Opinion
No. 59A05-1011-PC-769
09-01-2011
MICHAEL L. EDWARDS, Appellant, v. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee.
APPELLANT PRO SE: MICHAEL L. EDWARDS Wabash Valley Correctional Facility Carlisle, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: GREGORY F. ZOELLER Attorney General of Indiana J.T. WHITEHEAD Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE:
MICHAEL L. EDWARDS
Wabash Valley Correctional Facility
Carlisle, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. WHITEHEAD
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
APPEAL FROM THE ORANGE CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Larry R. Blanton, Judge
Cause No. 59C01-8703-CF-6
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MATHIAS , Judge
The Orange Circuit Court denied a petition for post-conviction relief filed by Michael L. Edwards. Edwards appeals and presents two issues, which we restate as: (1) whether the post-conviction court erred concluding that Edwards's guilty plea was valid, and (2) whether the post-conviction court erred in concluding that Edwards was not denied the effective assistance of trial counsel.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On March 6, 1987, the State charged Edwards with Class C felony criminal mischief as a result of Edwards damaging several tombstones at a graveyard. The State also charged Edwards with Class C felony forgery and Class C felony theft in two unrelated cases. Edwards eventually entered into a plea agreement with the State whereby he agreed to plead guilty to Class C felony criminal mischief, and the State agreed to dismiss the charges of Class C felony forgery and theft.
At a guilty plea hearing held on April 26, 1988, the trial court informed Edwards of the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, including the right to a public and speedy trial, the right to confront witnesses against him, the right to subpoena witnesses, the right to remain silent, and the right to appeal. Edwards stated that he understood that he was giving up these rights by pleading guilty and still desired to plead guilty. The trial court also asked Edwards whether he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol and whether Edwards suffered from any mental illness. Edwards answered "no" to both questions. Appellant's App. p. 93. The trial court further informed Edwards that the State bore the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that he had the right to an attorney. Again, Edwards indicated that he understood this, but was giving up such rights by pleading guilty. The trial court then read to Edwards the criminal mischief statute and explained the difference between criminal mischief as a Class D felony and a Class C felony:
Do you understand that the charge that you are pleading guilty to is criminal mischief. The statute under which the information was filed provides as follows: A person who recklessly, knowingly or intentionally damages a structure used for religious worship, a cemetery or a facility used for memorialization of the dead, a school or community center, . . . without the consent of the owner, possessor or occupant of the property that is damaged commits institutional mischief, a class A misdemeanor. However, the offense is a Class D felony if the pecuniary loss is at least $250.00 but less than $2,500.00 and a Class C felony if the pecuniary loss is at least $2,500.00 You are being charged and are pleading guilty to the Class C felony, it being alleged that there was . . . $2,500.00 worth of property damaged. Do you understand this?Id. at 95 (emphasis added). Edwards responded, "Yes." Id. The trial court then explained the possible penalties facing Edwards and that his plea could "affect the imposition of harsher sentences for any future crimes." Id.
The trial court then went over the plea agreement with Edwards, explaining that, pursuant to the agreement, Edwards agreed to plead guilty to Class C felony criminal mischief and be sentenced to five years, with two years and three months executed, with credit for time served, and five years of formal probation; in exchange, the State would dismiss the remaining C felony charges. Again, Edwards stated that he understood this plea. He also stated that he had not received any promises other than the plea, been given anything of value, offered any leniency or special treatment, or been forced or threatened in order to induce his plea. Moreover, he agreed that his plea was a "free and voluntary act," and that it was still his intention to plead guilty. Id. at 97.
To establish the factual basis for his plea, Edwards's trial counsel elicited testimony from Edwards that he was at the Bethel Church Cemetery in Orange County on the night of February 10, 1987 where he was drunk and vandalized the cemetery by turning over tombstones. The State then questioned Edwards as follows:
Q. How many tombstones did you turn over, do you remember?Id. at 99.
A. I'm not sure.
Q. A bunch though, more than one?
A. Yeah.
Q. Are you going to contest the total pecuniary damage was at least $2,500.00 or greater?
A. Yes.
The trial court then took the plea under advisement and scheduled a sentencing hearing. At the June 3, 1988 sentencing hearing, Edwards indicated that he was satisfied with the performance of his trial counsel. When given the opportunity to make a statement, Edward simply stated, "Yes sir, I'm sorry (inaudible) I've done enough time in jail and I'm not going to be doing anything again. I've learned my lesson drinking." Id. at 105. The court then proceeded to accept the guilty plea and sentenced Edwards pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement.
Over twenty years later, on December 17, 2008, Edwards filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On January 26, 2010, the post-conviction court denied Edwards's petition without a hearing, and Edwards appealed. On April 28, 2010, this court, in an unpublished order, remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. On remand, the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on Edwards's petition on October 4, 2010. At this hearing, the record from the guilty plea hearing and sentencing hearing were admitted into evidence, and Edwards, proceeding pro se, called two witnesses: his trial counsel and the original trial court judge. However, the trial court judge had since passed away. Therefore, the only witnesses to testify were Edwards and his trial counsel. Edwards argued that the trial court should not have accepted his plea because he maintained his innocence at the plea hearing. Edwards also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing Edwards to plead guilty even though he maintained his innocence. On October 7, 2010, the trial court issued an order denying Edwards's petition. Edwards now appeals.
At the post-conviction hearing, Edwards stated that he is currently serving a sixty-three year sentence for murder which was enhanced for his being a habitual offender. He admitted that his goal in the instant case was to attack his habitual offender determination. Tr. pp. 22-23.
The post-conviction court also accepted the State's argument that Edwards's attack on his guilty plea was barred by the doctrine of laches. To prevail on a claim of laches, the State had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the petitioner unreasonably delayed in seeking post-conviction relief, and (2) that the State has been prejudiced by the delay. Williams v. State, 716 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Ind. 1999). Here, the State presented no evidence. Therefore, it did not prove that it would be prejudiced by this delay. See Kirby v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (when asserting affirmative defense of laches, the State has an obligation to use due diligence in investigating availability of evidence and witnesses). Moreover, the trial court addressed the merits of Edwards's claims. We therefore choose to address the merits of Edwards's claims.
Standard of Review
A post-conviction petitioner bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. 2008). On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment. Id. To prevail on appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Id. at 643-44. When the post-conviction court makes findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6), we do not defer to the court's legal conclusions, but the "findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. at 644.
I. Guilty Plea
A trial court may not accept a plea of guilty unless it has determined that the plea is voluntary. Richardson v. State, 800 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Ind. Code § 35-35-1-3). Before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must take steps to insure that the defendant's plea is voluntary. Id. (citing Ind. Code §§ 35-35-1-2, 35-351-3). "Generally speaking, if a trial court undertakes these steps, a post-conviction petitioner will have a difficult time overturning his guilty plea on collateral attack." Id. (citing State v. Moore, 678 N.E.2d 1258, 1265 (Ind. 1997)). Edwards argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because he insists that the trial court could not have properly accepted his plea. Specifically, Edwards claims that he maintained his innocence when he pleaded guilty.
Edwards's attack on the validity of his guilty plea is reviewable only by means of a petition for post-conviction relief. See Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ind. 1996).
As summarized by our supreme court:
In 1970, the United States Supreme Court found that the federal Constitution did not bar a court from accepting a guilty plea when the defendant maintains innocence. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970). But Alford explicitly recognizes that the individual states may refuse to accept guilty pleas that accompany protestations of innocence. Id. at 38 n. 11. Indiana law has long refused to accept such "Alford" pleas. Over fifty years ago, this Court held that "a plea of guilty tendered by one who in the same breath protests his innocence, or declares he does not actually know whether or not he is guilty, is no plea at all." Hartman v. State, 232 Ind. 618, 621, 115 N.E.2d 501, 502 (1953). "A defendant who says he did the crime and says he did not do the crime has in effect said nothing, at least nothing to warrant a judge in entering a conviction." Carter v. State, 739 N.E.2d 126, 128-29 (Ind. 2000). Indiana jurisprudence has insisted that a factual basis must exist for a guilty plea, and that a judge may not accept a guilty plea while a defendant claims actual innocence. Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind.1983). This rule was designed to both increase the reliability of guilty pleas and prevent the diminishment of respect for the court system as jailing people who committed no crime. See Trueblood v. State, 587 N.E.2d 105, 107 (Ind. 1992).Norris v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1152 (Ind. 2008).
Here, Edwards claims that he maintained his innocence at the time he pleaded guilty. The only evidence in support of Edwards's claim is his response to the State's question during the guilty plea wherein the prosecutor asked, "Are you going to contest the total pecuniary damage was at least $2,500.00 or greater," to which Edwards stated, "Yes." Appellant's App. p. 99. Edwards claims his response amounts to a denial that the damage to the cemetery was over the $2,500 threshold required to make criminal mischief a Class C felony and thus a denial of his guilt. We disagree.
At no time in the guilty plea hearing did Edwards or his trial counsel actually claim that the damage to the cemetery was less than $2,500. To the contrary, after the trial court read the criminal mischief statute to Edwards and explained that to be convicted of a Class C felony, the damage had to exceed $2,500, Edwards indicated that he understood this, yet he still told the trial court that his plea was "free and voluntary" and that he intended to plead guilty. Id. at 97. And Edwards admitted that he knocked over "a bunch" of tombstones at the cemetery. Id. at 99. Moreover, Edwards's trial counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing that he did not recall Edwards having maintained his innocence. In fact, his trial counsel stated that he did not understand how Edwards could have maintained that the damage to the cemetery was less than $2,500 because "the damage at the cemetery was pretty considerable" and that "numerous tombstones were overturned, broken down." Id. at 79. Trial counsel further testified that Edwards was "tickled to death to take the plea they offered," and was "eager to take the plea." Id.
Under these facts and circumstances, we are unable to conclude that Edwards's affirmative response to the State's question over whether he planned to contest whether the damage to the cemetery was less than $2,500 was an explicit assertion of innocence. Even if we take his answer to the question at face value, Edwards never actually followed through with his claim that he intended to contest the damage done to the cemetery. Therefore the trial court did not err in accepting Edwards's guilty plea because Edwards never claimed that he was innocent.
It is possible that Edwards simply misunderstood the question. In fact, Edwards's answer makes much more sense in the context of the guilty plea hearing if he understood the question as asking whether he intended to admit, rather than contest, that the damage to the cemetery was at least $2,500.
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The present case is unlike that before us in Huddleston v. State, 20A05-1012-PC-813, 2011 WL 2670206 (Ind. Ct. App. July 8, 2011), trans. pending. In that case, we concluded that the trial court erred in accepting the defendant's plea of guilty to being an accomplice to murder where he clearly and unequivocally stated at his guilty plea hearing that he did not intend for the victim to be killed nor did he know or anticipate that the principal would kill the victim. Id., slip op. at 8. We held that these statements constituted an "outright denial" that the defendant possessed the required mens rea to be convicted as an accomplice. Id. In contrast, here there was never any outright denial of any element of the charge, just an answer to a perhaps poorly-worded question that indicated that Edwards might challenge an element of the crime. But this challenge never occurred.
Instead, we find this case more similar to Bates v. State, 517 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ind. 1988), in which our supreme court held that the trial court properly accepted the defendant's plea of guilty to Class A felony criminal deviate conduct even though defense counsel had informed the trial court that the defendant did not admit that crime was committed with deadly force or while threatening deadly force. In so holding, the court noted that the defendant never did actually deny the use of a deadly weapon and did indicate that his crime was "forcibly done." Id.
Similarly, in Love v. State, 514 N.E.2d 339, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), this court held that the trial court properly accepted the defendant's guilty plea even though defense counsel informed the trial court that the defendant was not admitting his involvement in the crimes. The trial court in that case explained to the defendant that his guilty plea would act as an admission of the facts alleged in the charges and that he had to admit to the facts if he desired to plead guilty. Id. The defendant did admit to the facts alleged and never actually asserted that he was innocent of the charges. Id. at 343.
Similar to both Bates and Love, Edwards, despite his answer indicating to the contrary, never actually claimed he was innocent of the crime charged. See also Bland v. State, 708 N.E.2d 880, 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (trial court properly accepted defendant's guilty plea to operating a vehicle after a lifetime suspension even though defendant stated "[my] license wasn't suspended for life in no court," where defendant also admitted that the State's evidence showed that his license had been suspended for life and that notice of this suspension was mailed to his last known address).
Edwards did not affirmatively claim that he was actually innocent of the crimes charged until after the plea was accepted and after he was sentenced. "[A] defendant who waits until his post-conviction relief hearing to protest innocence has waited too long." Belcher v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). Under these facts and circumstances, the post-conviction court properly concluded that the trial court did not err in accepting Edwards's guilty plea.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
Edwards also claims that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. As explained by our supreme court in Timberlake v. State:
A defendant claiming a violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel must establish the two components set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the errors were so serious that they resulted in a denial of the right to counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. . . . The two prongs of the Strickland test are separate and independent inquiries. Thus, [i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted).
Edwards claims that, because he professed his innocence when he pleaded guilty, his trial counsel should have taken steps to stop the trial court from accepting the plea or moved to withdraw the plea. But we have already concluded that Edwards did not actually claim that he was innocent. As noted above, his trial counsel testified that Edwards did not claim to be innocent and was in fact eager to accept the plea. And we will not reweigh this evidence on appeal. Therefore, Edwards's trial counsel cannot be faulted for moving to withdraw a plea that Edwards was eager to accept. Edwards has not established the required element of deficient performance by his trial counsel, and his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel therefore fails.
Conclusion
Because Edwards never affirmatively claimed he was innocent and instead admitted to his guilt to the charge alleged, the trial court properly accepted his guilty plea. And because the trial court properly accepted his guilty plea, his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the trial court's acceptance of the plea. Therefore, the post-conviction court properly concluded that Edwards was not entitled to post-conviction relief.
Affirmed. BAILEY, J., and CRONE, J., concur.