Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. CVPB05-084
BLEASE, J.
In this pro se judgment roll appeal, Elmer Jesus Arceo asks us to reverse a trial court order striking the affidavit by which Elmer in 2005 fraudulently acquired a house in Woodland from the estate of a distant relative who died intestate in 1983 and had no immediate family. The trial court expressly found that “a fraud [was] perpetrated on the court” in that Elmer’s affidavit contained “intentional misrepresentation” and “did not comply with relevant Probate Code requirements.”
Use of first names in this family dispute helps us provide a concise recitation of the facts. No disrespect is intended.
The order was predicated upon a motion in the probate court brought by Eve Patterson, a longtime tenant on the property, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, that vacated and set aside the clerk’s certification of Elmer’s Affidavit Re Real Property of Small Value upon which title to the Woodland property was transferred to Elmer. (Prob. Code, § 13200.)
Elmer did not appear in the proceedings below but filed an opposition to the motion based inter alia on the claim that Patterson was neither a successor of the decedent nor an heir or beneficiary and thus lacked standing to bring the motion. We disagree.
A person may move to set aside a judgment if his or her interests are injuriously affected. The trial court’s order indicates that Patterson entered into an agreement in 1995 to rent the property, had paid rent and property taxes on the property, was purchasing the property from the “previous owner” and was the subject of several unlawful detainer actions brought by Maria O’Neil, to whom Elmer had transferred the property. The order certifying the real property to Elmer would have “injuriously affected” Patterson’s possessory interest in the property, and if she had an agreement to purchase the property, it would have affected this right as well.
The trial court did not err. We shall affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
Elmer Claims to be Antonio’s Sole Heir
The decedent, Antonio Arceo (Antonio), was born in Mexico, lived on Freeman Street in Woodland, and died in 1983 at the age of 77. He died intestate and had no wife or children. His newspaper obituary, however, stated he was survived by four siblings, all living in Mexico.
Antonio’s estate was never probated.
In April 2005, Elmer filed an “Affidavit re Real Property of Small Value,” declaring that Antonio died intestate owning real property whose gross value was less than $20,000, and that Elmer was his sole heir under the applicable Probate Code sections. The affidavit states that an “Inventory and Appraisal [had been] made by an probate referee appointed for the county in which the property is located[,]” but no inventory and appraisal was attached to the affidavit. The only attachment to the affidavit is a copy of Antonio’s death certificate, which states that Antonio had a nephew named Alfredo Arceo, then living in Los Angeles.
Throughout the trial proceedings, Elmer was represented by counsel.
On the same day, identifying himself as the representative of Antonio’s estate and a small estate claimant, Elmer submitted a form “Final Inventory and Appraisal” of Antonio’s estate. No appraisal is attached; rather, the form states no appraisal by the probate referee was required, with a typewritten notation “waiver is requested pursuant to Probate Code § 8903.” The inventory identifies the Freeman Street property as the sole asset, whose gross value Elmer estimated at $16,392. The inventory states bond is waived, with the typewritten words added “Personal representative is sole beneficiary.”
Elmer attached two documents to the inventory: (1) a copy of a 1983-1984 tax bill for the Freeman Street property, showing an assessed value of $16,392 and (2) a notice that Elmer signed as “Administrator/Executor” of Antonio’s estate and filed with the Yolo County Assessor. The notice indicated that, by virtue of Antonio’s death, and his relationship as Antonio’s “nephew,” Elmer had succeeded to 100 percent ownership of the Freeman Street property and directed that tax bills be sent to him at 9625 Muller Avenue, Downey, California. In the same notice, Elmer reported to the County that the property was vacant.
A Yolo County Superior Court clerk certified a copy of the affidavit and Elmer promptly recorded it. The legal effect of that recording was to transfer fee simple title in the Freeman Street property to Elmer.
Elmer then recorded a gift deed, transferring the Freeman Street property to Maria O’Neil for no consideration. The recorder was instructed to mail the recorded deed to O’Neil at 9625 Muller Avenue, Downey, California, the same address used by Elmer when he notified the County assessor that he was Antonio’s sole heir.
The Instant Proceedings
Armed with the deed showing she owned the property, O’Neil began the first of three successive unlawful detainer actions against Eve Patterson, an Arceo family friend and Antonio’s Goddaughter since her baptism in 1947, who had lived at the Freeman Street property since 1990.
While the third of O’Neil’s unlawful detainer actions was pending against her, Patterson initiated this action in the probate court, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, to vacate the clerk’s certification and order in order to reverse the legal effect of Elmer’s Affidavit re Real Property of Small Value on the grounds that: (1) the affidavit is void on its face; (2) certification by the probate court of the affidavit was the result of clerical error; and (3) certification of the affidavit was the result of extrinsic fraud on the court by Elmer. Patterson complained that O’Neil relied on Elmer’s fraudulently asserted interest in the Freeman Street property in her unsuccessful attempts to have Patterson evicted from it.
In support of her motion, Patterson submitted a declaration in which she averred that Antonio was survived by at least two nephews, Alfredo Arceo of Los Angeles and Juan Arceo (now deceased). According to Patterson, Elmer is not Antonio’s nephew, nor his sole living heir; rather, Elmer is one of the children of Antonio’s nephew Juan, which makes him “related to Antonio Arceo in the fourth degree of kinship . . . .”
No opposition to Patterson’s motion was filed by Elmer.
Elmer, who was then represented by counsel, attempted to file an opposition in pro se, but the court only permitted the document to be lodged/received. In it, Elmer purported to argue that the court had no jurisdiction to consider Patterson’s motion because she had no standing or capacity in this matter.
The court granted Patterson’s motion to vacate the clerk’s certification of the Affidavit re Real Property of Small Value filed by Elmer. It also issued an order to show cause directing all persons claiming any interest in the Freeman Street property to show cause why Elmer’s Affidavit re Real Property of Small Value should not be stricken on the grounds (among others) that it was based on incorrect assertions regarding the “successors of decedent” Antonio, the familial relationship of Elmer to Antonio, and the lack of necessity for filing an appraisal of the property by a probate referee. Patterson was ordered to publish notice of the order in the Woodland Daily Democrat and the Long Beach Press-Telegram, the latter a newspaper of general circulation in Downey, California.
While the order to show cause was pending, Patterson demurred to O’Neil’s pending third unlawful detainer action, on the ground the complaint was premised on an alleged oral rental agreement entered into in September 2001, before Elmer or O’Neil could have had an interest in the property.
No opposition to the order to show cause was filed by Elmer.
Again, despite the fact that he was then represented by counsel and no substitution or motion to withdraw had been filed, Elmer attempted to file in pro se one document: a “Response to Order to Show Cause and Points and Authorities in Support Thereof.” The court ordered it stricken.
Four members of Elmer’s family filed declarations in response to the order to show cause, which collectively showed Elmer is one of seven children of Antonio’s nephew Juan and that Elmer saw all but one of his siblings as recently as 2003, at his father’s memorial service in Tucson.
Neither Elmer nor his counsel appeared at the hearing on the court’s order to show cause, and no reporter’s transcript of the hearing appears in the record on appeal.
In its Order to Strike Affidavit Affecting Title to Real Property, the court concluded it had jurisdiction to rule upon the validity of the Affidavit re Real Property of Small Value and Final Inventory and Appraisal filed by Elmer, because “[a] court always has jurisdiction to consider a matter where it appears from whatever source that a fraud has been perpetrated on the court.” It ordered stricken the Affidavit re Real Property of Small Value filed by Elmer “because it was obtained through intentional misrepresentation and because it did not comply with relevant Probate Code requirements”, and declared that the recording of that affidavit “was and is of no legal effect and that title to [Freeman Street] property . . . remains in the un-probated estate of decedent Antonio Arceo over which Elmer Jesus Arceo had and has no authority to act in any manner whatsoever.”
DISCUSSION
Elmer contends on appeal that the court’s order “has been issued and entered erroneously and based on false findings by the court unsupported by evidence or record . . . without any party with standing or capacity, without jurisdiction and beyond the Statutes of Limitation.”
I. Applicable Standards of Review
On appeal, we must presume the trial court’s judgment is correct. (See Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) In service of that rule, we adopt all intendments and inferences to affirm the judgment or order unless the record expressly contradicts them. (See Brewer v. Simpson (1960) 53 Cal.2d 567, 583.)
It is the burden of the party challenging a judgment on appeal to provide an adequate record to assess error. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141.) Thus, an appellant must not present just an analysis of the facts and legal authority on each point made; he or she must support arguments with appropriate citations to the material facts in the record. If an appellant fails to do so, the argument is forfeited. (County of Solano v. Vallejo Redevelopment Agency (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274; Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.)
Elmer is not exempt from the rules governing appeals because he is representing himself in propria persona. A party representing himself is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247; see Leslie v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 117, 121 [self-represented parties are held to the “same ‘restrictive procedural rules as an attorney’”].)
Because Elmer provides us with only a clerk’s transcript, we must treat this as an appeal “on the judgment roll.” (Allen v. Toten (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1079, 1082-1083; Krueger v. Bank of America (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 204, 207.) Therefore, we “‘must conclusively presume that the evidence is ample to sustain the [trial court’s] findings . . . .’” (Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 147, 154.) Our review is limited to determining whether any error “appears on the face of the record.” (National Secretarial Service, Inc. v. Froehlich (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 510, 521; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.163.)
II. Elmer Has Failed to Show Error
Although his challenges to the order are somewhat confusingly presented, Elmer’s primary contention appears to be that the court below was without power to strike the Affidavit re Real Property of Small Value. His use of the word “stranger” in referring to Patterson suggests he means to rely upon the rule that a probate court is without power to determine adverse claims to properties of an estate when such claims are asserted by “a stranger” to the estate. (See Estate of Auslender (1960) 53 Cal.2d 615, 624 and cases cited therein.) But he has not shown how this rule would apply here. Nothing in the record suggests Patterson, a “stranger” to the estate, was asserting a claim of her own against Antonio’s estate; she was merely defending her contractual right as a tenant to reside in the property and purportedly to purchase the property. We are aware of no decisions applying the general rule in such a case, and Elmer has brought none to our attention.
In this case, we have a motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473 to vacate and set aside the clerk’s certification of Elmer’s Affidavit Re Real Property of Small Value. Section 473 is applicable to probate proceedings. (Estate of Efird (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 227, 230.) A person may move to set aside a judgment if his or her interests are injuriously affected. (Grief v. Dullea (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 986, 992.)
The notion of standing in probate proceedings appears to be fairly loose, the standing of any person depending on the nature of the proceeding. (See Prob. Code, S 48 [“(a) Subject to subdivision (b), ‘interested person’ includes any of the following: (1) An heir, devisee, child, spouse, creditor, beneficiary, and any other person having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceeding. (2) Any person having priority for appointment as personal representative. (3) A fiduciary representing an interested person. (b) The meaning of ‘interested person’ as it relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding.”
Elmer is likewise mistaken to the extent he purports to suggest the court was otherwise powerless to strike the affidavit certified by the probate court. A court sitting in probate is a court of general jurisdiction possessing the same power and authority with respect to its proceedings as any superior court. (Prob. Code, § 800; 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 217, p. 824.) “It is now well established that a probate court has the power to . . . set aside any of its prior orders, even though final, on the ground of extrinsic fraud or mistake.” (Estate of Beard (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 753, 774, citing Estate of Auslender, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 626 & fn. 1.) Here, moreover the court’s finding of extrinsic fraud was proper: Elmer’s misrepresentations in the affidavit and accompanying inventory effectively prevented Antonio’s other heirs -- including both Antonio’s surviving siblings (who would have had a claim superior to Elmer’s) and Elmer’s siblings and cousins (who could have claimed an interest equal to Elmer’s) -- from asserting any interest in his estate. (See Estate of Beard, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pp. 775-776.)
Indeed, it is well-established that “a court may set aside at any time a judgment or order obtained by extrinsic fraud. A court may set aside at any time a judgment or order void on its face.” (In re Estate of Estrem, 16 Cal.2d 563, 572, italics added.) Elmer’s suggestion that the court’s action was precluded by some (unidentified) statute of limitations is meritless.
In sum, the court’s order striking the Affidavit re Real Property of Small Value was not error: its conclusion that the affidavit was the result of Elmer’s intentional misrepresentations to the court is amply supported by the evidence in the record. To obtain Antonio’s Freeman Street house, Elmer represented to the court that he was both Antonio’s nephew and his sole heir. He was neither.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
We concur: SCOTLAND , P. J., BUTZ , J.