Opinion
C.A. No. 98C-12-133-WTQ.
Submitted: June 9, 2000.
Decided: June 20, 2000.
Letter Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment — MOTION DENIED
Gentlemen:
This letter constitutes the Court's Opinion and Order on the Plaintiff Darlena Ervin's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated herein, that Motion is DENIED.
FACTS
This is a personal injury/automobile accident case. The Complaint alleges that on September 24, 1997, Defendant Robert Vesnaver was driving a bus owned by the Murray Transportation Company. The allegation is that Mr. Vesnaver parked the bus on 12th Street in Wilmington and got out. Mr. Vesnaver states that he put the bus in park, set the emergency brake, turned the bus off, and chocked the wheels. Allegedly, after he left the bus, the bus rolled backwards and struck Ms. Ervin's vehicle. Eventually, Mr. Vesnaver was charged and pled guilty to a violation of 12 Del. C. § 4182 which states:
No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition, removing the key and effectively setting the brake thereon and, when standing upon any grade, turning the front wheels to the curb or side of the highway.
On December 14, 1998, Ms. Ervin filed suit in an attempt to recover damages for her injuries. In answering the Complaint, the Defendants stated: "[t]he negligence of the individual defendant is generally admitted. The specific allegations of negligence are denied." Ans. Compl., Dkt. No. 6, ¶ 5. The Answer, as yet, has not been amended and the Case Scheduling Order deadline to file Motions to amend or add passed on April 30, 1999.
Frankly, this Judge is not sure what such a pleading means.
In the Pretrial Stipulation in this case, the Defendants assert that Mr. Vesnaver was not negligent when he parked the bus and left the vehicle. The Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, admitting that a plea of guilty for a motor vehicle violation is only regarded as an admission against interest in a civil case and is not regarded as proof of a fact in issue. Plaintiff argues, however, that because the admission was contained in the pleading, it is a judicial admission and cannot be contradicted by the party who made that admission. Therefore, Plaintiff argues that because the Defendants admitted negligence in their initial Answer, Summary Judgment should be granted in her favor on the negligence issue.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court's function is to examine the record to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist. Oliver B. Cannon Sons, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., Del. Super., 312 A.2d 322, 325 (1973). If, after viewing the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact, Summary Judgment will be appropriate. Id. Summary Judgment will not be granted if the record indicates that a material fact is in dispute or if it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of law to the circumstances. Ebersole v. Lowengrub, Del. Supr., 4 Storey 463, 180 A.2d 467 (1962).
DECISION
In this case, the Defendants have been represented by three different attorneys. Originally, Mr. Durstein entered an appearance on behalf of both Defendants. Dkt. No. 3. Mr. Durstein signed the Answer of the Complaint. Subsequently, Mr. Durstein withdrew his appearance and Mr. Conner represented both Defendants. Dkt. No. 14. Recently, Mr. Leoni has assumed representation of the Defendants.
The question here is whether admitting negligence generally in the Answer to the Complaint constitutes a judicial admission. Wigmore states that pleadings in a cause are, for the purposes of use in that suit, not mere ordinary admissions but judicial admissions. IV Wigmore, Evidence § 1064 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). Judicial admissions are recognized under Delaware law. See Levinson v. Delaware Compensation Rating Bureau, Del. Supr., 616 A.2d 1182, 1186 (1992); Blinder, Robinson Co. v. Bruton, Del. Supr., 552 A.2d 466, 474 (1989); Rudnick v. Schoenberg, Del. Supr., 2 W. W. Harr. 339, 122 A. 902, 903 (1922) (citing Wigmore); Godwin v. State, Del. Supr., 1 Boyce 173, 74 A. 1101, 1103 (1910). Judicial admissions are not a means of evidence but a waiver of all controversy and therefore are a limitation on the issues. IV Wigmore, Evidence § 1064 (Chadbourn rev. 1972); 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence § 770; accord, Godwin, 74 A. at 1103. An attorney's admission during the management of the case, including utterances in the pleading, does affect the client. IV Wigmore, Evidence § 1063 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
Judicial admissions which are binding on the tendering party are limited to factual matters in issue and not to statements of legal theories or conceptions. Blinder, Robinson Co., 552 A.2d at 474, Normally factual statements in the pleadings are considered conclusive unless they are amended or withdrawn. 29A Am. Jur.2d, Evidence, § 775. However, once the pleadings have been amended or withdrawn, the original pleading becomes an evidentiary admission which may be refuted or explained by a party against whom it is used. Id.; see also, Annotation, Admissibility in Evidence of Withdrawn, Superseded, Amended or Abandoned Pleading Containing Admissions Against Interest, 52 ALR2d 516 (1957).
When counsel speaks of legal principles, he makes no judicial admission. Id.
Mr. Vesnaver in his Answer admits to negligence generally but denies the specific allegations of negligence as stated in the Complaint. At his deposition, when asked about the accident, Mr. Vesnaver stated that he did leave the bus and that is why he pled guilty to the charge of leaving the vehicle unattended. He also stated that when he left the bus everything was off, and it was in park. While this Court does recognize that judicial admissions in the pleadings are binding, a plain reading of the Complaint and Answer shows that the Defendants did not admit to the specific acts of negligence alleged therein. Moreover, it appears that the equitable thing to do in this situation, especially since there have been three different individuals act as counsel for the Defendants, is to allow the Defendants to refute or explain at trial the evidentiary admission contained in the answer.
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.