Opinion
Record No. 2607-92-4
August 10, 1993
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY, ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA, JUDGE.
(Sean D. O'Malie; Pelton, Ballard, Young, Demsky Baskin, on brief), for appellant.
(David P. Bobzien, County Attorney; Robert Lyndon Howell, Deputy County Attorney; Kyle Elizabeth Skopic, Assistant County Attorney, on brief), for appellee Fairfax County Department of Human Development.
(Gabriel J. Zepecki, Guardian Ad Litem, on brief).
Present: Judges Barrow, Koontz and Bray.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Brenda Edwards appeals the order of the circuit court terminating her parental rights to her two daughters. The issue raised on appeal is whether the Fairfax County Department of Human Development ("Department") established by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children's best interests. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. As the parties are familiar with the facts of the case, we recite them only as necessary to explain our decision.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, giving it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). "Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it."Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of Social Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986).
The record indicates that the children were placed in foster care in 1988 and were found by the juvenile and domestic relations district court to be abused and neglected. The foster care plan drafted by the Department required Edwards to receive substance abuse treatment and mental health counseling, stop associating with drug dealers and users, find stable and appropriate housing, obtain employment, maintain weekly visitation with her daughters, and acknowledge the abuse and neglect suffered by them.
There was evidence that, since 1988, Edwards had participated sporadically in several different drug treatment programs and mental health counseling, and had lived in approximately twenty-five to thirty different residences, including a brief move to Florida, and had lived with five different men. Edwards agreed to submit to urine testing initially, then refused to continue the tests. She also did not maintain steady employment.
The record indicates that while initially Edwards maintained consistent visits with her daughters, the visits became less frequent, leaving her children disappointed. Edwards failed to participate in the girls' weekly therapy, despite being encouraged to do so. When her elder daughter needed eye surgery in November 1991, a court order was required to allow the surgery because Edwards failed to keep the Department informed as to her whereabouts.
The circuit court found that termination of Edwards' parental rights was warranted under Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C) (2). Subpart (B) provides, in pertinent part, that:
The residual parental rights of a parent or parents of a child found by the court to be neglected or abused and placed in foster care . . . may be terminated if the court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child and that:
1. The neglect or abuse suffered by such child presented a serious and substantial threat to his life, health or development; and
2. It is not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the child's safe return to his parent or parents within a reasonable period of time.
Subpart (C) (2) provides that residual parental rights may be terminated, based upon clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child's best interests and that:
[t]he parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period not to exceed twelve months to remedy substantially the conditions which led to the child's foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end.
Evidence before the circuit court indicated that Edwards' daughters were suffering from depression due to the uncertainty of their status and were unable to form attachments to adults because they felt abandoned. Both girls needed permanency and consistency, as well as a parent who was able to set limits for them. The older daughter also had serious medical needs which required daily attention. Moreover, the evidence showed that Edwards has not been amenable to accepting the services offered to her, has refused to continue urine screening, has no stable housing or employment, and continues to engage in relationships with men which even she describes as "bad choices."
"In determining that termination was warranted under Code § 16.1-283, the trial count is bound to consider the best interests of the child." Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Development, 12 Va. App. 877, 886, 407 S.E.2d 25, 30 (1991). "It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his responsibilities." Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Social Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Based upon the evidence presented to the circuit court, we cannot say that the court's finding is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.
On the record before us, we conclude that the Department has "demonstrate[d] by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child's best interest for [Edwards' parental] rights to be terminated." Banes v. Pulaski County Dep't of Social Servs., 1 Va. App. 463, 466, 339 S.E.2d 902, 904 (1986). For the reasons stated, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.
Affirmed.