Opinion
Civil No. 01-854-AS
January 30, 2002
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Presently before the court is the motion of defendants Orange County and Tony Rackaukas, Orange County District Attorney (the "Orange County Defendants") to dismiss or, alternatively, transfer this action to California. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the Orange County Defendants and recommends granting the Orange County Defendants motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Richard Carl Eaton ("Plaintiff") alleges in his complaint that by order dated October 15, 1978, the State of California required Plaintiff to pay $200.00 per month in child support (the "California Order"). In October 1979, defendant Rackauckas, filed a petition in the Superior Court of California for the purpose of modifying the California Order. The action was referred by the California court to the District Court of Colorado, Plaintiff's residence at that time, for determination. On November 21, 1979, an Order issued by the Colorado court reducing Plaintiff's child support obligation to $75.00 per month was certified to and filed in the records of the California court (the "Colorado Order"). The Orange County Defendants have refused to acknowledge the Colorado Order and have continued to engage in actions to enforce to the California Order, including conviction of Plaintiff for the misdemeanor of failure to provide support, interception of Plaintiff's income tax refunds, and reporting of Plaintiff's delinquency to creditors. Additionally, erroneous information provided by the State of California to the United States Secretary of State has prevented Plaintiff from obtaining a passport, preventing him from working at his occupation as an international helicopter pilot. Plaintiff this action alleging a violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking actual damages in the amount of $5,000,000, as well as consequential damages and general damages in amounts to be determined at trial.
Plaintiff has also named Gray Davis, Governor of the State of California, and Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of the State of California, as defendants in this action. Mr. Davis and Mr. Lockyer have not answered Plaintiff's complaint and are not parties to this motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Orange County Defendants move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). When a court limits its jurisdictional decision to pleadings and affidavits and does not conduct an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff is required merely to establish a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over the defendant to defeat a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). For the purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), the allegations of the complaint must be taken as true. Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, to avoid a defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Corporate Investment Business Brokers v. Melcher, 824 F.2d 786, 787 (9th Cir. 1987). In a diversity action, the availability of personal jurisdiction in this court over a nonresident defendant depends upon two considerations: (1) whether an Oregon statute or rule confers personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, and (2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction thereby conferred accords with federal principles of due process. Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Funds, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986). Subsections A through K of O.R.C.P. 4 are patterned after facts which the United States Supreme Court has held are adequate bases for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Therefore, "if a case falls within one of them, there is no need to litigate more involved issues of due process." State ex rel Hydraulic Servocontrols Corp. v. Dale, 294 Or. 381, 384 (1982). Alternatively, O.R.C.P. 4L extends personal jurisdiction to the outer limits of the Constitution's due process clause. Id.
Due process requires that a defendant have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The fundamental issue is whether a "defendant's conduct and connection with the forum are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."
Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1397 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297). There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1396. The test of general jurisdiction is whether the defendant has "substantial" or "continuous and systematic" contacts with the forum state. "Substantial" is intended to be a fairly high standard. Brand v. Menlove Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 1986). If this standard is met, the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant even if the cause of action is unrelated to those contacts with the forum. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n. 9 (1984); Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1396.
If general jurisdiction is lacking, the court determines whether the forum state may exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendant. The inquiry involves the relationship among the forum, the defendant, and the litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 204, [ 433 U.S. 186], (1977). Specific jurisdiction involves a three-part test:
1. The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.
2. The claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities.
3. Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.
Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1397. In response to Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985), the Ninth Circuit indicated that this three-part test is to be applied flexibly. See Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1397; Brand, 796 F.2d at 1074. For example, a strong showing of reasonableness lessens the required showing of minimum contacts. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
In the Ninth Circuit, seven factors are examined to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable:
existence of an alternative forum; burden on the defendant; convenience and effectiveness of relief for the plaintiff; most efficient judicial resolution of the dispute; conflict with sovereignty of the defendant's state; forum state's interest in the suit.
Brand, 796 F.2d at 1075. See also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. Furthermore, "there is a presumption of reasonableness upon a showing that the defendant purposefully directed his activities at forum residents which the defendant bears the burden of overcoming by presenting a compelling case that jurisdiction would be unreasonable." Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1397 (emphasis in original) (citing Burger King).
A defendant "purposefully avails" himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum if he purposefully directs his activities at residents of the forum. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 462. If litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities, the defendant was on fair warning that his conduct might subject him to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. Id. The purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or as a result of the "unilateral activity of another party or a third person." Id. at 475 (citations omitted). A sole contact may be sufficient if it creates a substantial connection with the forum, and physical entrance into the forum is not required. Id. at 476. The Supreme Court has recognized that "it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence." Id. Therefore, jurisdiction may be proper over a defendant "whose only `contact' with the forum state is the `purposeful direction' of a foreign act having effect in the forum state." Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1397 (emphasis in original) (citing to Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)).
Here, Plaintiff appears to concedes that the Orange County Defendants' activities in the State of Oregon are insufficient to support general jurisdiction. However, Plaintiff asserts that this court has specific jurisdiction over the Orange County Defendants in this action. In support of this assertion, Plaintiff points out that the defendants registered the California Order with the State of Oregon after Plaintiff moved to this State and that defendants have intercepted Plaintiff's tax refunds, which consist of money earned in the State of Oregon.
The evidence before the court indicates that the sole contact defendants had with the State of Oregon was to forward the California Order for registration, which, in turn, apparently placed a lien on Plaintiff's tax refunds. This contact was initiated only after Plaintiff elected to make the State of Oregon his residence. All previous interactions between the Orange County Defendants and Plaintiff, with the exception of the Colorado Order, have occurred in the State of California.
It is unclear from the record whether the Orange County Defendants were involved in registering the California Order in the State of Oregon or intercepting Plaintiff's Oregon tax refund. For the purposes of this motion, the court will assume that all defendants participated in these acts.
There is no indication that the tax refunds intercepted were state or federal refunds.
The Ninth Circuit is somewhat unique in that it applies a less strenuous showing of purposeful availment in tort cases than that required in contract cases. In Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit held that Section 1983 claims are akin to tort claims and are subject to the less strenuous tort standard. "[T]he three elements of purposeful availment in tort cases are: (1) intentional action; (2) aimed at the forum state; and (3) causing harm that the defendant should have anticipated would be suffered in the forum state. * * * A lack of physical contact with the forum does not preclude exercising jurisdiction." Id. (citing Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB., 11 F.3d 1482, 1485-86 (9th Cir. 1991). The record shows that the defendants forwarded the California Order to the State of Oregon. It is reasonable to assume that the Orange County Defendants knew that such action might cause the State of Oregon to attempt enforcement proceedings or otherwise cause harm to Plaintiff in the State of Oregon. Plaintiff has arguably met his burden of demonstrating that the Orange County Defendants purposefully availed itself of Oregon law.
The second element is that the claims must arise out of the forum-related activities. Claims arise out of a defendant's forum-related activities if plaintiff would not have a cause of action "but for" defendant's contacts with the forum. Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 474. The "but for" test should not be narrowly applied — the requirement should confirm that there is a nexus between the cause of action and defendant's contact with the forum. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). Plaintiff is unable to meet this test. Plaintiff's complaint is that defendants have refused to recognize the decrease in his child support obligation evidenced by the Colorado Order. This claim exists regardless of where Plaintiff lives, which is evidenced by the fact that much of the conduct complained of occurred before Plaintiff moved to the State of Oregon. The fact that defendants registered the California Order with the State of Oregon in August 17, 2000, does not add anything to Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff's claims would be the same no matter where Plaintiff lived. Plaintiff has failed to establish that "but for" defendants' registration of the California Order in the State of Oregon he would not have his Section 1983 claims. The court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the Orange County Defendants.
CONCLUSION
The Orange County Defendants' motion (3) to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction should be GRANTED. The Orange County Defendants' alternative motions to dismiss and transfer should be DENIED as moot.