Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. PES–94–262684
Swager, J.
Carolyn Daley (Carolyn) and her brother Ronald Daley (Ronald) appeal from the probate court’s order requiring their late mother’s estate to pay attorney fees for counsel that represented Gregory O’Keeffe, the administrator of the estate, in an earlier appeal brought before this court. Ronald also appeals from three other court orders. We affirm all four orders.
We have consolidated the two appeals on our own motion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. The Action for Declaratory Relief
Because the underlying case is relevant to the issues asserted in the appeal of the attorney fee order, we summarize it in some detail, relying largely on our prior opinion.
A substantial portion of this section is taken from our earlier nonpublished opinion, as indicated by quotation marks. (O’Keeffe v. Daley (Oct. 11, 2006, A109762).)
“Gertrude D. Daley died intestate in March 1994. One year later, the probate court of the San Francisco Superior Court appointed Gregory O’Keeffe to act as administrator of her estate. The decedent’s four children—Ronald, Carolyn, Philip Daley (Philip), and Pamela Keyes (Pamela)—were identified as the heirs at law in the ensuing probate proceeding [citation]. (See Prob. Code, § 6402, subd. (a).)[ ]
“These heirs became embroiled in ‘severe disagreement and dissension,’ raising numerous claims against one another. In some instances one or two of the heirs claimed that another heir owed the estate money, offsetting that heir’s share of the estate. In other instances one heir claimed an ownership interest either in personal property found on estate premises or in real property nominally held by the estate. The heirs divided into two camps over most, if not all, of these disputed claims, with Ronald and Carolyn in one and Philip and Pamela in the other. Because of this ongoing sibling conflict, over 10 years have elapsed without any final settlement in the underlying probate proceeding.[ ]
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“In the final weeks of 1996, O’Keeffe published, served, and filed a notice of intent to sell the [decedent’s 25th Avenue property. [Citation.] This notice called for a private sale and requested written, sealed bids that O’Keeffe was to open and consider on January 21, 1997. The notice specified that the 25th Avenue property would be sold ‘on an “as is” basis, except as to title,’ and that the sale would be for ‘all cash, or on terms acceptable to the Administrator and to the Superior Court.’ The notice reserved to ‘[t]he Administrator’ a right ‘to reject any and all bids prior to entry of an order confirming the sale.’
Brackets enclosing material (other than citations) denote insertions or additions by this court, unless otherwise specified.
“O’Keeffe conducted the sale as scheduled. The highest bid was from [John and Sandy Tom (the Toms)]. It was in the amount of $456,789 cash and included a check for 10 percent of that amount. O’Keeffe subsequently filed a report with the probate court, indicating his acceptance of the Toms’ bid and seeking confirmation of the sale. [Citation.]
“On February 14, 1997, five days before the scheduled date of the confirmation hearing, Ronald recorded the gift notices that the decedent had executed in favor of Carolyn and himself. [The probate court had determined in February 1996 that these gifts were invalid.]
“At the confirmation hearing on February 19, 1997, Ronald[ ] proposed to make an overbid for the 25th Avenue property, on behalf of Carolyn and himself. This bid was to be in the amount of $480,128. [Citation.] O’Keeffe explained at the outset of the hearing that he understood the proposed overbid to consist of an offer of cash for one-half of the bid’s amount with the remainder of the amount covered by application of their combined interests in the 25th Avenue property, as two of the four heirs to the estate. O’Keeffe told the court that the other two heirs, Philip and Pamela, had ‘indicat[ed] that they ha[d] claims against Ronald.’ According to O’Keeffe, the probate court in earlier proceedings had deferred decision on some of these claims, while others had been communicated to him but had not yet been presented to the court. O’Keeffe stated ‘it would be awkward’ for him to accept the overbid under these circumstances, and he thought the claims required judicial resolution before he could accept a bid that ‘include[d] a distribution.’ ” (O’Keeffe v. Daley, supra, A109762.)
Several years passed before the sale was finalized.
“[S]ometime in 2002, O’Keeffe and the heirs discussed a ‘recommendation’—apparently from the arbitrator—that they submit some of the disputed issues to the civil department of the superior court by way of a complaint for declaratory relief. It appears that the parties to the probate proceeding agreed to this approach, and that the probate court itself ‘directed’ O’Keeffe to file such a complaint.
“On March 14, 2003, over six years after the February 1997 confirmation hearing, O’Keeffe filed a complaint for declaratory relief on behalf of the estate. The complaint named the four heirs and the Toms as defendants. It alleged the sale of the 25th Avenue property to the Toms and its confirmation by the probate court. It alleged the estate’s inability to complete the sale by conveying clear title, because of gift notices recorded by Ronald and Carolyn. The validity of the gift notices, according to the complaint, was ‘[a]t issue.’ Finally, it alleged Ronald was claiming he had been ‘prevented from increasing the bid’ on the 25th Avenue property at the February 1997 confirmation hearing. The prayer was for an order ‘determining the rights of the parties as to the sale of [the 25th Avenue] property,’ and the ‘interest’ of Ronald, Carolyn, and all other parties in that property.”
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“In early October 2004, the trial court commenced an 11-day bench trial of the declaratory relief action. O’Keeffe’s position, as disclosed by his trial brief, was that the gift notices recorded by Ronald and Carolyn were invalid and should be expunged. He also argued he had properly rejected the proposed overbid made by Ronald and Carolyn, as it had not been an all-cash bid. On the other hand, O’Keeffe sought for the first time to disaffirm the estate’s sale of the 25th Avenue property to the Toms. He argued the court should not confirm that sale, because the Toms had not timely pursued their rights as purchasers. Moreover, since the property had greatly appreciated in value,[ ] it was in the best interest of the estate to conduct a new sale.
“In its judgment, the court confirmed the sale of the 25th Avenue property to the Toms pursuant to the petition for confirmation filed by O’Keeffe in January 1997. It further directed that the estate was to retain both the rental income from that property and the interest from the Toms’ deposit. The court additionally ‘use[d] its equitable powers . . . to determine the total debt owe[d] to the estate’ by Ronald. It ruled that Ronald owed the estate $114,197 ‘for decreased value in the estate.’ Noting that this amount was equal to one-fourth of the confirmed sale price, the court ordered that Ronald’s one-fourth share of these proceeds was to be applied to extinguish the debt to the estate. With respect to this determination, the court’s intent was to ‘curtail[] and render[] moot any other litigation concerning the amount of [Ronald’s] debt to the estate’ either in the probate proceeding or any other proceeding.” (O’Keeffe v. Daley, supra, A109762.)
On appeal, O’Keeffe argued that the sale to the Toms should be confirmed and the damage award against Ronald should be upheld. O’Keeffe also asserted that the awards to the estate of rental income and of interest on the Toms’ deposit should be confirmed. We upheld the sale of the 25th Avenue property to the Toms, and reversed the judgment’s award against Ronald for his alleged debt to the estate.
II. Attorney Fees
On March 15, 2004, the probate court issued an order authorizing O’Keeffe to retain Daniel A. Conrad as litigation counsel in connection with the declaratory relief action “and any other litigation probate proceedings.” The court also authorized O’Keeffe to pay Conrad a retainer of $10,000 out of the funds of the estate.
On March 23, 2005, O’Keeffe filed a petition for approval of payment of $35,000 in legal fees to Conrad. In his petition, O’Keeffe noted Carolyn and Ronald were expected to appeal the trial court’s decision in the declaratory relief action. The petition stated that $22,267.42 was already due and owing, and that the balance of the funds would be used for the anticipated appeal.
O’Keeffe filed on April 27, 2005, a supplement to the earlier petition, stating that the amount owed to Conrad was now $24,629.10. He included a copy of the notice of appeal filed by Carolyn and Ronald.
On May 12, 2005, Carolyn filed an objection to the petition for approval of legal fees. She alleged that fees were incurred for services that were not in the best interests of the estate, that appellate work was not authorized under the fee agreement, and that the fees as calculated were not in accord with the fee agreement. Ronald filed a similar objection on June 3, 2005. On June 8, 2005, the court issued an order authorizing payment of $35,000 for the past due balance. $10,370.90 was to be maintained in the account for the anticipated appeals.
On April 12, 2006, O’Keeffe filed a petition for approval of payment of fees to Conrad. The amount then owing was $20,303.90. O’Keeffe then filed a supplemental petition for fees on April 28, 2006, stating that the amount owed had risen to $25,704.83. A declaration filed by Conrad indicated that this figure represented the amount now owing, as the $10,370.90 reserve had already been applied to fees and costs incurred in responding to the appeals. Carolyn filed an objection to the fee petition on May 19, 2006. On July 11, 2006, Ronald filed a request for a statement of decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 632.
The court issued a minute order on August 9, 2006, directing Ronald and O’Keeffe to prepare proposed statements of decision, addressing the issues framed by Ronald’s request. O’Keeffe submitted a second proposed statement of decision on August 23, 2006. Ronald submitted his proposed statement of decision on August 25, 2006, and O’Keeffe submitted a revised statement of decision on September 8, 2006.
On September 22, 2006, the court issued a proposed statement of decision, authorizing O’Keeffe to pay Conrad $25,704.83.
On October 11, 2006, we filed our opinion in the prior appeal.
The following day Carolyn filed objections to the probate court’s proposed statement of decision. Ronald also filed further objections.
The court issued its judgment on November 28, 2006, authorizing the payment of $25,704.83 in attorney fees. The court also issued its final statement of decision.
Carolyn and Ronald timely appealed, contending that the estate should not be required to pay the legal fees incurred by Conrad’s representation of O’Keeffe in the appellate proceeding.
III. O’Keeffe’s Motions
On October 25, 2005, O’Keeffe filed a petition for orders finalizing the tentative rulings of the arbitrator regarding small issues in the estate and personal property, along with a petition for instructions regarding the sale of real property located at 3000 24th Avenue in San Francisco. On November 3, 2005, O’Keeffe filed a petition for approval of accounting and estate administration, for partial compensation of the personal representative, and to increase bond of the personal representative. The hearing on the three petitions was set for December 20, 2005. The hearing was continued twice.
On February 14, 2006, the day before the hearing on the three petitions, Ronald filed a response and rebuttal to the petitions. Carolyn also filed a response on this same date. At the hearing the following day, the probate court refused to consider both responses because they were filed late.
The court signed three orders drafted by O’Keeffe, approving each of O’Keeffe’s petitions on March 1, 2006. On March 24, 2006, Ronald filed a motion to vacate the three orders under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, asserting that he and Carolyn were surprised by the entry of the orders and had not been provided an opportunity to object. The court denied the motion to vacate on August 9, 2006. Ronald has also appealed this order.
DISCUSSION
I. Standards of Review
“Allowance of litigation expenses rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse.” (Whittlesey v. Aiello (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1230.)
“ ‘ “The term [judicial discretion] implies the absence of arbitrary determination, capricious disposition or whimsical thinking. It imports the exercise of discriminating judgment within the bounds of reason. [¶] To exercise the power of judicial discretion all the material facts in evidence must be known and considered, together also with the legal principles essential to an informed, intelligent and just decision.” [Fn. omitted.]’ [Citations.]” (Estate of Gilkison (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1448–1449.)
Under this standard, a “ ‘showing on appeal is wholly insufficient if it presents a state of facts, a consideration of which, for the purpose of judicial action, merely affords an opportunity for a difference of opinion. An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge. To be entitled to relief on appeal from the result of an alleged abuse of discretion it must clearly appear that the injury resulting from such a wrong is sufficiently grave to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Estate of Gilkison, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1449.)
We review a challenge to a trial court’s order denying a motion to vacate under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 for abuse of discretion. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981.)
II. Fees for Representation of Administrator
In seeking authorization to pay Conrad’s fees, O’Keeffe was requesting “extraordinary” compensation from the estate. A personal representative and its attorney may obtain “ordinary” (statutory) compensation or “extraordinary” compensation for services rendered in the administration of the estate. (See Estate of Hilton (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 890, 894–895 (Hilton).)
Ordinary statutory compensation—for the more typical services rendered to collect, care for, maintain, and preserve estate property—is usually approved in accordance with a compensation schedule set forth in the Probate Code. (Prob. Code, §§ 10800, 10810; see Ross and Moore, Cal. Practice Guide: Probate (The Rutter Group 2007) ¶¶ 16:321 to 16:323, pp. 16–96 to 16–97 [ordinary services include: personal representative’s routine tasks, such as marshaling and inventorying assets, processing claims, collecting rents and receipts, and maintaining the estate books; attorney services routinely incident to estate administration, such as interviewing the client, preparing the initial petition, inventories, status reports and routine probate proceedings, and handling debts and claims].) Compensation for ordinary services is mandatory.
“Extraordinary” compensation may be authorized for exceptional or nonroutine services, to the extent the court in its discretion deems such compensation “just and reasonable.” (Prob. Code, §§ 10801, subd. (a), 10811, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.703; see Estate of Trynin (1989) 49 Cal.3d 868, 873; Hilton, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th 890, 894–895; Ross and Moore, Cal. Practice Guide: Probate, supra, ¶ 16:325, pp. 16–97 to 16–98 [extraordinary services include sales of real or personal property, carrying on decedent’s business pursuant to court order, court proceedings to determine the testator’s intention concerning undisclosed beneficiaries, defense of personal representative’s account, securing a loan to pay estate debts].)
“The Probate Code authorizes payment of the executor’s attorney’s fees out of the estate for ‘such other litigation or special services as may be necessary for the executor or administrator to prosecute, defend, or perform.’ [Citations.] Where the statutory authorization applies, the attorney’s fees are paid from the estate as an expense of administration . . . . Allowance of attorney’s fees is within the discretion of the probate court, and when the court has made its determination in respect thereto, its judgment will not be interfered with on appeal except only in the face of a plain abuse of discretion. [Citation.] Whether the attorney’s services have conferred a benefit on the estate is merely one of several factors which the court may consider in exercising its discretion.” (Estate of Stokley (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 461, 473.)
III. Statement of Decision
The probate court’s nine-page statement of decision set forth its reasons for granting the attorney fee request. The court found that Conrad’s services benefited the estate by helping to avoid the possibility of a lawsuit by the Toms, and by moving the estate towards closure. The court also determined that Conrad’s billing rates were reasonable and that the work billed for was justified. The court found that O’Keeffe’s payment request complied with California Rules of Court, rule 7.702(1) through (6). The court also concluded that O’Keeffe’s support of the damages award against Ronald benefited the estate and did not constitute a conflict of interest.
IV. Carolyn’s Arguments
Carolyn first claims that O’Keeffe’s participation in the prior appeal was unnecessary. She argues that regardless whether this court had affirmed or denied the appeal, the estate itself would not have been harmed any more than it had already been harmed by the trial court’s decision. She claims the Toms would have had no cause of action against the administrator if the sale had been set aside, and argues that the estate would have been better off because it would have realized a $500,000 increase in assets, presumably due to the increase in the property’s value since the Toms’ bid in 1997.
We reject this argument. In the first place, O’Keeffe had no way of knowing what grounds the appealing parties would assert in their briefs before they were filed. Thus, as the plaintiff in the declaratory relief action, O’Keeffe arguably would have breached his fiduciary duty to the estate if he had neglected to prepare for the appeal that inevitably followed the trial. We also note that our opinion was not filed until after the court issued its first statement of decision on the attorney fee issue. Therefore, even though most of the attorney fees were incurred after the opening briefs were filed, the impact of O’Keeffe’s participation in the appeal could not have been assessed in advance.
We also reject Carolyn’s position regarding the absence of any potential for damage to the estate. In arguing that the Toms would not have had a “conceivable basis” for suing the estate if the sale had been negated on appeal, she overlooks that the Toms would have had motivation to file a lawsuit against the estate if they had lost the property, regardless of the underlying merits of such an action. In fact, the record on appeal contains a letter written shortly after judgment was entered in the trial court, wherein the Toms’ attorney threatened litigation if escrow did not close within 30 days. Defending against such a suit would have drained the estate’s resources even if the Toms were ultimately unsuccessful.
“Once a testamentary instrument has been admitted to probate, the executor has a duty to defend it against attack and to protect the beneficiaries’ interests, as long as he acts reasonably and in good faith in undertaking the defense.” (Estate of Stokley, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d 461, 473.) Unlike Carolyn, we do not believe it is so clear that O’Keeffe’s efforts on appeal were intended solely to benefit the Toms or to protect himself from accusations of wrongdoing. The trial court reasonably could have concluded that, in seeking to uphold the sale on appeal, not only was he protecting the estate from potential litigation, he was also endeavoring to bring closure to the estate. Given how long this probate proceeding has dragged on, we agree with the trial court that closure is a valid goal. While the estate may have potentially benefited from the property’s appreciation if the sale to the Toms had been negated on appeal, the history of this estate proceeding suggests there is no guaranty the property would thereafter have been sold in a timely manner.
We also disagree with Carolyn’s position that O’Keeffe’s participation was unnecessary to protect the interests of Philip and Pamela. Both Philip and Pamela opposed Carolyn’s and Ronald’s attempts to acquire the property by overbidding the Toms. This suggests to us a lack of unanimity amongst the beneficiaries of the estate with respect to at least one critical issue that was the subject of the prior appeal. O’Keeffe was justified in taking a position that he believed to be in the best interest of the estate as a whole.
We also note that we read and considered O’Keeffe’s briefs in the prior appeal. The input we received from all the parties, including O’Keeffe, assisted us in resolving the issues before us. We do not share in Carolyn’s low opinion of the quality of Conrad’s work, nor in her characterization of his work as “redundant and superfluous.” While she asserts that “[n]othing in the Administrator’s brief was necessary or instrumental in convincing the appellate court to confirm the sale to the Toms” we question how she can claim to have such insights into the workings of this court. And while it is true that we were not convinced by any of the parties to affirm the damages against Ronald, it does not necessarily follow that O’Keeffe was unreasonable in advancing arguments to the contrary.
“Although benefit to the estate is one of the factors to be weighed by the court in fixing compensation [citations], an attorney may be entitled to compensation even though the extraordinary services rendered ‘turn out to be entirely valueless’ [citations]. Services that do not directly benefit the estate in the sense of increasing, protecting, or preserving it are nonetheless compensable if the estate’s attorneys or representatives in performing the services were ‘acting in consonance with the fiduciary duties imposed upon them’ [citation].” (Estate of Trynin, supra, 49 Cal.3d 868, 874.) At best, Carolyn’s arguments demonstrate only that there can be differences of opinion on the need for Conrad’s services. She does not satisfy us that the court abused its discretion in ordering the estate to pay his fees.
Finally, Carolyn argues that if fees are awarded to Conrad the amount should be reduced. However, she offers no specifics regarding how such a reduction should be calculated. We have concluded that the court did not abuse its discretion in authorizing the payment of the attorney fees, and we have no basis upon which to order a reduction in the fee amount.
In summary, O’Keeffe was under a duty to undertake the declaratory relief action, including participating in the appeal that resulted in our earlier opinion. The trial court was reasonable in concluding that his actions were undertaken for the benefit of the estate and the attorney fees incurred in connection with the appeal were, therefore, “necessary.”
V. Timeliness of Statement of Decision
By way of a curious addendum to Carolyn’s opening brief, Ronald contends that the trial court’s statement of decision was untimely under California Rules of Court, rule 232 [current rule 3.1590] and Code of Civil Procedure section 632.
“Code of Civil Procedure section 632 requires the trial court to issue a statement of decision ‘upon the trial of a question of fact’ when it receives a request therefor by a party appearing at trial. In general, however, section 632 applies when there has been a trial followed by a judgment. [Citation.] It does not apply to an order on a motion. [Citation.] This is true even if the motion involves an evidentiary hearing and the order is appealable.” (In re Marriage of Askmo (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1040.) “A statement of decision is not required regarding an award of attorney fees pursuant to a motion.” (Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1252.)
As the attorney fees here were the subject of postjudgment motions, Ronald’s arguments are inapposite.
VI. O’Keeffe’s Petitions
We now turn to Ronald’s appeal of the orders approving O’Keeffe’s three petitions. As noted above, Carolyn’s and Ronald’s objections were filed late. The Superior Court of San Francisco County, Local Rules, rule 14.6B, provides that oppositions to motions in probate court must be filed five days prior to the hearing date. Ronald and Carolyn filed their objections the day before the hearing on O’Keeffe’s motions. The court was under no obligation to consider the objections.
O’Keeffe’s request for judicial notice filed December 21, 2006, of various court documents is granted.
Ronald argues that the court’s refusal to continue the February 15, 2006 hearing in order to consider his objections was inconsistent with the position the court took with respect to late filings in other cases. The facts of those cases, however, are not before us. Accordingly, we do not find that the court abused its discretion simply because it treated Ronald’s tardy objections differently from late objections raised in other cases. Our inquiry, however, does not end here.
At the February 15, 2006 hearing, the court directed O’Keeffe to prepare a proposed judgment. The court then indicated that Ronald and Carolyn would have an opportunity to review and object to the judgment, with the option of having a hearing: “What I propose is that Mr. O’Keeffe is going to submit to the court a proposed judgment and in it will be all of the things that you’re talking about. . . . And then you can, if you feel that he hasn’t answered the questions – I thought he answered them this morning myself – but if you feel he hasn’t then you will have an opportunity to object and we can set the matter for hearing.” O’Keeffe concedes the orders were signed by the judge on the same day that he submitted them to the court. Thus, Ronald did not have the opportunity to review the orders in advance of their entry.
While the court was under no duty to continue the hearing, we are sympathetic to Ronald’s argument that the court erred in not offering the parties the opportunity to request an evidentiary hearing before signing O’Keeffe’s orders. The court’s rationale for failing to follow through with its offer is somewhat troubling. In denying Ronald’s subsequent motion to vacate the orders, the court stated: “Well, I am aware that I did indicate to Mr. Daley that you would have time to respond, however, I don’t see anything wrong with Mr. O’Keeffe’s orders that I signed. And I don’t know if it would make that much difference if I granted the motion or not. I think that the outcome would be the same here. You would appeal it anyway, so I might as well let you appeal it now.”
The court clearly indicated on February 15, 2006, that it would provide a hearing upon request. While it may not have been required to offer the parties such an option, once it did so, it should have followed that procedure. However, we note that at the hearing on April 4, 2006, the court appeared to concede as much, stating: “What I will do, I will give you time to meet and confer, like three weeks. And then you could come back and tell me specifically what it is that you are concerned about.” The matter was then set for May 9, 2006. We have no information as to the results of that hearing, assuming it occurred.
At oral argument, Ronald acknowledged that the record of the May 9, 2006 hearing is not before us.
In any event, the court’s error, if any, does not result in a reversal as Ronald advances no argument suggesting how he was prejudiced by any of the three orders. As the appellant, Ronald bears the burden on appeal to spell out in his brief, using specific and appropriate citations to the record, how an alleged error caused a miscarriage of justice, in that it is reasonably probable that he would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the alleged error. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; Cucinella v. Weston Biscuit Co. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 71, 82–83; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106.)
We appreciate the effort involved in Ronald representing himself in these proceedings. But self-representation does not exempt a litigant from the requirements of the law. “A litigant has a right to act as his own attorney [citation] ‘but, in so doing, should be restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as is [sic] required of those qualified to practice law before our courts; otherwise, ignorance is unjustly rewarded.’ [Citations.]” (Lombardi v. Citizens Nat. Trust etc. Bank (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 206, 208–209.) A self-representing party is due the same consideration as any other party from trial and appellate courts, but no greater. (Monastero v. Los Angeles Transit Co. (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 156, 160; see also Harding v. Collazo (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1056.)
Ronald fails to show how the court’s alleged error was prejudicial. He merely offers conclusory statements, such as: “The fact is, Mr. O’Keeffe’s orders are confusing, ambiguous, misleading and in many respects constitute perjury.” He does not point to any specific examples of these transgressions within the orders themselves. It is not the function of this court to comb through pages of orders to uncover instances of prejudicial error. Under the circumstances, we presume no error, no abuse of discretion, and no prejudice. (See People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 364.)
We will not address any issues raised at oral argument that were not raised in Ronald’s briefs. (See Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2007) ¶ 10:22, pp.10-5 to 10-6 [“Issues that could have been but were not raised in the briefs normally cannot be raised for the first time in oral argument (although the court has discretion to relax this rule).”
In conclusion, we note that at the hearing of the motion to vacate, the court observed: “First of all, I notice that both you and co-counsel have indicated that this matter has been going on so long, 11 to 12 years, and you’re blaming others, but I think the reason it’s been going on for so long is because of all of the appeals being taken.” Our opinion here is the result of the second and third appeals taken in this estate proceeding. Another appeal from Ronald is pending.
Four appeals in a span of three years in a single probate proceeding appears to us to be somewhat excessive as is the amount of time this estate has been open. We are not suggesting that these appeals have been entirely void of merit, as the first appeal did result in a partial reversal. The grounds asserted by Carolyn and Ronald in the present appeals, however, are not very compelling in view of the standards of review that are applicable. And while we do not agree that the appeals are the only reason this estate proceeding has been prolonged, they certainly have not helped the process move along any faster. It is time for the probate court and all parties to resolve this matter soon, lest the resources of this estate be entirely consumed by legal fees.
In his reply brief to the appeal regarding the March orders, Ronald asserts that O’Keeffe has violated California Rules of Court, rule 7.702 by hiring Conrad to represent him. He requests that we strike O’Keeffe’s brief. We decline to address this argument, as the issue is not properly before us.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
We concur: Marchiano, P. J., Stein, J.