Opinion
1:01CV446
June 3, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
This matter is now before the court on Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. For the reasons discussed below, the court will award Defendants attorney fees in the amount of $5,000 and costs in the amount of $3,402.55.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Ebenezer and Jean Eberhart, both black, brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants Buddy Gettys, Eric Stillwell, Larry E. Smith, and the Town of Spencer violated their Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights by racially discriminating against them under color of state law. Defendants Gettys (Spencer's mayor), Stillwell (a Spencer police officer), and Smith (Spencer's land management director) were sued in both their individual and representative capacities. Plaintiffs alleged that the section 1983 violations stemmed from selective enforcement of (1) town noise ordinances in relation to a dance club operated by Mr. Eberhart, and (2) town ordinances in relation to rental properties owned by the Eberharts.
Defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which was granted as to Defendants Stillwell and Smith in their individual capacities. The court found that Stillwell and Smith should be accorded qualified immunity because Plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding a racially discriminatory motive for those Defendants. Eberhart v. Gettys, 215 F. Supp.2d 666, 680 (M.D.N.C. 2002).
The remaining claims went to trial before this court. At the conclusion of Plaintiffs' evidence, the court granted Defendants' motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 to dismiss the claims against Stillwell and Smith in their representative capacities, finding no support for the claim that they acted in a discriminatory way toward Plaintiffs. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the court granted Defendants' Rule 50 motion as to all claims by Plaintiff Jean Eberhart and all claims relating to the Eberharts' rental properties. The court found no support for Mrs. Eberhart's claims, a failure of proof regarding selective enforcement of laws and ordinances relating to the rental properties, and no evidence of damages relating to the rental properties. Although the remaining claims against Gettys and the Town of Spencer regarding the enforcement of town noise ordinances were not strong, these were matters where reasonable minds might draw different conclusions based on the facts in evidence, and were therefore allowed to go to the jury. The jury returned verdicts for Defendants on all remaining counts, and the court entered judgment accordingly.
Defendants timely presented their Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs appealed the judgment to the Fourth Circuit and this court stayed consideration of Defendants' motion pending appeal. Plaintiffs abandoned their appeal early in the proceedings and it is now proper for the court to consider Defendants' fee and cost motion.
II. DISCUSSION
Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the court in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action may, in its discretion, allow attorney fees to the prevailing party. While a prevailing civil rights plaintiff "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust,"Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (citations omitted), a prevailing defendant should only be awarded a fee when a court finds "`that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.'" DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 510 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (per curiam) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978)) (applying Christiansburg standard to cases arising under sections 1983 and 1988)). The nearly routine award of attorney fees to prevailing plaintiffs is intended to facilitate ready access to the courts for civil rights claimants. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429.
Applying the same standard to attorney fee awards made to prevailing defendants would increase the plaintiff's risk in litigation, thereby undermining the clear congressional intent to promote vigorous enforcement of civil rights laws. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422. The court must therefore be especially mindful of "`the potential chilling effect fee awards may have on plaintiffs.'" Banks v. Jefferson-Smurfit, 2002 WL 31370396 at *3 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 17, 2002) (quoting Arnold v. Burger King Corp., 719 F.2d 63, 65 (4th Cir. 1983)). To avoid this chilling effect on civil rights plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has provided guidance regarding the application of the Christiansburg "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation" standard:
In applying these criteria, it is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No matter how honest one's belief that he has been the victim of discrimination, no matter how meritorious one's claim may appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable. Decisive facts may not emerge until discovery or trial. The law may change or clarify in the midst of litigation. Even when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit.Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22.
With those high standards in mind, the court must ensure that civil rights plaintiffs bring their claims on a reasonable basis, and may exercise its discretion to tax attorney fees under 1988 against section 1983 plaintiffs whose claims are "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." DeBauche, 191 F.3d at 510 (citations omitted). This is not inconsistent with the congressional intent undergirding civil rights legislation, for "`[w]hen a court imposes fees on a plaintiff who has pressed a "frivolous" claim, it chills nothing that is worth encouraging.'" Id. at 511 (quotingHutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993)).
In this case, the court concludes after a thorough review of the record and after conducting a jury trial lasting six days, that some but not all of Plaintiffs' claims were frivolous, unreasonable, and/or without foundation. Mr. Eberhart's claims against Gettys and the Town of Spencer alleging racially discriminatory selective enforcement of the noise ordinance at his dance club were sufficiently grounded in law and fact to escape the effect of section 1988. However, the claims against Stillwell and Smith in their individual and representative capacities, the claims by Mrs. Eberhart, and particularly the claims relating to the rental properties, were not sufficiently supported by law and fact for Plaintiffs to avoid taxation of attorney fees under section 1988.
It should be noted that many cases evaluating the award of attorney fees to civil rights defendants deal with the special case of pro se plaintiffs, who are held to more lenient standards when evaluating the availability of fees to defendants. See, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15. These concerns are, however, not present here, as Plaintiffs were represented by two qualified and experienced members of the Middle District bar.
The court cannot conclude that any of Plaintiffs' claims were brought in bad faith, however, a showing of bad faith is not necessary for an award of 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Calculating the amount of attorney fees due Defendants is a difficult matter because they will be allowed for some but not all of Plaintiffs' claims. Defendants have furnished the court with an Affidavit in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs which documents the total amount of defense attorney fees, through the conclusion of trial, as $54,826. The court finds that these fees are reasonable and appropriate in all respects. Defendants must bear their own attorney fees for litigating Mr. Eberhart's noise ordinance claims against Gettys and the town, and much of the total $54,826 fee would have been incurred to defend those claims even had the other claims not been brought. The defense of the claims against Stillwell and Smith, the claims by Mrs. Eberhart, and the claims regarding the rental properties was not, however, without added expense. Defending those claims necessarily required additional legal research, discovery, briefing, trial preparation, and trial time.
In order to be eligible for an attorney fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a party must be the "prevailing party." In this case, Defendants are clearly the prevailing party under any reasonable definition of that term.
The total fees were calculated as follows: 339.5 hours at $100 per hour, 139.4 hours at $115 per hour, and 96.9 hours at $50 per hour.
Because the amount of those additional expenses cannot be determined with precision, the court will, in its discretion, err on the side of Plaintiffs and conservatively estimate that, at minimum, Defendants incurred $5,000 of attorney fees in defending the claims against Stillwell and Smith, the claims by Mrs. Eberhart, and the claims regarding the rental properties. This amount represents less that 10% of Defendants' total attorney fees, and the court has no doubt that the actual amount spent defending against Plaintiffs' frivolous, unreasonable and/or unfounded claims was even greater. The court therefore finds that Defendants incurred at least $5,000 in attorney fees compensable under section 1988.
Finally, before awarding attorney fees to a civil rights defendant, the court should consider any evidence that such an award will result in financial hardship or peril to the plaintiff. See DeBauche, 191 F.3d at 511. The court has carefully examined Plaintiffs' submissions on the pending motion and finds no allegation that any such financial hardship or peril will result, and, finding none, will infer that Plaintiffs will suffer no such effects if Defendants are awarded attorney fees.
The court will therefore exercise its discretion to order Plaintiffs to compensate Defendants for attorney fees in the amount of $5,000.
Defendants also seek an award of costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) ("costs other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party") and Local Rule of Civil Practice 54.1. The court has reviewed the Bill of Costs submitted by Defendants, together with its accompanying supporting affidavit, and finds that the $3,402.55 in costs prayed for are detailed, reasonable, appropriate, and necessary in both amount and kind. An examination of Plaintiffs' submissions to the court shows that Plaintiffs do not raise specific objections to the award of costs to Defendants. The court will therefore tax Defendants' costs in the amount of $3,402.55 upon Plaintiffs.
In addition, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, Defendants served an offer of judgment in the amount of $42,500 on Plaintiffs on November 2, 2001. Because Plaintiffs did not accept that offer and failed to obtain a judgment more favorable than the offer, Plaintiffs are liable under Rule 68 for costs incurred by Defendants after the offer was made.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs [71] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as detailed below;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall have and recover attorney fees in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall have and recover costs in the sum of Three Thousand Four Hundred Two and 55/100's Dollars ($3,402.55)