whether a premature appeal qualifies under the Barassi exception, "we must determine whether there were substantive motions or issues awaiting determination at the time the premature notice of appeal [was] filed." Bradley, 231 Ariz. 475, ¶ 19. If so, the ruling of the court could change and, therefore, the premature notice of appeal would be "ineffective" and a "nullity." Craig, 227 Ariz. 105, ¶ 13. But, if the ruling preceding the premature notice of appeal is a final decision, there are no substantive motions pending or filed thereafter, and the trial court enters a formal judgment consistent with its prior unsigned ruling, the Barassi exception applies. See Bradley, 231 Ariz. 475, ¶ 19.
¶8 Here, the June 13 minute entry represents a final decision on the merits and resolves all claims involving Ross, Isner, and the estate. There were no other pending motions or substantive issues left to be decided, and no additional substantive rulings by the trial court. Accordingly, the June 13 minute entry constituted a final decision resolving the issues between the parties.
¶9 Both the August 31 order and the subsequently entered Rule 54(c) compliant order are consistent with the June 13 minute entry, and the acts of entering those orders appear to be merely ministerial. Isner and the estate were aware that Ross intended to appeal the distribution contained in the June 13 minute entry, and they were not prejudiced by the prematurity of the notice of appeal. See Barassi, 130 Ariz. at 421. Thus, we conclude Ross's premature notice of appeal fits within the Barassi exception and that we have jurisdiction over her appeal.
Discussion
¶10 Although we have jurisdiction, Ross has failed to comply with the rules of appellate procedure to such an extent that she has waived her arguments on appeal. An opening brief in this court must contain an argument with "[a]ppellant's contentions concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to the portions of the record on which the appellant relies." Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A). And, "[w]e generally decline to address issues that are not argued adequately, with appropriate citation to supporting authority." In re J.U., 241 Ariz. 156, ¶ 18 (App. 2016), citing Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7). In her opening brief, Ross contends at length that she was disregarded or otherwise mistreated in the probate proceedings and that the trial court's distribution of the estate was unfair to her. However, she does not make any discernable legal argument, nor does she provide any "citations of legal authorities . . . on which [she] relies" to establish that the trial court erred. Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A). Ross's noncompliance with the rules supports finding her claims waived. See State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 (1989) ("Failure to argue a claim usually constitutes abandonment and waiver of that claim.").
It is not incumbent on this court to develop legal arguments for a party. See Ace Auto. Prods., Inc. v. Van Duyne, 156 Ariz. 140, 143 (App. 1987). Moreover, although self-represented, Ross is "held to the same familiarity with [the] required procedures . . . as would be attributed to a qualified member of the bar," and she "is entitled to no more consideration than if [she] had been represented by counsel." Copper State Bank v. Saggio, 139 Ariz. 438, 441 (App. 1983). --------
Disposition
¶11 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.