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Eakle v. State

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas
Nov 8, 2017
No. 04-16-00513-CR (Tex. App. Nov. 8, 2017)

Opinion

No. 04-16-00513-CR

11-08-2017

William B. EAKLE, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee


MEMORANDUM OPINION

From the 227th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2015CR10789
Honorable Kevin M. O'Connell, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice AFFIRMED

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, appellant, William Eakle, pled nolo contendere to tampering with evidence-intent to impair. He received a sentence of three years' confinement, probated for three years, and a $1,500 fine. On appeal, appellant asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Ryan Gabriel, a Bexar County Sheriff's Department patrol officer, testified he stopped appellant because appellant was driving fifty-five miles per hour in a posted forty-five mile per hour zone. Appellant was alone in the car. Officer Gabriel said appellant came to a complete stop and put up his hands. Appellant appeared nervous, was sweating, and had shaky hands. Officer Gabriel thought it was unusual that appellant held up his hands, and appellant explained he did so because he did not want Officer Gabriel to shoot him.

Officer Gabriel asked for appellant's identification and told appellant to place his hands on the steering wheel, while he walked back to his patrol car to run a check on appellant's identification. The criminal history check revealed appellant had a valid driver's license and no outstanding warrants, but that he had "a narcotics past." At some point after he finished the criminal check, Officer Gabriel noticed appellant "making furtive movements" and moving around, and that he had removed his hands from the steering wheel. Because appellant appeared to be reaching for something in his car, Officer Gabriel became concerned for his own safety. Officer Gabriel walked back to appellant's car and asked appellant to step outside his vehicle. When appellant stepped outside his vehicle, Officer Gabriel patted him down and found no weapons. However, when asked if he had any illegal narcotics or weapons inside the car, appellant told Gabriel he had a crack pipe inside a black bag. As appellant spoke, the officer noticed appellant moving his mouth as if chewing gum. Officer Gabriel asked appellant to open his mouth, and he saw a blue bag inside appellant's mouth. When appellant tried to swallow the bag, Gabriel grabbed him by the neck to prevent him from swallowing the bag. Officer Gabriel forced appellant to the ground where appellant spit out the bag. The bag was a small Ziploc, which Officer Gabriel believed contained drugs. Officer Gabriel then arrested appellant. Approximately eight minutes elapsed from the initial stop to when Officer Gabriel took appellant into custody. No other police officers were present.

The record does not explain this so-called "past."

The trial court denied the motion to suppress and this appeal ensued.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court's decision to deny a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. Ex Parte Moore, 395 S.W.3d 153, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Shepherd v. State, 273 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). A trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed under a bifurcated standard of review. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). First, we afford almost complete deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, "especially if those are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor." Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We afford the same deference with respect to the trial court's rulings on application of the law to questions of fact and to mixed questions of law and fact, if resolution of those questions depends on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. Second, we conduct a de novo review of mixed questions of law and fact that do not hinge on credibility or demeanor determinations. Id. When, as here, the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports those findings. State v. Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d 544, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

ANALYSIS

In three issues, appellant asserts there was no (1) reasonable suspicion to justify his further detention, (2) probable cause to arrest him for possession of drug paraphernalia, and (3) probable cause to search his mouth.

A. Further Detention

Appellant does not contest he was lawfully detained for speeding. Nor does appellant appear to challenge Officer Gabriel's authority to detain him while the officer ran a criminal check on appellant's driver's license. Instead, appellant asserts Officer Gabriel's authority to detain him ended once the officer determined appellant's driver's license was valid and appellant had no outstanding warrants.

A seizure justified only by a traffic violation becomes unlawful if prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to conduct the traffic stop. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015). Thus, continuing a brief investigatory detention beyond the time necessary to conduct a traffic stop requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity apart from the traffic violation. See id. at 1616; see also Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ("Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless detention of the person that amounts to less than a full-blown custodial arrest must be justified by a reasonable suspicion.").

A police officer has reasonable suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914. This is an objective standard that disregards the arresting officer's actual subjective intent, and instead, looks to whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the detention. Id. This standard also "looks to the totality of the circumstances; those circumstances may all seem innocent enough in isolation, but if they combine to reasonably suggest the imminence of criminal conduct, an investigative detention is justified." Id.; Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (same). "The relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent or criminal, but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular non-criminal acts." Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). "A determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." Leming v. State, 493 S.W.3d 552, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Rather, "the cumulative information known to [the officer] at the time of the stop is to be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists." Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914 (citation omitted).

When Officer Gabriel initially stopped appellant, appellant appeared nervous, was sweating, had shaky hands, and he immediately held up his hands because he did not want Officer Gabriel to shoot him. Officer Gabriel allowed appellant to remain in his car with his hands on the steering wheel while Gabriel ran a criminal background check from his patrol car. Gabriel stated the criminal history check had already come back before he asked appellant to step out of his car. However, the officer also stated that while he was in his patrol car running the check he noticed appellant remove his hands from the steering wheel, he saw appellant make "furtive movements," and he saw appellant "moving around" and reaching for something. Because he was concerned for his own safety, Officer Gabriel walked back to appellant's car, asked appellant to step out of his car, and he conducted a weapons pat-down.

We conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, during the course of the initial stop, Officer Gabriel developed separate reasonable suspicion that appellant was engaged in or soon would engage in criminal activity, justifying his continued detention and questioning after the purpose of the initial stop was complete.

B. Probable Cause to Arrest

Appellant asserts because "[t]here is no indication in the record that a crack pipe was found," Officer Gabriel could not have arrested him for this offense. Appellant cites to section (a) of Article 14.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that "[a] peace officer or any other person, may, without a warrant, arrest an offender when the offense is committed in his presence or within his view, if the offense is one classed as a felony or as an offense against the public peace." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 14.01(a) (West 2015); however, appellant was not arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia. He was indicted for attempting to destroy evidence knowing that an investigation was in progress, and he pled nolo contendere to tampering with evidence-intent to impair. Appellant does not explain how his argument under this issue relates to his motion to suppress; therefore, it is waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring brief to contain a clear and concise argument for contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and the record); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (stating that an inadequately briefed issue presents nothing for review and holding the issue inadequately briefed because the appellant provided neither argument nor citation to authority to support the contention).

C. Probable Cause to Search Appellant's Mouth

Appellant argues that when Officer Gabriel saw the blue bag inside appellant's mouth, the officer had no facts on which to conclude that a specific offense was being committed or that the bag contained anything illegal. Therefore, appellant concludes, Officer Gabriel lacked probable cause to search his mouth.

A warrantless search under exigent circumstances is reasonable only if the officer has both (1) probable cause, and (2) an exigency that requires an immediate search. Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). There are three categories of exigent circumstances that may, coupled with probable cause, justify a warrantless search. Id. Those categories of exigent circumstances include: (1) providing aid or assistance to persons believed to be in need of assistance, (2) protecting police officers from persons believed to be armed and dangerous, and (3) preventing the destruction of evidence. Id. Here, only the third category of exigent circumstances is applicable, i.e., preventing the destruction of evidence.

Officer Gabriel knew appellant had "a narcotics past." Gabriel saw appellant reaching for something inside his car, after Gabriel told appellant to keep his hands on the steering wheel. Appellant told Officer Gabriel there was a crack pipe in a black bag inside the car. As appellant spoke, Officer Gabriel noticed appellant moving his mouth as if he was chewing gum. Gabriel asked appellant to open his mouth, and he saw a blue bag inside appellant's mouth. Appellant tried to swallow the bag. Given the sum total of this information, and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from this information, Officer Gabriel had probable cause to believe appellant was in the process of destroying evidence and was actively concealing evidence from him. Officer Gabriel, therefore, had probable cause to search appellant, and exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search of him.

CONCLUSION

We overrule appellant's issues on appeal and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Do not publish


Summaries of

Eakle v. State

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas
Nov 8, 2017
No. 04-16-00513-CR (Tex. App. Nov. 8, 2017)
Case details for

Eakle v. State

Case Details

Full title:William B. EAKLE, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee

Court:Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas

Date published: Nov 8, 2017

Citations

No. 04-16-00513-CR (Tex. App. Nov. 8, 2017)