Opinion
No. 04-03-00207-CR
Delivered and Filed: June 15, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the 379th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2002-CR-4762, Honorable Bert Richardson, Judge Presiding. Affirmed.
Sitting: Catherine STONE, Justice, Sarah B. DUNCAN, Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Robert Espinoza appeals the judgment convicting him of capital murder and sentencing him to life imprisonment. Espinoza contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his oral and written statements and the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
In the early hours of a Sunday morning, a man wearing a cap on his head and a bandana over his nose and mouth and brandishing a .38 caliber revolver entered a Stop-N-Go convenience store, robbed the night clerk, Keith Turner, and shot him once, killing him. The store's video cameras recorded the incident. That afternoon the police asked the major networks to air the videotape. Several days later, police received a tip that led them to Espinoza, who later confessed to the crime. After the trial court denied Espinoza's pretrial motion to suppress his oral and written statements, a jury found him guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to life in prison.Motion to Suppress
Espinoza contends his oral statements to the investigating detective, Thomas Matjetka, were involuntary and should have been suppressed because they were the result of custodial interrogations when Espinoza had not been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Espinoza further argues his two subsequent written statements, which were preceded by Miranda warnings, were "the tainted fruit of the . . . oral statement(s)." We disagree.Applicable Law
A person is "in custody" only if a reasonable person would believe that he was deprived of his freedom to a degree associated with a formal arrest. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 321 (1994)). In Dowthitt, the Court of Criminal Appeals outlined four general situations that might constitute custody: (1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, (2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave, (3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, and (4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255. The first through third situations require that the suspect's freedom of movement be restricted to the degree associated with an arrest as opposed to an investigative detention. Id. The fourth situation dictates that the officers' knowledge of probable cause be manifested to the suspect. Id." Such manifestation could occur if information substantiating probable cause is related by the officers to the suspect or by the suspect to the officers." Id. "Moreover, given [the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals's] emphasis on probable cause as a `factor' in other cases, situation four does not automatically establish custody; rather, custody is established if the manifestation of probable cause, combined with other circumstances, would lead a reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest." Id. Interpreting Dowthitt, this court determined that five factors must be considered in determining when custody attaches: (1) whether the suspect arrived at the place of interrogation voluntarily, (2) the length of the interrogation, (3) whether the suspect's requests to see relatives and friends are refused, (4) the degree of control exercised over the suspect, and (5) whether a "pivotal admission established custody." Xu v. State, 100 S.W.3d 408, 413 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. ref'd).Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under an abuse of discretion standard. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, affording almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts that the record supports, especially when the fact findings are based on an evaluation of the witnesses' credibility and demeanor. Id. at 89. We review de novo the court's application of the law to the facts. Id.Testimony
Espinoza did not testify at the hearing on his motion to suppress or at the trial. Accordingly, the only evidence concerning Matjetka's questioning of Espinoza is Matjetka's testimony. Matjetka testified that, several days after the police received a tip that they should speak to Espinoza and his girlfriend, Veronica Leos, about the incident, Matjetka went to UPS, where both worked, to talk to them. Matjetka approached Leos first. She agreed to come to the homicide office and give a statement. In her statement, Leos identified Espinoza as the robber and provided a narrative of events leading up to and occurring after the robbery. Matjetka testified he had gotten enough information from Leos to believe Espinoza committed the murder. However, although Matjetka admitted he had probable cause to arrest Espinoza, Matjetka also testified he was not certain the case against Espinoza would be solid without his statement. Therefore, Matjetka returned to the UPS office at 8:00 p.m. and spoke to Espinoza for approximately ten minutes. Without specifying which murder he was investigating, Matjetka informed Espinoza he wanted to talk to him about a homicide and asked Espinoza if he were willing to talk. Espinoza agreed. Matjetka informed Espinoza he was not under arrest and did not have to talk. Espinoza said he did not know anything. Matjetka told Espinoza he did not believe him and informed him he was investigating the Stop-N-Go murder. Matjetka told Espinoza that he knew Espinoza was responsible and that his girlfriend was at the station giving a statement naming him as the killer. Again, Espinoza denied any involvement. Matjetka then mentioned to Espinoza certain facts he had learned from Leos. According to Matjetka, Espinoza's demeanor changed at this point and Espinoza "sank a little bit." Matjetka told Espinoza that he was going to continue to investigate the case and "ultimately if it came back to [Espinoza] he would be charged with this case." Matjetka testified he told Espinoza "at least six times" that Espinoza was not under arrest. He also told Espinoza he was free to leave and did not have to talk to him. Matjetka testified that Espinoza understood his rights. When Matjetka stopped talking, Espinoza looked at him and said "what are we waiting for; let's get it done." Matjetka interpreted this statement as Espinoza's assent to talk about the case. Therefore, Matjetka asked Espinoza if he were willing to come to the homicide office and give a statement, explaining that Espinoza was not under arrest, Espinoza did not have to go, and once Espinoza was finished, Matjetka would return him back to UPS or wherever Espinoza wanted to go. Espinoza agreed to come to the station. Espinoza arrived at the police station at approximately 8:30 p.m. He rode in the front seat of Matjetka's unmarked car, was not under arrest, and was not handcuffed. Matjetka testified that Espinoza, while in the car, declared that "his life was over" and asked Matjetka "when he was going to be arrested" and why Matjetka "wasn't arresting him." Matjetka testified he told Espinoza, after each question Espinoza asked, he was not under arrest. Matjetka testified Espinoza's statements made him feel "uncomfortable that maybe he [Espinoza] truly didn't believe he was free to leave." Upon their arrival at the police station, Matjetka took Espinoza to Matjetka's office, which Matjetka described as "kind of small," "about 8 by 10." Espinoza sat in a chair located in the doorway to Matjetka's office. Matjetka explained to Espinoza that he was not under arrest and that Espinoza did not have to talk to Matjetka if he did not want to. Matjetka asked Espinoza whether he wanted something to eat or drink. Espinoza declined. Matjetka asked Espinoza if he needed to use the restroom. Espinoza said he did not. Espinoza asked if his girlfriend was at the station. Matjetka responded that she was and asked Espinoza if he wanted to speak to her after he finished. Espinoza said that he did. Matjetka asked Espinoza to tell him orally what happened. Espinoza agreed. Espinoza spoke for thirty minutes, admitting he robbed Turner and accidentally shot him. Espinoza was not handcuffed. When Matjetka asked Espinoza to give a written statement, Espinoza agreed. At 9:25 p.m., Matjetka read Espinoza his Miranda rights and began taking the written statement. Matjetka testified Espinoza indicated he understood his rights and was willing to waive them. Matjetka further testified he did not force or coerce Espinoza to talk to him, did not threaten Espinoza, and did not promise Espinoza anything in return for the statement. Espinoza signed the written statement at approximately 11:00 p.m. After signing his written statement, Espinoza spent some time with Leos. Matjetka returned Espinoza and Leos to UPS at approximately 11:30 p.m. The next day Matjetka secured an arrest warrant for Espinoza. Matjetka testified he planned to interview Espinoza again because Matjetka did not believe the shooting was an accident. When Matjetka reached Espinoza, Espinoza agreed to come to the station. After Matjetka read Espinoza his Miranda rights, Espinoza executed a second written statement in which he admitted pulling the trigger. Only then did Matjetka arrest Espinoza.Discussion
We hold that Espinoza was not in custody during his first interview at UPS's security office. Espinoza was not handcuffed and thus not physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way; and he had not been told by Matjetka that he could not leave and in fact had been told by Matjetka that he could leave and did not have to talk. In short, Matjetka did not create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement had been significantly restricted. And the interview lasted only ten minutes, during which time Espinoza was told at least six times that he was not under arrest, was free to leave, and did not have to talk. We recognize that Matjetka manifested to Espinoza that he believed he had probable cause to arrest him. However, these manifestations did not of themselves establish custody since Espinoza was repeatedly told he was free to leave. See and compare Xu, 100 S.W.3d at 411-14 (holding that suspect was in custody during second interview in which suspect confessed to killing his wife and noting that detectives who questioned suspect during second interview did not inform the suspect before or during the interview that he was not under arrest and was free to leave). Finally, Espinoza did not proffer a "pivotal admission" during this first interview; saying "what are we waiting for; let's get it done" simply cannot be considered an admission of guilt. See and compare id. (holding that suspect was in custody during second interview and noting suspect confessed to killing his wife). Indeed, in this first interview, Espinoza denied any involvement in the robbery. We hold that a reasonable person in these circumstances could not have believed that he was under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest; therefore, Espinoza was not in custody during this first interview. Nor was Espinoza in custody later at the police station when he orally admitted to Matjetka that he robbed Turner and shot him. Espinoza was not physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. He arrived at the police station voluntarily, riding — unhandcuffed — in the front seat of an unmarked vehicle. Both in the car and later at the station, he was told repeatedly that he was not under arrest and was never told he could not leave. Before the interview began, he was asked if he wanted something to eat or drink or wanted to go to the restroom; and he was told he would be able to see his girlfriend after giving his statement. The interview lasted only an hour; and, even after Espinoza orally confessed, Matjetka read Espinoza his Miranda rights, which Espinoza waived, and was taken to his girlfriend. We conclude Espinoza's oral statements were not made when he was in custody. Because these statements were not "tainted," Espinoza's written statements are not the "illegal fruit of a poisonous tree." We therefore hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Espinoza's motion to suppress his oral and written statements.Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his second and third points of error, Espinoza argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction because the "State failed to prove the requisite intent required for a murderer to be convicted as a capital murder." We again disagree.Standard of Review
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we "look at all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 753-54 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 986 (2003) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we must ask whether, considering the evidence in a neutral light, the fact finder was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). "[T]here are two ways in which the evidence may be insufficient": (1) "when considered by itself, evidence supporting the verdict may be too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"; and (2) if there is "both evidence supporting the verdict and evidence contrary to the verdict," "the contrary evidence may be strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. . . ." Id. at 484-85.Applicable Law
To establish capital murder, the State was required to prove Espinoza intentionally or knowingly caused Turner's death in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1) (Vernon 2003), § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Intent, which is a fact question for the jury, may be proved with evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crime. Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 938 (2004); Flanagan v. State, 675 S.W.2d 734, 744 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982) (op. on reh'g); Childs v. State, 21 S.W.3d 631, 635 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd).Discussion
The evidence at trial established that Espinoza drank alcohol every day and smoked marijuana almost every day; and he had been drinking alcohol from approximately noon on Saturday until 3:00 or 4:00 a.m. Sunday morning, three to two hours before the robbery, and had smoked four joints during that period. Espinoza's friend and roommate testified that Espinoza had a high tolerance for both beer and marijuana and thus could appear sober; and he was not violent. Espinoza's co-worker and friend testified that Espinoza's behavior did not change when he drank alcohol or smoked marijuana and that, although Espinoza was intoxicated on Saturday, he was not falling down drunk; this friend did not notice anything out of the ordinary about Espinoza on Saturday. A tow truck driver who received three calls from Espinoza between 4:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. testified he thought Espinoza sounded "like he . . . had quite a few." Leos testified that, while she was driving Espinoza in her car minutes before the shooting, he told her he was talking about robbing somebody; indeed, Espinoza said "[n]obody knows what I can do and what I've done" and "they don't know what I am capable of." Leos admitted she thought Espinoza "was talking out of his ass"; she had never seen Espinoza act violently. She admitted, however, that Espinoza was taking pain pills for his injured right hand; but she was unsure whether he had taken the pills that night. The manager of the Stop-N-Go, who was present when Turner was robbed and shot, testified she saw a man "coming up to the door with a gun . . . in his [left] hand . . . with the gun up in the air like this"; and, almost immediately after walking into the store, the man pointed the gun at Turner and told Turner it was a robbery. The manager heard Turner tell the man to "be cool"; however, the man trained the gun on Turner and cocked it. She next "heard the register ding and then immediately the shot." However, she agreed the videotape of the incident was the best evidence of what occurred. On the videotape, which was introduced into evidence, Espinoza does not exhibit any outward signs of inebriation. In his first statement, Espinoza testified that he discharged the gun accidentally; but, in his second statement, Espinoza explained what happened:I was just mad and scared at the same time. That clerk never did anything to me. But I was standing there and I was mad and I just pulled the trigger. It wasn't an accident. I wasn't even seeing the clerk. I just decided to do it and I did. As soon as he opened the register I pulled the trigger.The jury obviously disbelieved Espinoza's first statement and believed his second, perhaps inferring an intent to kill from his use of the gun and his explanation in his second statement. See Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 809-10 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (holding that a jury may infer intent from any facts that tend to prove its existence, such as the acts, words, and conduct of the defendant), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 974 (1992); Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) (holding that the intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon, unless it would not be reasonable to infer that death or serious bodily injury could result from the use of the weapon), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 832 (1997). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold the evidence is legally sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Espinoza intended to kill Turner while in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. Viewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we hold the State's evidence is neither so obviously weak nor so greatly outweighed by contrary proof as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination. We affirm the trial court's judgment.