Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1668-14T3
05-11-2016
E.L., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF FAMILY DEVELOPMENT, Respondent.
Stanley G. Sheats argued the cause for appellant (Northeast New Jersey Legal Services, Inc., attorneys; Mr. Sheats, on the brief). Erick J. Lucadamo, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mr. Lucadamo, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fuentes, Kennedy and Gilson. On appeal from the Department of Human Services, Division of Family Development, Docket No. C226087. Stanley G. Sheats argued the cause for appellant (Northeast New Jersey Legal Services, Inc., attorneys; Mr. Sheats, on the brief). Erick J. Lucadamo, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mr. Lucadamo, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Appellant, E.L., appeals a final agency action of the Department of Human Services (DHS), Division of Family Development (DFD), denying her application for Emergency Assistance (EA) pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1 to -6.10 on the ground that she caused her own homelessness. In making this determination, the DFD adopted the findings of an administrative law judge (ALJ), who found that appellant had executed a consent judgment to vacate her apartment after she was served with a complaint by her landlord alleging that she caused an "unsanitary and unlivable condition" to exist in the apartment.
Appellant had resided in the first-floor apartment of a two-family home in Palisades Park since May 2012. At some point, she applied for and began receiving public assistance under the Work First New Jersey (WFNJ)/Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, N.J.S.A. 44:10-34 et seq., N.J.A.C. 10:90-1.1 et seq., through the Passaic County Board of Social Services (PCB).
In the middle of August 2014, appellant received a summons and complaint filed by her landlord seeking an order to evict her. The complaint alleged appellant caused the apartment to be in an "unsanitary and unlivable" condition. On July 1, 2014, the landlord provided appellant with a Notice to Quit giving her thirty days to vacate the apartment.
Appellant claims she took the summons and complaint to the PCB where she was allegedly advised by "Ms. Diaz," a PCB representative, to "ask [the landlord] for 30 days and for [her] security deposit back[.]" Appellant further alleged that Diaz told her that the PCB was "going to end up helping me anyway, whether I got the security deposit or not."
On August 28, 2014, appellant appeared in landlord-tenant court, where she met with the landlord's attorney and a mediator. At that time, she voluntarily signed a "Consent to Enter Judgment," in which she agreed to the "immediate entry of a judgment for possession" and the landlord agreed he would not seek a warrant of removal until September 30, 2014. Appellant was told by the mediator that her security deposit would be addressed after she left the premises.
In September, appellant returned to the PCB, where, after an emergency hearing, her EA application was denied. Appellant thereafter requested a "fair hearing" on her eligibility for EA benefits, and a hearing was scheduled for September 22, 2014, before an ALJ. At the hearing, appellant briefly testified and denied the allegations of the complaint filed by her landlord. She further testified about her reasons for executing the consent judgment, as we have outlined above.
Following oral argument, the ALJ concluded that the PCB's denial of EA benefits was appropriate because appellant contributed to her own homelessness by signing the consent order in which she agreed to vacate the apartment on September 30, 2014, and consented to the entry of a judgment of possession. The ALJ also found that because appellant had been able to pay her rent through the end of September, no "emergency" existed.
Appellant then appealed the ALJ's decision to the Director of the Division of Family Development, who reviewed the record and adopted the decision of the ALJ. The Director also determined that by signing the consent judgment, appellant "caused her own homelessness," and thus was ineligible for EA benefits for six months. This appeal followed.
Appellant argues that she should not have been denied EA benefits for following the instructions of the PCB. We start our analysis by examining the principles of law that guide our decision.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in an effort to promote local control over public assistance benefits. Pers. Resp. and Work Opp. Reconcil. Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as 8 U.S.C.A. 1601-1646). In response to the PRWORA, New Jersey enacted the WFNJ Act. N.J.S.A. 44:10-55 et seq.; Sojourner A. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 177 N.J. 318 (2003). The Legislature recognized that the PRWORA provided an "opportunity for a state to establish and design its own welfare program," N.J.S.A. 44:10-56(a), and "[w]orking individuals . . . needing temporary assistance should have the transitional support necessary to obtain and keep a job in order to be able to avoid cycling back onto public assistance[,]" N.J.S.A. 44:10-56(c). In Sojourner A., the Court recognized that "the primary purpose of WFNJ is to encourage employment, self-sufficiency and family stability." Sojourner A., supra, 177 N.J. at 327.
The WFNJ program is established in the DHS, N.J.S.A. 44:10-58(a); however, it is administered at the municipal and county levels, N.J.S.A. 44:10-59(c). The Commissioner of the DHS is authorized to establish regulations governing eligibility and other requirements for the WFNJ program. N.J.S.A. 44:10-59(e). Pursuant to this authority, the Commissioner has adopted rules governing the WFNJ program, including availability of emergency housing assistance. N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1 to -6.10.
Further, EA benefits are limited to "meet the emergent needs" of persons who receive public assistance paid through the WFNJ/TANF program. N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1(a); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq. (authorizing federal grants to states for temporary assistance to needy families); N.J.S.A. 44:10-55 et seq. (establishing, pursuant to federal legislation, the WFNJ program to be implemented by county welfare agencies). Among other things, the WFNJ program is aimed at promoting "[p]ersonal and family security and stability, including the protection of children and vulnerable adults[.]" N.J.S.A. 44:10-56(f).
Given the relatively modest sums of money allocated to the EA program, New Jersey has established stringent criteria that govern an individual's eligibility for funding:
[W]hen there has been substantial loss of housing . . . or an actual or imminent eviction from prior housing, and the assistance unit is in a state of homelessness or imminent homelessness due to circumstances beyond their control or the absence of a realistic capacity to plan in advance for substitute housing . . . and the county or municipal agency determines that the provision of shelter/housing and/or food and/or emergency clothing, and/or minimum essential house furnishings or utilities is necessary for health and safety.
[N. J.A.C. 10:90-6.1(c) (emphasis added).]
In this case, appellant argued that she adequately demonstrated under N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1(c) the "absence of a realistic capacity to plan in advance for substitute housing" as a consequence of the pending eviction action which threatened her with "imminent homelessness." This argument, however, is belied by several facts in the record, which are either uncontested or conceded by appellant.
Appellant knew at least as early as July 1, 2014, that her landlord wanted her to leave the apartment as a consequence of what he perceived to be her breach of the lease by overcrowding and by creating unsanitary conditions on the property. Yet, the record is devoid of evidence that appellant undertook any steps to address those conditions or to discuss the problems with her landlord.
These facts do not support the conclusion that appellant lacked a "realistic capacity to plan in advance" to avoid her "imminent homelessness." The EA regulations provide that the absence of a realistic capacity to plan for substitute housing may be satisfied in instances where there is "insufficient time to secure housing between receipt of notice of imminent loss of housing and actual eviction, foreclosure, or a loss of prior permanent housing." N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1(c)(1)(i).
Moreover, appellant at least had available to her at that time sufficient cash to pay her rent of $950 per month through September 30, 2014. Again, this fact is inconsistent with the eligibility requirements of N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1(c).
Most telling, however, is that appellant agreed to the entry of a consent order, granting her landlord a judgment for eviction against her. This action was undertaken despite the fact that appellant denied the factual predicate for the eviction complaint and marshaled the evidence that supported her denial. Such an act can be viewed as nothing other than "causing" her own homelessness. Accordingly, it appears that the final agency action at issue is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.
Appellant's allegation that the PCB specifically instructed her to seek the return of her deposit and obtain thirty additional days in her apartment is simply an uncorroborated assertion and, in any event, cannot be read as an instruction to unequivocally surrender in landlord-tenant court and to agree to her own eviction. The ALJ found appellant would not have undertaken such self-destructive acts based on an agency instruction like the one ascribed to a "Ms. Diaz" - the agency representative that she claims she spoke to in August 2014. The record supports this finding.
We accord substantial deference to administrative agencies in our review of their final agency decisions. See George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994); Aqua Beach Condo. Ass'n v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 186 N.J. 5, 15-16 (2006). In most instances, our function is confined to determining whether the challenged administrative action was "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." Aqua Beach, supra, 186 N.J. at 16; see also Barone v. Dep't of Human Servs., 210 N.J. Super. 276, 285 (App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 107 N.J. 355 (1987). However, we are not bound by an agency's determinations on matters of law arising under the pertinent statutes and regulations. Levine v. Dep't of Transp., 338 N.J. Super. 28, 32 (App. Div. 2001) (citing G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 170 (1999)).
Having carefully reviewed the record and the applicable EA regulations, we conclude that the DFD faithfully adhered to the controlling legal principles when it adopted the ALJ's determination and held that appellant had not proven the facts required by N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1(c) for EA eligibility.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION