Opinion
CASE NO. 687 CRD-7-88-1
MARCH 2, 1989
The claimant was represented by Marc Jerome Glass, Esq., Glass, Lebovitz Dubois.
The respondents were represented by Thomas H. Cotter, Esq., and Thomas G. Cotter, Esq., of Cotter, Cotter Sohon, P.C.
This Petition for Review from the January 14, 1988 Order Granting Motion to Preclude of the Commissioner for the Seventh District was heard August 19, 1988 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Andrew Denuzze and A. Thomas White, Jr.
OPINION
Respondents seek to reverse the Seventh District's January 14, 1988 Order granting claimant's Motion to Preclude. They argue: (1) claimant's July 28, 1987 notice of claim did not sufficiently comply with Sec. 31-294, C.G.S. to trigger the preclusive effects of Sec. 31-297 (b), C.G.S.; (2) respondents' August 10th disclaimer filed by regular mail in the District satisfied Sec. 31-297 (b)
One of Respondents' Reasons of Appeal alleged Sec. 31-297 (b) was unconstitutional. See, DeLeon v. Jacobs Bros., 38 Conn. Sup. 331 (1981) appeal dismissed 456 U.S. 952 (1982); Faraci v Connecticut Light and Power Co., 5 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 160 508 CRD-2-86 (1988); Repasi v. Jenkins Bros., 4 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 82, 227 CRD-4-83 (1987) appeal dismissed on other grounds, 16 Conn. App. 121 (1988).
The claimant widow's July 28th notice of claim is set down below. Sec. 31-294 prescribes the content of such notices. It states:
In pertinent part said letter provided: "This letter is to notify you that I making a claim for Workers' Compensation Benefits as a result of the death of my husband, Robert C. Ebrech, 53 Buckingham Road, Yonkers, New York, 10701, from cardiac arrest which occurred on June 15, 1987 while in the course of his employment with you in Stamford, Connecticut without prior symptoms."
Such notice may be given to the employer or any commissioner and shall state, in simple language, the date and place of the accident and the nature of the injury resulting therefrom, or the date of the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease and the nature of such disease, as the case may be, and the name and address of the employee and of the person in whose interest compensation is claimed.
Respondents' Motion to Correct would require the notice to state that the injury arose out of the employment. They would also require language amounting to a medical diagnosis of the claimed compensable condition. But the statute itself imposes no such requirements. As we said in Pagan v. Paparazzo Son, et. al, 653 CRD-5-87, 15 CLT 6, p. 20 (9/30/88), Sec. 32-294 only requires the statement of claim and the nature of the injury in "simple language." It does not demand a medical diagnosis The "simple language" formula contrasts with Sec. 31-297b which obligates the employer to enumerate "the specific grounds on which the right to compensation is contested." We, therefore, agree with the Seventh District that claimant filed a proper Sec. 31-294 notice.
With respect to the second issue raised by respondents, they forwarded their Form 43 disclaimer by certified mail to the claimant's address and it was received August 10 1987 Respondents argue that filing the disclaimer via ordinary mail to the Commissioner substantially complied with Sec. 31-297b. In Skorupski v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 2 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 133, 338 CRD-3-84 (1985) we held that the filing must be in accordance with Sec. 31-321 C.G.S., "service personally or by registered or certified mail addressed to the person upon whom it is to be served." Sec. 31-297 (b) mandates that the notice of contest be filed with the Commissioner and a copy be sent to the employee; Cf. Timothy v. Upjohn, 2 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 150 CRD-3-82 (1983) dismissed on other grounds, 3 Conn. App. 162 (1984). Ricci v. Peabody N.E., Inc., 738 CRD-3-88-6 (October 26, 1988). As the respondents' disclaimer to the Commissioner did not meet the technical requirements of Sec. 31-321, it did not comply with Sec. 31-297b, and the trial Commissioner was correct in granting claimant's Motion to Preclude.
We also note parenthetically that the disclaimer sent to the claimant was addressed to the decedent c/o the claimant. The document, therefore, technically was not addressed to the claimant widow.
For the reasons cited herein, we affirm the Order of the trial Commissioner.
Commissioners Andrew Denuzze and A. Thomas White, Jr. concur.