Opinion
No. CV-08-5006259
June 16, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (NO. 120)
FACTS
The plaintiff, Darrell Erickson, commenced the present action on March 11, 2008, by service upon the defendants, Behzad Maboudi and Swift Transportation Co., Inc. (Swift). The following facts are alleged in the plaintiff's complaint. On July 19, 2006 the plaintiff was a passenger in a Swift truck being driven by the defendant, Maboudi. Both the plaintiff and the defendant are residents of Maine and on the day in question were driving from Maine to New York. At a point on highway 144 near exit 43 in Connecticut, the truck was involved in an accident causing injury to the plaintiff. At the time of the injury, the plaintiff and the defendant were coworkers acting in the scope of their employment. In his two-count complaint, the plaintiff has alleged negligence against each of the defendants.
On December 23, 2008, the defendants filed the present motion for summary judgment and accompanying memorandum of law. On February 10, 2009 the plaintiff filed his objection to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Oral argument was heard on the matter at short calendar on March 2, 2009.
DISCUSSION
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Provencher v. Enfield, 284 Conn. 772, 790-91, 936 A.2d 625 (2007).
As grounds for their motion for summary judgment, the defendants argue that the plaintiff's action is barred by New York law, which holds that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy when an employee is injured by the negligence or wrong of another employee. In their memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants cite the recent Connecticut Supreme Court case Jaiguay v. Vasqez, 287 Conn. 323, 948 A.2d 955 (2008), as authority for their contention that New York law should apply in this case. The defendants argue that New York has the most significant relationship with the parties involved in the suit because Swift has two terminal locations in New York and regularly conducts business there. The defendants argue further that workers' compensation benefits were paid to the plaintiff under New York workers' compensation laws and that Swift does not have terminal locations in Connecticut. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants have submitted affidavits of Juanita Reynolds of Gallagher Bassett and Bess Padilla-Winfield of Swift Transportation Co.
Connecticut workers' compensation law, as distinguished from New York, permits an action for damages arising out of a coworker's negligent operation of a motor vehicle. See General Statutes § 31-293a.
The plaintiff objects to the defendants' motion on the grounds that Connecticut has the most significant relationship to the cause of action, that Connecticut has the greatest interest in the application of its law and therefore summary judgment should be denied. The plaintiff argues that during his six years employed by Swift, he regularly and routinely traveled through Connecticut, often two to three times per week. Further, the plaintiff argues that his immediate supervisor was located at an onsite location in North Grosvenordale, Connecticut. The plaintiff also states that both he and the defendant, Maboudi, are residents of Maine and that Swift is headquartered in Arizona and has terminal locations all over the United States. The plaintiff argues that he merely was assigned to a terminal location in New York and that was his supervisor in Connecticut his employment relationship was primarily maintained through his supervisor in Connecticut. The plaintiff concedes that he collected workers' compensation under New York workers' compensation laws, but that he only did so based upon the instruction of Swift. The plaintiff has submitted his own affidavit in support of his objection.
In Jaiguay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. 373 the court was presented with a very similar set of facts to the present matter. The plaintiff's decedent in that case was killed in an automobile accident in Greenwich, Connecticut, while riding in a pick-up truck operated by a coworker and owned by the landscaping company they both worked for. The coworkers were traveling through Connecticut briefly to their destination in New York. The landscaping company in that case was a New York corporation and both the decedent and his coworker were residents of New York. The decedent's estate brought a wrongful death action in Connecticut, so as to avoid the exclusivity of the New York workers' compensation statute.
The Supreme Court wrote an in-depth opinion in Jaiguay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. 323 discussing many preceding cases on this issue. The court chose to move away from the disjunctive three-prong test that it had used in previous cases, such as Johnson v. Atkinson, 283 Conn. 243, 926 A.2d 656 (2007) (Connecticut law applies if Connecticut is the place of injury, place of employment contract or place of employment relation). That test is now to be used only when the question of whether a state's workers' compensation laws are to be applied because each state has an interest in making sure people who are injured in their state are compensated.
The Jaiguay court decided that the test that should apply for tort suits resulting from cases with these facts is which state's law, to the exclusion of other potentially interested states, is the governing or controlling law. To decide this question, the court opined that the choice of law analysis used for tort cases should be used. That test is the most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Second). "Subsection (1) of § 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of laws provides that `[t]he rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.' 1 Restatement (Second), [ supra, § 145(1), p. 414]. Subsection (2) of § 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, in turn, provides: `When there is no [statutory] directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of a particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.' Id., § 6(2) p. 10.
"For assistance in our evaluation of the policy choices set out in §§ 145(1) and 6(2) . . . we turn . . . to § 145(2) . . . which establishes black-letter rules of priority to facilitate the application of the principles of § 6 to tort cases . . . Subsection (2) of § 145 . . . provides: `Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.' [ Id.], § 145(2), p. 414." Jaiguay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. 351-59 citing Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 801-02, 830 A.2d 752 (2003).
As discussed in Jaiguay and cited by the defendants, Snyder v. Seldin, 81 Conn.App. 718, 841 A.2d 701 (2004), offers another similar set of facts to the present matter. "In Snyder, the plaintiff, Jennifer Snyder, and the defendant, Barbara Seldin, were employed by Casual Corner Group, Inc. (Casual Corner), which had its corporate headquarters in Connecticut. Both Snyder and Seldin were residents of New York, and Snyder had been principally employed at Casual Corner retail stores in New York since commencing her employment with Casual Corner . . . while on their way to a meeting at Casual Corner's Connecticut headquarter's, Snyder was injured in a car that Seldin was driving . . . Snyder received workers' compensation benefits in New York and then commenced a negligence action against Seldin." Jaiguay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. 340-41 (Internal citations omitted.) citing Snyder v. Seldin, supra, 81 Conn.App. 720. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. "After observing that Snyder had received workers' compensation benefits under New York law, the court explained that `New York's interest in compensating an injured employee, a New York resident, while precluding her from bringing a negligence action against her co-employee, who also [was] a New York resident, for injuries sustained in the course of [her] employment, [was] clear and legitimate. New York's interest further lies in the fact that [Snyder's] employment relationship with Casual Corner began in New York, and that [Snyder] ha[d] traveled to Connecticut for business only twice since [she was] hired by Casual Corner." Id. 341.
In the present matter, as in Jaiguay and Snyder, the injury in question took place in Connecticut. Further, a significant portion of the plaintiff's employment activity took place within Connecticut. The plaintiff was assigned to a supervisor whose location is in Connecticut and he made trips through Connecticut two to four times per week since the commencement of his employment with Swift six years ago, as distinguished from both Jaiguay and Snyder. Both the plaintiff and the defendant, Maboudi, are residents of Maine, also as distinguished from both Jaiguay and Snyder where the parties resided in New York. Swift is headquartered in Arizona and has terminal locations all over the country. The plaintiff's employment relationship with Swift, however, began in New York, and the plaintiff was assigned to a terminal location in New York. In Jaiguay, factors (c) and (d) of § 145 (2) weighed heavily in favor of applying New York Law, in the present matter, however, only factor (d), the parties' employment relationship, weighs in favor of applying New York Law Factors (a) and (b) of § 145 (2) weigh heavily in favor of the application of Connecticut law.
"As O'Connor informs us, [however] it is the significance, and not the number, of § 145(2) contacts that determines the outcome of the choice of law inquiry under the Restatement [Second] approach. As the concluding sentence of § 145(2) provides, `[t]hese contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue." Jaiguay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. 353, citing O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 637, 519 A.2d 13 (1986). In evaluating the relative importance of each factor, this court concludes that Connecticut has the greater contact with the parties in this case. The fact that both Erickson and Maboudi live in Maine and Swift is headquartered in Arizona make factors such as where the injury occurred and where the conduct causing the injury occurred the dispositive factors to be considered. Further, although the plaintiff's employment relationship with Swift appears to have begun in New York and the plaintiff was assigned to a terminal location in New York, his supervisor was located in Connecticut and he made frequent trips through Connecticut. Therefore, the parties' relationship can be seen to be both centered in New York and Connecticut.
The Jaiguay court did not stop with an analysis of the factors contained in § 145(2), however. It is important to weigh the factors enumerated in § 6(2) by reviewing the respective policies and interests of New York and Connecticut in this matter. See Jaiguay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. 353, citing 1 Restatement (Second), supra, § 6(2)(b), (c), and (e), p. 10. The plaintiff contends that Connecticut law should apply because Connecticut's interests are stronger than those of New York in that Connecticut has a significant interest in deterring recklessness and speeding on its roadways and highways, especially with regard to frequent, commercial users of its highways and roadways. The defendants assert the application of New York law is preferable in this instance because New York issued workers' compensation payments and therefore has an interest in hearing all tort claims that result from the action spurring workers' compensation benefits. This court agrees with the plaintiff on this matter. Connecticut has a substantial interest in hearing cases that result from speeding and recklessness on its highways, especially by commercial vehicles that frequently travel through this state. Although New York has an interest in hearing cases that are connected to workers' compensation benefits that they have paid out, it is secondary to Connecticut's interest in this case.
Finally, the defendants argue that even if Connecticut law should apply, there remain no genuine issues of fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 446, 476 A.2d 559 (1984). Summary judgment procedure is especially ill-adapted to negligence cases, where . . . the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation . . . [T]he conclusion of negligence is necessarily one of fact . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 434, 362 A.2d 857 (1975). As there remain issues of negligence to be decided by the fact finder, this matter is not ripe for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Connecticut law is appropriate to the application of the facts in the present matter. Therefore, because this matter involves injuries resulting from an automobile accident, it falls within the exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity provision listed at General Statutes § 31-293a. Furthermore, there remain genuine issues of fact involving the negligence in this case. The defendants' motion for summary judgment is therefore denied.