Opinion
Civil Action No. AW-99-1964.
February 1, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court is Defendants' Montgomery County Board of Education, et al.'s Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiffs Jose Escobar, et. al.'s Complaint. Plaintiffs have filed an opposition to the motion, and the motion is ripe for resolution. No hearing is deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md.). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' allegations of false imprisonment and discrimination under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, Jose Escobar and his parents, Raul Escobar and Aracely Escobar, bring this action against Defendants Montgomery County Board of Education ("MCBE") and Stan Foreman. Plaintiffs allege racial and national origin discrimination as well as false imprisonment under Maryland common law. The claims arise out of interactions between the Escobars and Jose's school vice principal. According to the Complaint, Jose was attending school at Earl B. Wood Junior High School when, in November of 1995, he reported that he had witnessed a sexual assault involving at least four fellow students in the gym locker room at the school. Mrs. Escobar became concerned for her son's safety and called the school office to ask if the boys who allegedly committed the assault had been removed from school. Mrs. Escobar alleges that she was told the accused boys would be removed from school, however the boys never where. Jose also told his version of the locker room events to Vice Principal Foreman, who conducted the investigation of the locker room incident. After taking into account statements from Jose, the accused boys, the victims, their parents, and Mr. Allen, the gym teacher who Jose brought onto the scene, Defendant Foreman came to the conclusion that the boys were horsing around. There had recently been a number of incidents of "chest bumping" and boys running around in the gym locker pulling down pants. Furthermore, one of the victims, at first, told Defendant Foreman that he was bothered by what the accused had done to him, and then later recanted his story and said that everybody was just joking around.
Where the boys would bump their chests together in imitation of National Basketball Association ("NBA") players.
On March 28, 1996, Jose was brought into Defendant Foreman's office in order to discuss a separate incident. Jose had been walking down the hall near the shop classes, when he saw a group of kids pulling down a piece of ceiling tile and/or light fixture. When the piece of ceiling fell to the ground, the kids ran into one of the shop rooms. Jose, as he walked by, kicked the piece of ceiling down a flight of stairs, whereby the piece broke even further. Jose was identified by the other students as actually bringing down the piece of ceiling material. When asked by Defendant Foreman about what happened, Jose denied having removed the piece of ceiling, but also lied to Defendant Foreman about kicking the material while it was on the ground. Defendant Foreman admittedly became frustrated with Jose's behavior. Jose had been to see Defendant Foreman on a number of disciplinary matters since the locker incident on such matters as tardiness to class and throwing an eraser at a substitute teacher. Defendant Foreman allegedly called Jose's mother and stated in an angry tone, "I can't stand Jose. I don't want him in my school." See Complaint at ¶ 11. Since the latest incident was so close to the school's spring break, Jose was sent home that day so that Jose and his parents could think about Jose's behavior.
The school's principal received pressure from the Parent Teacher Association ("PTA"), courtesy of Mrs. Escobar's phone calls, to reinvestigate the locker room incident. On April 10 1996, Defendant Foreman asked Jose to give him another written account of what he saw on November of 1995. While Jose was in Foreman's office, the accused boys came in and began to intimidate Jose because rumors where going around that Jose was telling everyone about what happened in the locker room. This was despite Jose having been previously told by Foreman not to talk about the locker room incident with fellow students. The accused students were asked to leave Defendant Foreman's office. Defendant Foreman asked that Jose work on the written statement during second period and bring the statement to Defendant at the beginning of third period. When third period began, Jose had not brought the statement to Defendant Foreman. Foreman sent for Jose during third period and told him that he had to write the statement on the bench outside of Foreman's office at that moment. While Jose was writing the statement, Defendant Foreman was called out of his office to take care of another school situation. It is Jose's testimony that he finished the statement, placed it on Foreman's desk and remained on the bench for what seemed like four or five periods. When Foreman returned back to his office, lunch period was just ending. Foreman began to take Jose to the cafeteria to get him some lunch when the accused students confronted Foreman and Jose once again. Foreman asked for the accused students' stories. After hearing their statements, Foreman allegedly stated to Jose, "You are a liar. . . . You need to go to (psychological) counseling." Complaint at ¶ 14. Foreman reportedly threatened Jose, stating, "I told you not to tell anyone. I could press charges against you for telling lies. You are a bully and you need to go to counseling. There is something mentally wrong with you. There is something wrong with your brain." Complaint at ¶ 14. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss before this Court. On October 12, 1999 by Memorandum Opinion and subsequent Order, this Court granted, in part, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, leaving only Plaintiffs' false imprisonment claim against Defendants MCBE and Foreman, and Plaintiffs' Title VI discrimination claim against those same defendants.
A class period was approximately 42 minutes long.
DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review for Motion for Summary Judgment
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment will be granted when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). While the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences drawn in its favor, a party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of inferences. See Deans v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 152 F.3d 326, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1998); Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). To defeat such a motion, the party opposing summary judgment must present evidence of specific facts from which the finder of fact could reasonably find for him. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). "Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (citations omitted). Accordingly, in determining whether genuine and material factual disputes exist, the Court has reviewed the memorandums and the exhibits attached thereto, construing all facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).
II. Count I: False Imprisonment
One of the remaining counts in the Plaintiffs' complaint is the claim of false imprisonment of Plaintiff Jose Escobar against MCBE and Stan Foreman. To state a cause of action for false imprisonment under Maryland law, the plaintiff must allege an unlawful "deprivation by one person of the liberty of another without his consent, whether by violence, threat or otherwise." Manikhi v. Mass. Transit Administration, 127 Md. App. 497, 733 A.2d 372 (1999) (quoting Mahan v. Adam, 144 Md. 355, 365, 124 A. 901 (1924); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 173, 122 A.2d 457 (1956); Mason v. Wrightson, 205 Md. 481, 487, 109 A.2d 128 (1954)). See also McGrier v. State of Maryland, 125 Md. App. 759, 772, 726 A.2d 894, 900 n. 2 (1999) ("False imprisonment is merely the unlawful detention of a person against his will.") Plaintiff Jose alleges that when Defendant Foreman detained him in the vice principal's office to write down his statement of what occurred in November of 1995, Jose's liberty was unlawfully deprived without his consent. Not all of the facts from the April 10, 1996 meeting are clear, but the Court shall examine the incident in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. Jose was initially called into Defendant Foreman's office during the first period of the school day.
Defendant Foreman had been asked by the school's principal to reinvestigate the alleged November, 1995 sexual assault. Also, there was talk amongst the student body about the incident. The accused students were complaining that Jose was spreading rumors about the incident when he had been told by Defendant Foreman, previously, to keep quiet about the issue for privacy reasons. Defendant Foreman asked Jose to give another written account of what he saw in the locker room. While the two were talking, a number of the students involved in the incident came into Foreman's office. They were verbally caustic towards Jose, specifically about the comments that Jose was allegedly making around school. Defendant Foreman asked the students to leave. As Foreman sent Jose back to first period, he asked that the statement be written during second period and that the statement be given to Foreman at the beginning of the third period.
As third period began, Jose had not given Foreman his statement. Once again, Jose was summoned to Foreman's office during the middle of third period. Since Jose had not yet completed the statement, Foreman directed Jose to sit on the bench outside of his office and finish writing the statement. While Jose was writing, Defendant Foreman was called out into the hallway in order to handle another school matter. When Jose finished writing the statement, he placed it on Foreman's desk and returned to the bench. Both parties disagree with how long Jose was left sitting on the bench. What is undisputed is that when Foreman returned to his office, Jose and he started walking towards the cafeteria at the end of the lunch period. The parties also disagree as to whether Jose was free to leave Foreman's office once he finished writing the statement. Defendant Foreman testified in his deposition that it was the usual practice for students to obtain a hall pass from his secretary when they were done in the vice principal's office. Defendants argue that Jose was aware of this policy having been to Foreman's office on a number of occasions. Jose, however, testified that it was not clear to him whether he could leave and go back to class, or whether he was required to remain on the bench until Foreman's return. Jose stated that he believed that he was to stay and wait for Foreman, ". . . or I would have left."
Jose stated in his deposition testimony that he thought he was on the bench for four to five class periods. Defendant Foreman believes that the time frame was much shorter. From the evidence presented by both parties, it appears that Jose was, at the most, on the bench for one and a half to two hours. From the evidence it is clear that Jose was at or near the vice principal's office from the middle of third period until the end of the lunch period. Unfortunately, the Court was not given a schedule of Jose's school day, but one could reasonably assume that had Jose actually been sitting on the bench for four to five periods (each period being 42 minutes in length), Foreman would not have returned to his office until the end of the school day.
(Plaintiff's [sic] Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment. Exhibit #5, pg. 145, line 1.)
While there is a dispute as to whether Defendant Foreman intended for Jose to remain in the office, false imprisonment is an intentional tort, and therefore, Plaintiff does not need to prove that Defendant was motivated by malice to keep Jose on the bench. Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447 (1995). The fact that Jose believed that he was to remain on the bench is enough to implicate a false imprisonment claim. However, the Court's analysis does not end there. Plaintiff must show that he was: (1) deprived of his liberty; (2) without Plaintiff's consent; and (3) without legal justification. Plaintiffs are easily able to establish that Jose did not consent to sitting on the vice principal's bench for nearly two hours. However, Plaintiffs are unable to establish that Jose's liberty was deprived and that Defendant Foreman was without legal justification to detain Jose.
The nature of power that a public school posses is ". . . custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults." Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2392 (1995). "A proper educational environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985). The United States Supreme Court has acknowledge that for many purposes, "school authorities act in loco parentis." Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986). Defendant Foreman had ample legitimate authority as the vice principal of the school to detain Jose in his office for a reasonable amount of time. Jose had developed a reputation with Foreman outside of the November 1995 incident. Jose had lied to Defendant Foreman on at least two occasions with respect to his involvement with the ceiling light fixture and his throwing of an eraser at the substitute teacher. (Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, pgs. 89, 92). Furthermore, Jose was referred to Foreman's office for disciplinary reasons relating to his tardiness to class and his academic problems. Defendant Foreman had asked Jose once that day to provide him with a written statement of what he saw in November of 1995. Furthermore, he was receiving complaints from other students that Jose was spreading rumors about the incident. Defendant Foreman had sufficient reasons to detain Jose in his office for a reasonable amount of time. Foreman's detention of Jose is tantamount to Jose receiving in-school detention or even punishment at home. Mrs. Escobar, acting as a parent, admitted in her deposition that she had to discipline Jose because of the ceiling fixture incident and his in class behavior. (Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit C, pg. 37). Foreman's actions of discipline were similar to Mrs. Escobar disciplining her own child. When Defendant Foreman detained Jose in his office, he had "legal authority" because he was acting "in loco parentis."
Furthermore, Plaintiffs are unable to establish that Jose was deprived of any liberty. Plaintiffs' complaint states that Jose was denied food, water, and the use of a bathroom. However, the evidence submitted to this Court simply does not show this to be the case.
Nowhere in almost one hundred and forty five pages of deposition testimony by Jose does he state that he was denied the right to use the bathroom or to get some water. Even though Defendant Foreman was not present with Jose through much of his time on the bench, Foreman's secretary was right around the corner from where Jose was sitting. Having been to Foreman's office on a number of occasions, Jose should have known that Foreman's secretary was available to speak with. If Jose needed to use the bathroom or to get some water he could have asked the secretary. However, there is no evidence that Jose needed or asked anyone to use the bathroom or get a drink of water, and was denied that right. While Jose did miss his lunch period, as soon as Foreman returned from his other school duties, he started to take Jose to the cafeteria, realizing that Jose was in his office through lunch and was probably hungry.
The only other liberty of Jose's that could have been deprived was his ability to move about freely. A student does not generally enjoy the right to move about freely. A student is compelled to travel in the school hallways during school hours, traveling from one classroom to another depending on their schedule of classes. The only time a student is permitted to leave school grounds is with the permission of their parents or when the school day has ended. For this Court to hold that Foreman's detention of Jose deprived the Plaintiff of his liberty of movement, would result in all in-school and after school detentions to be considered false imprisonment. Because Defendant Foreman was acting within his "legal authority" as a vice principal in detaining Jose, and because none of Jose's liberties were deprived, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I against Defendants Foreman and MCBE.
III. Count V: Discrimination under Title VI
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Courts have applied a disparate impact analysis to cases brought under Title VI where injunctive or declaratory relief was requested. See, e.g., Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (assessing an award of declaratory and injunctive relief following a showing of disparate impact, but reserving compensatory damages for parties proving intentional discrimination); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying a disparate impact analysis and noting that the regulations implementing Title VI prohibit disparate impact discrimination); Gomez v. Illinois St. Board of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying disparate impact analysis in accordance with regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI). However, where compensatory relief is sought, intentional discrimination must be proven. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584. Courts commonly use the Title VII discrimination proof scheme to evaluate claims for intentional discrimination under Title VI. See Hankins v. Temple University., 829 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1987); Baldwin v. University. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 945 F. Supp. 1022, 1031 (S.D.Tex. 1996), aff'd, 122 F.3d 1066 (5th Cir. 1997); Love v. Duke University., 776 F. Supp. 1070, 1073 (M.D.N.C. 1991), aff'd, 959 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiffs have not offered any direct proof of intentional discrimination by Defendant Foreman. Plaintiff Jose was asked a series of questions about whether Defendant Foreman had treated him differently because he was Hispanic. (Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, pg. 136-37). Jose replied that he felt as if Foreman treated him differently, but not because he was Hispanic. Furthermore, when asked is there were policies or procedures in place at the school which Jose felt impacted him differently because he was Hispanic, Jose responded "no." (Id at pg. 137, line 2). Mrs. Escobar has testified that Defendant Foreman, during a phone conversation regarding Jose, ask Plaintiff if she needed a translator. This, alone, is not enough to show direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Stray remarks will not be deemed direct evidence of discrimination. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 548-49 (4th Cir. 1995). Defendant Foreman testified in his deposition that Mrs. Escobar was taking long pauses before answering his questions and he believed that she was having trouble understanding him clearly. As for Mr. Escobar, there has been no evidence submitted by Plaintiffs of his interaction with Defendants, except for the fact that he attended the April 11, 1996 meeting with the Plaintiffs', Jose's Aunt and Uncle, and Defendant Foreman and the principal of the school. Plaintiffs can not establish a case of Title VI discrimination through direct evidence to this Court.
Defendants have consistently argued in their pleadings that Mrs. Escobar actually took advantage of Foreman's suggestion and used a translator. Despite the fact that the Plaintiffs have not denied this fact, Defendants have failed to submit any proof of Mrs. Escobar's use of a translator to the Court.
Plaintiffs do have the opportunity to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by way of the McDonnell-Douglas proof scheme. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For Plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, they must show that they are members of a protected class, that they suffered an adverse action, and similarly situated individuals did not suffer the same adverse actions in the same or similar situations. Plaintiffs are a member of a protected class by virtue of their Guatemalan national origin. Jose suffered an adverse action in that he was suspended from school and eventually transferred middle schools because of the actions of the Defendants. Although Plaintiffs can establish the first two prongs of the McDonnell-Douglas proof scheme, Jose was treated the same as similarly situated non-Hispanics. Plaintiffs claim that Jose was singled out by Foreman's treatment of him. Plaintiffs allege that, not only did Foreman allegedly call Jose a liar and tell him that he had mental problems, but Foreman disciplined Jose differently than he did to non-Hispanic children. Plaintiffs are unable to show that Jose was treated differently when it came to discipline. Plaintiffs point to the fact that the three accused boys in the locker room incident, who were non-Hispanic, were allowed to stay in school, whereas Jose was sent home before spring break for his alleged role with the ceiling fixture. While it is true that Montgomery County Public Schools have outlined a minimum punishment of suspension for sexual assault, Foreman was never able to establish that the three accused boys were guilty of a sexual assault. As stated previously in this Memorandum Opinion, one of the alleged victims of the sexual assault stated that he had been attacked, but later recanted his story. Furthermore, no other witnesses in the boys locker room testified that they had seen the sexual assault. The evidence came down to Jose's word against the accused boys.
Rather than believing one child over another, Defendant Foreman followed his policy of not handing out a suspension when the facts of the situation are not clear. Jose benefitted from this policy as well. When Jose was referred to Defendant Foreman's office for throwing an eraser at a teacher, Foreman did not take any action against Jose despite the fact that a witness identified Jose as throwing the eraser, because Jose denied having thrown it to Foreman. Defendant Foreman testified that, "His [Jose's] word is as good as the next one's." (Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B, pgs. 25-26.) Because Foreman had a classic "he said, she said," no action was taken against Jose. Jose was treated the same as the three accused boys involved in the locker room incident. As further evidence of the similar treatment Jose received, Jose was not "suspended" until after five to six incidents in the month of March alone. One of the accused boys in the locker room incident (who is African-American) was also suspended when he was in a physical altercation with another student after the November, 1995 incident. Defendant Foreman administered his policy of a gradual punishment evenly and to all students.
Jose subsequently admitted to throwing the eraser at his deposition. (Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Exhibit A, pg. 92).
Jose being sent home on March 28, 1996 has not been called a suspension by the Defendants, however he was sent home for a few days, similar to a suspension.
There are a number of statements allegedly made by Defendant Foreman to Jose that, if a trier of fact found to be true are certainly inappropriate for a school administrator to say to a student. Among the alleged comments are Foreman calling Jose a liar to his face and in front of Mr. and Mrs. Escobar, telling Jose that he had some psychological problems, and threatening to press charges against Jose for allegedly spreading rumors about the locker room incident. For the purposes of deciding the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must assume that Foreman did say all of these things to Jose and his family. However, even assuming that Defendant Foreman called Jose a liar and threatened him with criminal action, the Court can find no evidence that these comments were made with any racial animus. There has been no evidence presented to this Court that Foreman engaged in name calling to other Hispanic students, or any students for that matter. Furthermore, Foreman testified that he was fed up with Jose because of numerous disciplinary problems he was having unrelated to the November, 1995 incident. Jose had been in Foreman's office for a variety of behavioral, academic and tardiness problems.
Furthermore, Jose had lied at least twice to Foreman about incidents that Jose was involved in. While none of Jose's behavior justifies Foreman's alleged behavior, it certainly is a legitimate, non discriminatory reason for Foreman's alleged outburst. This Court wants to make it clear that while is does not condone Foreman's alleged behavior, it certainly was not the product of racial animus, but rather the result of Jose and Foreman's interaction over the past six months. Plaintiffs have not shown that Jose was treated differently than similarly situated non-Hispanics. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count V.
CONCLUSION
This Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts I and V of the Plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs have failed to show that Jose was deprived of his liberty without legal authority by Defendant Foreman when he was detained in Defendant's office for up to two hours. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiffs' have failed to show the Court that Jose and his family were treated differently than similarly situation non-Hispanic children. Additionally, although the Court finds Defendant Foreman's alleged comments reprehensible, there is no evidence that a reasonable trier of fact could use to decide that they were the product of racial animus towards Hispanics.
A separate Order consistent with this Opinion will follow.