Opinion
Civil Action 2:24-cv-14
11-07-2024
ANDREW WILLIAM ECKERD, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF E. NEAL JUMP, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BENJAMIN W. CHEESBRO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff filed this action, as amended, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Docs. 1, 13. This matter is before the Court for a frivolity screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety. Because I have recommended dismissal of all of Plaintiff's claims, I RECOMMEND the Court DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal. Additionally, I RECOMMEND the Court DENY Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Show Cause for Temporary Protective Order, Temporary Restraining Order, and Preliminary Injunction. Doc. 12.
Additionally, Plaintiff has filed Motions for Default Judgment and Summary Judgment. Docs. 16, 17. Plaintiff filed these Motions before the Court completed its frivolity screening. Since I am recommending the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety, I RECOMMEND the Court DENY as moot Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and Motion for Summary Judgment.
All allegations set forth here are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint, as amended. Docs. 1, 13. During frivolity review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, “[t]he complaint's factual allegations must be accepted as true.” Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017).
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at Glynn County Detention Center. Doc. 13 at 6. Plaintiff alleges he was falsely arrested and imprisoned by Glynn County Police Department officers on October 29, 2023, October 30, 2023, and December 3, 2023. Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff also makes several claims against Glynn County Judges, Superior Court staff, public defenders, and private citizens related to judicial proceedings against him. Id. at 19-38. Lastly, Plaintiff brings claims related to his confinement at Glynn County Detention Center. Id. at 23.
I. False Arrests
On October 29, 2023, Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with Sheryl Taylor and Mary Ellen Taylor. Id. at 25. Sheryl Taylor called the Brunswick Police Department and told officers Plaintiff had stolen Mary Ellen Taylor's phone and hidden it in his truck. Id. Police questioned Plaintiff about the phone, but Plaintiff did not provide any answers. Id. Police officers, Sheryl Taylor, and Mary Ellen Taylor eventually left the scene without any further exchange with Plaintiff. Id.
Plaintiff lists both Mary Ellen Taylor and Mary Ellen Carter as Defendants. However, Plaintiff states Mary Ellen Taylor is also known as Mary Ellen Carter. Doc. 13 at 17.
Plaintiff alleges he went to meet Mary Ellen Taylor later that evening. Id. at 26. After another altercation with Sheryl Taylor, Plaintiff and Mary Ellen Taylor began to leave together. Sheryl Taylor called the police. Id. at 27. Plaintiff alleges Officers K. Miller, B. Gibson, T. Brown, and B. Rias falsely arrested Plaintiff on October 29, 2023, without an arrest warrant. Id. at 28. Plaintiff alleges he was arrested because he refused to spell his name after he already identified himself by name to the officers. Id. Plaintiff was held at Glynn County Detention Center overnight and was released after posting bail on October 30, 2023. Id. at 29.
After being released, Plaintiff attempted to recover his truck, which was left on the street the night before when he was arrested. Id. at 31. Plaintiff called the number he was given by the bondsman and spoke to someone at the impound lot. Id. Plaintiff alleges police officers arrived at his residence and lured him outside under the pretext they would help Plaintiff find his truck. Id. at 32. Plaintiff alleges he was then falsely arrested at his residence without an arrest warrant by Officers C. Padgett, C. Wooten, K. Moses, D. Shipskie, D. Davis, D. Roberts, D. Robinson, E. Wilson, and B. Grimes. Id. Plaintiff alleges he was falsely imprisoned for approximately 30 days at Glynn County Detention Center. Id. Plaintiff was released on bond on November 30, 2023. Id.
Plaintiff alleges he was falsely arrested again on December 3, 2023, by Officer J. Brandeberry and other unnamed officers. Id. Plaintiff alleges he has since been falsely imprisoned at Glynn County Detention Center by Sheriff E. Neal Jump. Id. at 9. Plaintiff has received legal assistance from two public defenders, Katelyn Gilbert and Holly Stephens. Plaintiff states the public defenders have been unsuccessful in securing Plaintiff's release since this arrest. Id. at 14.
Plaintiff has not named Officer Brandeberry as a Defendant. To the extent he did name Officer Brandeberry as a Defendant, Plaintiff's claims for false arrest are not actionable against that individual, as explained in § III of the Discussion.
II. Legal Filings and Judicial Hearings
Plaintiff alleges Sheryl Taylor told him on October 21, 2023, “I am going to do everything I can to make sure you get arrested.” Id. at 19. On October 30, 2023, Plaintiff alleges Sheryl Taylor knowingly and willfully made false statements on an affidavit for a dispossessory warrant. Id. at 20. Plaintiff alleges in November 2023, William K. Eckerd, Frank Taylor III, and Mary Ellen Taylor conspired against Plaintiff to deprive him of his personal property without his permission. Id. at 37. Plaintiff does not specify if any property was taken. Plaintiff's statements suggest he was forced to vacate his residence. Id.
Plaintiff has not named William K. Eckerd as a Defendant. To the extent he did name William K. Eckerd as a Defendant, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any private citizens, as explained in § V of the Discussion.
On December 1, 2023, Plaintiff alleges Sheryl Taylor induced Mary Ellen Taylor to falsely swear on a petition for a temporary protective order against him. Id. at 21. Plaintiff alleges Sheryl Taylor and Mary Ellen Taylor were involved in a conspiracy to commit a crime with Judge Stephen Morgan to remove Plaintiff from Sheryl Taylor's house by using a temporary protective order against him. Id.
On January 2, 2024, Plaintiff attended a hearing with Judge Morgan at Glynn County Superior Court. Id. at 12. The hearing was in relation to criminal charges of aggravated stalking against Plaintiff. Id. at 35. Plaintiff was represented by a public defender, Holly Stephens, at this hearing. Plaintiff alleges Judge Morgan did not allow Plaintiff to testify in his own defense, call witnesses to testify, or consult with Holly Stephens. Id. at 12. Plaintiff states Holly Stephens has not visited him at all since December 3, 2023. Id. at 13.
Plaintiff also alleges Judge Lane deprived him of a fair hearing on January 2, 2024. Id. However, it is unclear if there was a separate hearing with Judge Lane on January 2, 2024. Plaintiff does not provide any details about the hearing with Judge Lane. Plaintiff also alleges the Glynn County Superior Court Clerk of Court, Rebecca Walden, did not serve Plaintiff with a summons to appear for a hearing with Judge Lane at the Glynn County Courthouse on January 2, 2024. Id. Plaintiff only states Judge Lane issued a 12-month protective order against him. Id.
On January 2, 2024, Plaintiff alleges Sheriff Jump failed to transport him to the Glynn County Courthouse for his hearing, and Plaintiff was unable to defend himself. Id. at 38. Plaintiff alleges he showed documents to Sergeants Alexander and Elkins and Officers Wooten and Duran with the time and date of his hearing. Id. Plaintiff alleges Judge Lane should have known Plaintiff was confined at Glynn County Detention Center and was not able to leave on his own. Id. at 39.
Plaintiff alleges Sheryl Taylor conspired with Judge Morgan to remove Plaintiff from Defendant Taylor's house. Id. at 16. Plaintiff states Judge Morgan signed a temporary protective order against him. Id. Plaintiff alleges Sheryl Taylor and Mary Ellen Taylor worked with Holly Stephens and Judge Morgan to establish the aggravated stalking claim against him on January 2, 2024. Id. at 17. Plaintiff alleges Judge Morgan denied him bond because Judge Morgan pretended Plaintiff was dangerous. Id. Plaintiff alleges Judge Morgan did not allow him to testify. Id..
Plaintiff attended a bond hearing on January 18, 2024. Id. at 17. Plaintiff states Judge Morgan presided over this hearing. Plaintiff contends Judge Morgan had a conflict and should have recused. Id. at 18. Plaintiff states he walked out of the hearing. Id.
On April 2, 2024, Plaintiff appeared for a hearing in Glynn County Superior Court before Judge Roger Lane. Id. at 33. Plaintiff alleges he could not proceed with the hearing because there was a conflict of interest involving Judge Lane. Id.
III. Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff alleges Officers Shambrick Harris, Wooten, Hagan, and Elkins have subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment by placing him in disciplinary isolation for 60 days at Glynn County Detention Center. Id. at 23. Plaintiff alleges he was placed in isolation after asking questions regarding his hearing and missing his hearing at the courthouse. Id.
Plaintiff has not named Officers Shambrick Harris, Hagan, and Elkins as Defendants. To the extent he did name the officers as Defendants, Plaintiff does not plausibly state a conditions of confinement claim, as explained in § IV of the Discussion.
Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order against three named Defendants, as well as injunctive relief, monetary damages, and release from Glynn County Detention Center. Id. at 41-42.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A federal court is required to conduct an initial screening of all complaints filed by prisoners and plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(a), 1915(a). During the initial screening, the court must identify any cognizable claims in the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Additionally, the court must dismiss the complaint (or any portion of the complaint) that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or which seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. The pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and, therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, Plaintiff's unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
A claim is frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if it is “without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Moore v. Bargstedt, 203 Fed.Appx. 321, 323 (11th Cir. 2006). In order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To state a claim, a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not” suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff's Claims Against Defendants Morgan and Lane
Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant Morgan (a Glynn County Magistrate Court Judge) and Defendant Lane (a Glynn County Superior Court Judge). Doc. 13 at 3. Plaintiff's claim against Defendants Morgan and Lane, judges who presided over Plaintiff's court hearings, are based on actions they took in those proceedings fails. Judges enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 suits for “acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420, 418 (1976).
Absolute judicial immunity applies even when the judge's acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction . . . . Whether a judge's actions were made while acting in his judicial capacity depends on whether: (1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge's chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.Williams v. Alabama, 425 Fed.Appx. 824, 826 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations and quotations omitted). Presiding over temporary protective order and bond hearings are normal judicial functions in a case pending before the judge. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim against Defendants Morgan and Lane fail.
Because the individual judges are immune from suit, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Defendants Morgan and Lane. Mordkofsky v. Calabresi, 159 Fed.Appx. 938, 939 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding a sua sponte dismissal of a complaint based on judicial immunity would be appropriate on frivolity review).
II. Plaintiff's Ineffective Legal Assistance Claims Against Defendants Stephens and Gilbert
Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against his public defenders, Defendants Holly Stephens and Katelyn Gilbert. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1581 (11th Cir. 1995). “[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Plaintiff's claim against Defendants Stephens and Gilbert is based upon allegations they provided Plaintiff with ineffective legal assistance in his state criminal proceedings. Thus, even if the allegations in his Complaint are true, Plaintiff's public defenders were not acting under color of state law and may not be sued under § 1983. Accordingly, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Holly Stephens and Katelyn Gilbert.
III. Plaintiff's Claims for False Arrest and False Imprisonment
Plaintiff alleges the following Defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned him on October 29, 2023, October 30, 2023, and December 3, 2023: Defendants K. Miller, B. Gibson, T. Brown, B. Rias, C. Padget, C. Wooten, K. Moses, D. Shipskie, D. Davis, D. Roberts, D. Robinson, E. Wilson, B. Grimes, and Sheriff E. Neal Jump. Plaintiff requests monetary damages arising from his unconstitutional confinement. Doc. 13 at 41. In order to bring a § 1983 action for damages which “challenge[s] the validity of [an] outstanding criminal judgment[,]” a plaintiff must first “prove the unlawfulness of his confinement or conviction.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994). To show an unlawful conviction or confinement, the plaintiff must demonstrate “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . . . .” Id. at 486-87. If “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” and the sentence has not already been invalidated, the court must dismiss the complaint. Id. at 487 (“A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.”). Conversely, “as long as it is possible that a § 1983 suit would not negate the underlying conviction, then the suit is not Heck-barred.” Dyer v. Lee, 488 F.3d 876, 879-80 (11th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff alleges Defendants' unconstitutional actions in the form of a warrantless arrest led to his unlawful imprisonment, and he seeks relief from that unlawful imprisonment in the form of release and monetary damages. However, Plaintiff has not pointed to a “conviction or sentence reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. To award Plaintiff damages for unlawful imprisonment would necessarily imply his sentence is invalid. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff's claim is based on improper imprisonment resulting from a wrongful arrest, it is not actionable in a § 1983 suit. Accordingly, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's claims for monetary relief resulting from false arrest and false imprisonment.
IV. Plaintiff's Conditions of Confinement Claim
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Wooten, along with other officers, has subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment by placing him in disciplinary isolation for 60 days at Glynn County Detention Center. Doc. 13 at 23.
Conditions of confinement imposed prior to conviction are reviewed under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n. 16 (1979)). However, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has “historically treated convicted prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims and pretrial detainees' Fourteenth Amendment claims identically.” White v. Cochran, No. 16-17490, 2017 WL 6492004, at * 2 (11th Cir. Nov. 27, 2017). Thus, a conditions of confinement claim under the Fourteenth Amendment mirrors analysis under the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the United States Supreme Court found the “language of the [Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause] differs, and the nature of the claims often differs.” 576 U.S. 389, 400 (2015) (adopting a different test to evaluate pre-trial detainee's excessive force claims than the test used to evaluate convicted prisoners' excessive force claims). However, the Eleventh Circuit has determined “Kingsley is not squarely on point with and does not actually abrogate or directly conflict with precedent outside of the context of an excessive[ force claim.” White, 2017 WL 6492004, at *2 n.1 (citing Dang ex rel. Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cnty., 871 F.3d 1272, 1279 n.2 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal citation and punctuation omitted)).
Jail officials must provide a “reasonable level of food, living space, and medical care” to pretrial detainees. Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1574. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated only when jail conditions deprive a detainee of “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1565 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). However, the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349, and “does not require that prisoners be provided any and every amenity which some person may think is needed to avoid mental, physical, and emotional deterioration.” Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1977).
Plaintiff's assertions do not plausibly state a conditions of confinement claim. Plaintiff alleges he was placed in disciplinary isolation for 60 days. However, Plaintiff does not state he was deprived of any necessities while he was in isolation or placed on any restrictions. Plaintiff does not claim he was deprived of food or water or was harmed in any way while confined in isolation. Disciplinary isolation by itself is not enough to make a valid conditions of confinement claim. See Quintanilla v. Bryson, 730 Fed.Appx. 738, 746 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Under current precedent, ‘administrative segregation and solitary confinement do not, in and of themselves, constitute cruel and unusual punishment.'”) (quoting Shelley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420, 1428-29 (11th Cir. 1987)); see also Gholston v. Humphrey, No. 5:12-CV-97, 2014 WL 4976248, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 3, 2014) (dismissing prisoner's claims that his transfer to SMU with more restrictive conditions without a “legitimate penological justification” amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation); Anthony v. Brown, No. CV 113-058, 2013 WL 3778360, at *2 (S.D. Ga. July 17, 2013) (dismissing on frivolity review Eighth Amendment claims based on conditions of confinement in crisis stabilization unit for over four months). This claim does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. Accordingly, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's condition of confinement claim.
V. Plaintiff's Claims Against Private Citizens
Plaintiff makes several allegations against Defendants Sheryl Taylor, Mary Ellen Taylor (also known as Mary Ellen Carter), and Frank Taylor. These Defendants are private citizens. “Private citizens cannot be sued under § 1983 for non[-]state-related activities unless they conspired with state officers.” Carter v. Ingalls, 576 F.Supp. 834, 836 (S.D. Ga. 1983). Plaintiff alleges Defendants Sheryl and Mary Ellen Taylor conspired with Judge Morgan and public defenders to deprive him of his personal property and use the temporary protective order against him. Doc. 13 at 21-22. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Sheryl Taylor told him she had a meeting with a superior court judge, and he would remove Plaintiff from Defendant Sheryl Taylor's house. Id. at 21. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Sheryl Taylor “conspired with Chief Superior Court Judge Stephen Morgan[ ] and Mary Ellen Taylor,” Mary Ellen Taylor made false statements under oath on a petition for temporary protective order, and Judge Morgan signed the order. Id. at 22. Although Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy, Plaintiff merely describes a hearing for a temporary protective order. Plaintiff has not made any allegations of a conspiracy beyond broad and vague assertions. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim, and I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Sheryl Taylor, Mary Ellen Taylor (also known as Mary Ellen Carter), and Frank Taylor.
VI. Plaintiff's Claims Against Defendants Lush, Higgins, Rourke, and Walden
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held a district court properly dismisses a defendant where a plaintiff fails to state any allegations that associate the defendant with a legal wrong. Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2008) (“While we do not require technical niceties in pleading, we must demand that the complaint state with some minimal particularity how overt acts of the defendant caused a legal wrong.”). Plaintiff has not made any allegations against Defendants Lush, Higgins, and Rourke. Plaintiff has failed to state any allegations associating Defendants Lush, Higgins, and Rourke with a legal wrong. For Defendant Walden, Plaintiff only alleges she did not serve Plaintiff with a summons before his hearing before Judge Lane. Doc. 13 at 13. This is not a legal wrong. For these reasons, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Lush, Higgins, Rourke, and Walden.
VII. Plaintiff's Claims Against Glynn County Police Department
Plaintiff names Glynn County Detention Center as a Defendant. Doc. 13. In order to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “a person acting under color of state law” committed the act or omission in dispute. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). While local governments qualify as “persons” under § 1983, penal institutions, stage agencies, and police departments are generally not considered legal entities subject to suit. See Nichols v. Ala. State Bar, 815 F.3d 726, 731(11th Cir. 2016) (noting the Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 suits against state agencies) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986)); Williams v. Chatham Cnty. Sheriff's Complex, Case No. 4:07-cv-68, 2007 WL 2345243 (S.D. Ga. August 14, 2007) (“The county jail, however, has no independent legal identity and therefore is not an entity that is subject to suit under Section 1983.”).
Consequently, Glynn County Police Department is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. Hale, 50 F.3d at 1582. For this reason, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS all claims against Glynn County Police Department.
VIII. Plaintiff's Claims Against Glynn County
Plaintiff names Glynn County as a Defendant. Doc. 13. “A municipality may not be held liable under section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior.” Snow ex rel. Snow v. City of Citronelle, Ala., 420 F.3d 1262, 1270-1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)). Therefore, even if the individual Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, the county is not necessarily liable. To impose § 1983 liability on a municipal entity, Plaintiff must show: “(1) that [his] constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” Bankshot v. Billiards, Inc. v. City of Ocala, 634 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Plaintiff makes no plausible claim against Defendant Glynn County. Plaintiff makes no allegations against Glynn County aside from listing it as a Defendant. Plaintiff has not alleged any constitutional violation or a policy or custom which caused a constitutional violation. See Pickett v. Bryan County, No. CV406-251, 2007 WL 1238530 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 2007) (“While a city or county is a legal entity amenable to a § 1983 lawsuit, neither entity may be liable under § 1983 absent a showing that a custom, pattern, or practice of the city or county resulted in the deprivation of a plaintiff's constitutional rights.”). Therefore, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS all claims against Glynn County.
IX. Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Show Cause for Temporary Protective Order
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause for Temporary Protective Order, Temporary Restraining Order, and Preliminary Injunction. Doc. 12. A movant bears the burden of demonstrating four necessary elements for temporary restraining or preliminary injunctive relief: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the relief is necessary to prevent irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would cause the other litigant; and (4) the relief would not be averse to the public interest. Chavez v. Fla. SP Warden, 742 F.3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2014); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff has not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits at this point in the litigation. Plaintiff generally states Defendant Sheryl Taylor threatened Plaintiff and called law enforcement in the past year without providing any further details. Doc. 12 at 1. Thus, Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of showing he is entitled to temporary restraining or preliminary injunctive relief. I, therefore, RECOMMEND the Court DENY Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Show Cause for Temporary Protective Order, Temporary Restraining Order, and Preliminary Injunction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety. Because I have recommended dismissal of all of Plaintiff's claims, I RECOMMEND the Court DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal. Additionally, I RECOMMEND the Court DENY Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Show Cause for Temporary Protective Order, Temporary Restraining Order, and Preliminary Injunction. Doc. 12.
Additionally, Plaintiff has filed Motions for default judgment and summary judgment. Docs. 16, 17. Plaintiff filed these Motions before the Court completed its frivolity screening. Since I am recommending the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety, I RECOMMEND the Court DENY as moot Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and Motion for Summary Judgment.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation shall be filed within 14 days of today's date. Objections shall be specific and in writing. Any objection that the Magistrate Judge failed to address a contention raised in the Complaint must be included. Failure to file timely, written objections will bar any later challenge or review of the Magistrate Judge's factual findings and legal conclusions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Harrigan v. Metro Dade Police Dep't Station #4, 977 F.3d 1185, 1192-93 (11th Cir. 2020). To be clear, a party waives all rights to challenge the Magistrate Judge's factual findings and legal conclusions on appeal by failing to file timely, written objections. Harrigan, 977 F.3d at 1192-93; 11th Cir. R. 3-1. A copy of the objections must be served upon all other parties to the action.
Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge.
SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED.