Opinion
1:00CV00814
October 17, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Elder Lewis Banks's Motion for Reconsideration of Case Number 1:00CV00144 and Defendant Jefferson Smurfit's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees. For the reasons set forth herein, both motions will be denied.
Plaintiff also filed a "Motion to Dismiss the Defendant's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees, and Objects to the Expenses and Cost by the Defendant, to be Disallowed." Because of the court's action on Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees, Plaintiff's motion will be dismissed.
The facts of this employment dispute are set forth in the court's opinion granting summary judgment to Defendant Jefferson Smurfit. Plaintiff's motion pertains to this court's resolution of a previous suit, Case Number 1:00CV00144, which arose from the same facts and preceded the present case. In that earlier action, the court observed that in his complaint, Plaintiff failed to allege three facts necessary for the court to assert subject matter jurisdiction: (1) that Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, (2) that he filed suit within 90 days of receiving that letter, and (3) that he submitted all of his claims to the EEOC. Accordingly, the court dismissed Plaintiff's claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In addition, the court instructed Plaintiff to attach the EEOC charge and right-to-sue letter to any subsequent complaint concerning the incident.
Plaintiff appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the judgment.
Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration of this dismissal pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff states: "[O]n March the 9, 2000, a document was filed by the Plaintiff and low and behold the Plaintiff did in fact submit in his complaint a RIGHT TO SUE LETTER, that the court . . . ruled that the Plaintiff didn't do." (Pl.'s Mot. Recons. Supporting Br. at 2.) For this reason, "Plaintiff would like for the Middle District to correct this mistake" and reverse the dismissal without prejudice. (Id.) Plaintiff also seeks a refund of the $150 fee he paid to file the second complaint.
Rule 60 provides a mechanism to correct judicial orders for reasons such as clerical errors, mistake, excusable neglect, fraud, newly discovered evidence, or "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
In Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff correctly states that a copy of the EEOC charge and right-to-sue letter were submitted as attachments to a document in the initial case. They were not, however, attached to the complaint. Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction contended that Plaintiff failed to allege the necessary procedural prerequisites to file a Title VII claim. When a complaint "simply fails to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based," the plaintiff "is afforded the same procedural protection as he would receive under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration." Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982) (distinguishing the pertinent variety of Rule 12(b)(1) challenge from a defendant's assertion "that the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint were not true"). Under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, a motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint, and the liberal construction appropriately applied to the pleadings of pro se litigants does not shift the court's attention away from the complaint. Therefore, the court's focus on the complaint was proper.
Plaintiff attached these documents to his "Brief Response to Support the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss the Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Complaint."
The court takes seriously its duty to be "`especially solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs'" and appreciates that this obligation "`must be heightened when a civil rights plaintiff appears pro se.'" Marshburn v. Postmaster General, 678 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (D. Md. 1988) (quoting Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978)). Such leniency does not, however, authorize the court to overlook fundamental jurisdictional deficiencies in a complaint.
Having reconsidered its decision, the court remains convinced that Plaintiff's initial complaint failed to satisfy the jurisdictional elements of a cause of action under Title VII. It has long been established that plaintiffs must adhere to administrative complaint resolution procedures before filing an employment discrimination action in federal court. Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1967 (1976); Young v. National Ctr. for Health Servs. Research, 828 F.2d 235, 237 (4th Cir. 1987). The court could not ascertain from Plaintiff's initial complaint whether such administrative requirements had been satisfied. Faced with this deficiency, the court dismissed Plaintiff's claims without prejudice, permitting Plaintiff to file a valid complaint. Because this result lacked preclusive effect, Plaintiff could — and later did — state sufficient claims for relief based on the same set of facts. In addition, the court's instruction that Plaintiff attach the EEOC charge and right-to-sue letter to any new complaint helped inoculate Plaintiff against jurisdictional challenges in the ensuing suit. Because dismissal of Plaintiff's original suit without prejudice was appropriate, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration will be denied.
Defendant moves for attorney's fees as the prevailing party in a Title VII action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k). A prevailing Title VII defendant may receive attorney's fees if the court finds that the plaintiff's claim "was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so."Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 701 (1978). The Court provided guidance to district courts charged with exercising discretion over fee awards:
In applying these criteria, it is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No matter how honest one's belief that he has been the victim of discrimination, no matter how meritorious one's claim may appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable. . . Even when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit.Id. 434 U.S. at 422-23, 98 S.Ct. at 700-01. Analyzing this cautionary language, the Fourth Circuit similarly warned of "the potential chilling effect fee awards may have on plaintiffs." Arnold v. Burger King Corp., 719 F.2d 63, 65 (4th Cir. 1983).
In light of these considerations, the court in its discretion does not find Plaintiff's claims frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. For that reason, awarding attorney's fees to Defendant Jefferson Smurfit would be inappropriate.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees [73] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that with regard to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Case Number 1:00CV00144 [77], the court's previous holding will remain in full effect.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss the Defendant's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees [75] is DISMISSED.